Norman Malcolm

Wittgenstein on Language and Rules

A paradoxical situation exists in the study of Wittgenstein. There is a sharp disagreement in the interpretation of his thinking about the concept of following a rule. According to one group of philosophers Wittgensteins position is that this concept presupposes a human community in which there is agreement as to whether doing such-and-such is or is not following a particular rule. A second group of philosophers hold that this interpretation of Wittgenstein is not merely wrong, but is even a caricature of Wittgensteins thought: for when Wittgenstein says that following a rule is ‘a practice’ he does not mean a social practice, he does not invoke a community of rule-followers, but instead he emphasizes that following a rule presupposes a regularity, a repeated or recurring way of acting, which might be exemplified in the life of a solitary person. On the first interpretation it would have no sense to suppose that a human being who had grown up in complete isolation from the rest of mankind could be following rules. On the second interpretation such isolation would be irrelevant.

Consciousness and causality : a debate on the nature of mind

Two distinguished philosophers present opposing views on the questions of howthe objects of consciousness are perceived. (Philosophy)

Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory

My main topic will be, roughly speaking, the claim that mental events or conscious experiences or inner experiences are brain processes.1 I hasten to say, however, that I am not going to talk about ‘mental events’ or ‘conscious experiences’ or ‘inner experiences’. These expressions are almost exclusively philosophers’ terms, and I am not sure that I have got the hang of any of them. Philosophers are not in agreement in their use of these terms. One philosopher will say, for example, that a pain in the foot is a mental event, whereas another will say that a pain in the foot certainly is not a mental event.

Is it a Religious Belief that ‘God Exists’?

Iadmire the strategic plan of Alston’s paper, and also the skill and thoroughness of his execution. I think his main results are entirely sound. I agree with his conclusion that even if it is a fact that ‘reason-irrelevant’ factors are sufficient to produce a belief in God’s existence, this could have little or no tendency to show that the belief is false, or probably false, or unworthy of serious acceptance.

Wittgenstein's Scepticism’ in on certainty 1

This paper compares Wittgensteins conception of ‘objective certainty’ with Descartess ‘metaphysical certainty’. According to both conceptions if you are certain of something in these senses, then it is inconceivable that you are mistaken. But a striking difference is that for Descartes, if you are metaphysically certain of something it follows both that the something is so and that you know it is so; whereas on Wittgensteins conception neither thing follows. I try to show that there is a form of ‘scepticism’ in Wittgensteins outlook on the concept of certainty, although it is not the familiar Philosophical Scepticism. The Appendix takes issue with a recent essay by John Cook which argues that the ‘hinge propositions’ of On Certainty are based on ‘the metaphysics of phenomenalism’.

Memory as Direct Awareness of the Past

The philosophy of memory has been largely dominated by what could be called ‘the representative theory of memory’. In trying to give an account of ‘what goes on in one’s mind’ when one remembers something, or of what ‘the mental content of remembering’ consists, philosophers have usually insisted that there must be some sort of mental image, picture, or copy of what is remembered. Aristotle said that there must be ‘something like a picture or impression’;1 William James thought that there must be in the mind ‘an image or copy’ of the original event;2 Russell said that ‘Memory demands an image’.3 In addition to the image or copy a variety of other mental phenomena have been thought to be necessary. In order for a memory image to be distinguished from an expectation image, the former must be accompanied by ‘a feeling of pastness’. One has confidence that the image is of something that actually occurred because the image is attended by ‘a feeling of familiarity’. And in order that you may be sure that the past event not merely occurred but that you witnessed it, your image of the event must be presented to you with a feeling of ‘warmth and intimacy’. When all the required phenomena are put together, the mental content of remembering turns out to be, as William James says, ‘a very complex representation’.4

Rejoinder to Mr Sosa

I believe that Mr Sosa is right about my example but wrong on the substantive issue; which shows that my example was poorly chosen. If the ugliest Irishman was so ugly that even the Irish were offended, they might form a committee to get rid of him. Suppose he was kidnapped and deposited in New York. If we were informed of all this and also knew that the ugliest Irishman is the Prime Minister, I agree that we should have been given an adequate explanation of why the Prime Minister is in New York.