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Dive into the research topics where Nuno Ferreira Neves is active.

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Featured researches published by Nuno Ferreira Neves.


Lecture Notes in Computer Science | 2003

Intrusion-tolerant architectures: concepts and design

Paulo Veríssimo; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Miguel Correia

There is a significant body of research on distributed computing architectures, methodologies and algorithms, both in the fields of fault tolerance and security. Whilst they have taken separate paths until recently, the problems to be solved are of similar nature. In classical dependability, fault tolerance has been the workhorse of many solutions. Classical security-related work has on the other hand privileged, with few exceptions, intrusion prevention. Intrusion tolerance (IT) is a new approach that has slowly emerged during the past decade, and gained impressive momentum recently. Instead of trying to prevent every single intrusion, these are allowed, but tolerated: the system triggers mechanisms that prevent the intrusion from generating a system security failure. The paper describes the fundamental concepts behind IT, tracing their connection with classical fault tolerance and security. We discuss the main strategies and mechanisms for architecting IT systems, and report on recent advances on distributed IT system architectures.


symposium on reliable distributed systems | 2004

How to tolerate half less one Byzantine nodes in practical distributed systems

Miguel Correia; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Paulo Veríssimo

The application of dependability concepts and techniques to the design of secure distributed systems is raising a considerable amount of interest in both communities under the designation of intrusion tolerance. However, practical intrusion-tolerant replicated systems based on the state machine approach (SMA) can handle at most f Byzantine components out of a total of n = 3f + 1, which is the maximum resilience in asynchronous systems. This paper extends the normal asynchronous system with a special distributed oracle called TTCB. Using this extended system we manage to implement an intrusion-tolerant service based on the SMA with only 2f + 1 replicas. Albeit a few other papers in the literature present intrusion-tolerant services with this approach, this is the first time the number of replicas is reduced from 3f + 1 to 2f + 1. Another interesting characteristic of the described service is a low time complexity.


IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems | 2010

Highly Available Intrusion-Tolerant Services with Proactive-Reactive Recovery

Paulo Sousa; Alysson Neves Bessani; Miguel Correia; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Paulo Veríssimo

In the past, some research has been done on how to use proactive recovery to build intrusion-tolerant replicated systems that are resilient to any number of faults, as long as recoveries are faster than an upper bound on fault production assumed at system deployment time. In this paper, we propose a complementary approach that enhances proactive recovery with additional reactive mechanisms giving correct replicas the capability of recovering other replicas that are detected or suspected of being compromised. One key feature of our proactive-reactive recovery approach is that, despite recoveries, it guarantees the availability of a minimum number of system replicas necessary to sustain correct operation of the system. We design a proactive-reactive recovery service based on a hybrid distributed system model and show, as a case study, how this service can effectively be used to increase the resilience of an intrusion-tolerant firewall adequate for the protection of critical infrastructures.


The Computer Journal | 2006

From Consensus to Atomic Broadcast: Time-Free Byzantine-Resistant Protocols without Signatures

Miguel Correia; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Paulo Veríssimo

This paper proposes a stack of three Byzantine-resistant protocols aimed to be used in practical distributed systems: multi-valued consensus, vector consensus and atomic broadcast. These protocols are designed as successive transformations from one to another. The first protocol, multi-valued consensus, is implemented on top of a randomized binary consensus and a reliable broadcast protocol. The protocols share a set of important structural properties. First, they do not use digital signatures constructed with public-key cryptography, a well-known performance bottleneck in this kind of protocols. Second, they are time-free, i.e. they make no synchrony assumptions, since these assumptions are often vulnerable to subtle but effective attacks. Third, they are completely decentralized, thus avoiding the cost of detecting corrupt leaders. Fourth, they have optimal resilience, i.e. they tolerate the failure of f = ⌊(n-1)/3⌋ out of a total of n processes. In terms of time complexity, the multi-valued consensus protocol terminates in a constant expected number of rounds, while the vector consensus and atomic broadcast protocols have O(f) complexity. The paper also proves the equivalence between multi-valued consensus and atomic broadcast in the Byzantine failure model without signatures. A similar proof is given for the equivalence between multi-valued consensus and vector consensus. These two results have theoretical relevance since they show once more that consensus is a fundamental problem in distributed systems.


european dependable computing conference | 2002

The Design of a COTS Real-Time Distributed Security Kernel

Miguel Correia; Paulo Veríssimo; Nuno Ferreira Neves

This paper describes the design of a security kernel called TTCB, which has innovative features. Firstly, it is a distributed subsystem with its own secure network. Secondly, the TTCB is real-time, that is, a synchronous subsystem capable of timely behavior. These two characteristics together are uncommon in security kernels. Thirdly, the TTCB can be implemented using only COTS components.


pacific rim international symposium on dependable computing | 2007

Resilient Intrusion Tolerance through Proactive and Reactive Recovery

Paulo Sousa; Alysson Neves Bessani; Miguel Correia; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Paulo Veríssimo

Previous works have studied how to use proactive recovery to build intrusion-tolerant replicated systems that are resilient to any number of faults, as long as recoveries are faster than an upper-bound on fault production assumed at system deployment time. In this paper, we propose a complementary approach that combines proactive recovery with services that allow correct replicas to react and recover replicas that they detect or suspect to be compromised. One key feature of our proactive-reactive recovery approach is that, despite recoveries, it guarantees the availability of the minimum amount of system replicas necessary to sustain systems correct operation. We design a proactive-reactive recovery service based on a hybrid distributed system model and show, as a case study, how this service can effectively be used to augment the resilience of an intrusion-tolerant firewall adequate for the protection of critical infrastructures.


principles of distributed computing | 1994

A checkpoint protocol for an entry consistent shared memory system

Nuno Ferreira Neves; Miguel Castro; Paulo Guedes

Workstation clusters are becoming an interesting alternative to dedicated multiprocessors. In this environment, the probability of a failure, during an application’s execution, increases with the execution time and the number of workstations used. If no provision is made for handling failures, it is unlikely that long running applications will terminate successfully. One solution to this problem is process checkpointing. This paper presents a checkpoint protocol for a multithreaded distributed shared memory system based on the entry consistency memory model. The protocol allows transparent recovery from single node failures and, in some cases, from multiple node failures. A simple mechanism is used to determine if the system can be brought to a consistent state in the event of multiple machine crashes. The protocol keeps a distributed log of shared data accesses in the volatile memory of the processes, taking advantage of the independent failure characteristics of workstation clusters. Periodically, or whenever the log reaches a highwater mark, each process checkpoints its state, independently from the others. The protocol needs no extra messages during the failure-free period, since all checkpoint control information is piggybacked on the memory coherence protocol messages.


Distributed Computing | 2005

Low complexity Byzantine-resilient consensus

Miguel Correia; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Lau Cheuk Lung; Paulo Veríssimo

Abstract.The application of the tolerance paradigm to security - intrusion tolerance - has been raising a reasonable amount of attention in the dependability and security communities. In this paper we present a novel approach to intrusion tolerance. The idea is to use privileged components - generically designated by wormholes - to support the execution of intrusion-tolerant protocols, often called Byzantine-resilient in the literature.The paper introduces the design of wormhole-aware intrusion-tolerant protocols using a classical distributed systems problem: consensus. The system where the consensus protocol runs is mostly asynchronous and can fail in an arbitrary way, except for the wormhole, which is secure and synchronous. Using the wormhole to execute a few critical steps, the protocol manages to have a low time complexity: in the best case, it runs in two rounds, even if some processes are malicious. The protocol also shows how often theoretical partial synchrony assumptions can be substantiated in practical distributed systems. The paper shows the significance of the TTCB as an engineering paradigm, since the protocol manages to be simple when compared with other protocols in the literature.


dependable systems and networks | 2011

OS diversity for intrusion tolerance: Myth or reality?

Miguel Garcia; Alysson Neves Bessani; Ilir Gashi; Nuno Ferreira Neves; Rafael R. Obelheiro

One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the components that constitute the system. In this paper we present a study with operating systems (OS) vulnerability data from the NIST National Vulnerability Database. We have analyzed the vulnerabilities of 11 different OSes over a period of roughly 15 years, to check how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. We found this number to be low for several combinations of OSes. Hence, our analysis provides a strong indication that building a system with diverse OSes may be a useful technique to improve its intrusion tolerance capabilities.


dependable systems and networks | 2006

Using Attack Injection to Discover New Vulnerabilities

Nuno Ferreira Neves; João Antunes; Miguel Correia; Paulo Veríssimo; Rui Ferreira Neves

Due to our increasing reliance on computer systems, security incidents and their causes are important problems that need to be addressed. To contribute to this objective, the paper describes a new tool for the discovery of security vulnerabilities on network connected servers. The AJECT tool uses a specification of the servers communication protocol to automatically generate a large number of attacks accordingly to some predefined test classes. Then, while it performs these attacks through the network, it monitors the behavior of the server both from a client perspective and inside the target machine. The observation of an incorrect behavior indicates a successful attack and the potential existence of a vulnerability. To demonstrate the usefulness of this approach, a considerable number of experiments were carried out with several IMAP servers. The results show that AJECT can discover several kinds of vulnerabilities, including a previously unknown vulnerability

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Miguel Correia

Instituto Superior Técnico

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