Nurlan Turdaliev

Universal Dumping of Homogeneous Products

Contrary to predictions from traditional comparative advantage analysis, a class of models with imperfect competition predicts intra-industry trade in homogeneous goods. Brander and Krugman offer a model with two countries and one firm in each country which generates the outcome that both firms dump into the export market (reciprocal dumping). The present paper determines the extent to which higher dimensionality alters this outcome by introducing a model with several firms in each of several countries. It is shown that dumping is universal. Thus, whenever trade occurs dumping occurs. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Calibration and Bayesian learning

In a repeated game of incomplete information, myopic players form beliefs on next-period play and choose strategies to maximize next-period payoffs. Beliefs are treated as forecast of future plays. Forecast accuracy is assessed using calibration tests, which measure asymptotic accuracy of beliefs against some realizations. Beliefs are calibrated if they pass all calibration tests. For a positive Lebesgue measure of payoff vectors, beliefs are not calibrated. But, if payoff vector and calibration test are drawn from a suitable product measure, beliefs pass the calibration test almost surely.