Oded Balaban

Praxis and poesis in aristotle's practical philosophy

ConclusionsAll the paradoxes in the Engberg-Pedersen interpretation and all the present-day discussions about whether energeia is an activity or a state, are not, in my opinion, the result of a defective reading of Aristotle but, rather, the influence of the prevailing values of our industrial society. These values - held, as it seems, by these commentators - are conspicuously teleological: they prevent us from grasping the qualitative difference between praxis and poesis and between energeia and kinesis. Indeed, since these teleological values do not take this difference into account, the commentators only ask, when Aristotle distinguishes between praxis and poesis, how much time praxis takes, or if it takes time at all, which is totally irrelevant. Duration in time is incompatible with praxis, not because praxis does not take time nor because it is a state, but because duration in time relates only to purposeful thinking and productive activity, which praxis is not. Commentators fail therefore to analyze successfully the meaning of the expression “actions in which the end (telos) inheres.” It is not clear to them what is meant by activities that are ends in themselves. Failing to grasp this fact, they resort to analysing the temporality of the activity, which is irrelevant to it.Time is a measure of efficiency, and therefore relevant in poesis which is concerned with achievement. The relation of poesis to time is an inverse one: the shorter the time taken for an activity the better the poesis.In ancient-Greek consciousness a valuable activity was that which was undertaken for its own sake and therefore without concern for the amount of time employed in its performance; whereas an action taken as a means to an end was regarded as immoral. In modern society, on the other hand, utilitarian values tend to make it almost incomprehensible that something should be done for its own sake: every human action is evaluated by its result, and when the focus is on the result the criteria of efficiency and utility are obviously relevant. The Greeks valued praxis more than poesis, whereas our culture values poesis and techne more than praxis. The understanding of Aristotles concept of praxis is useful therefore not only in order to understand ancient-Greek culture, but also to understand better our own presuppositions.

Epoché: Meaning, Object, and Existence in Husserl’s Phenomenology

The phenomenological reduction and the intuition of (essences Wesensanschauung),crystallized under the concept of epoche, have been subject to so many diverse interpretations that, were we to regard them all as valid, we would have to conclude that Husserl himself had a very imprecise idea of this highly technical term. Harrison Hall believes that epoche means “to set aside or abstain from questions of reference so as to focus on meaning.”1 According to Aron Gurwitsch, its concern is “with objects as meant and intended.”2 For Jacques Derrida, it entails even “the reduction of constituted eidetics and then of its own language.”3 Indeed, for Herbert Spiegelberg, it has become “the most controversial issue between the main trends of phenomenology”4 whereas for Maurice Merleau-Ponty “There is no other problem in which Husserl has invested more time in order to understand himself” than that of the phenomenological reduction.5 Spiegelberg’s accusation is against the interpreters, and Merleau-Ponty’s is against the author.

The Hermeneutics of the Young Marx According To Marx's Approach To the Philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus

In the History of Philosophy, the atomistic physics of Epicurus and of Democritus have been considered as very similar.1 Con trary to the more conventional view, Marx considers this similarity

Time, Understanding, and Will

So let us leave the Platonists to wander off down a blind alley Poor simpletons, they think they will find the secret of discourse about time in the link with eternity. Whereas I, who am powerless in the face of eternity, would prefer to ask: what link can be retained, in discourse about time, between past, present, and future? If there is some link, can the three kinds of time break free of their mutual bonds? Can predicting the future, a time that will be but has never existed before, be disconnected from what determines the future as a product of what already exists and what has already existed? Can the past be what it once was or will it always be what each age decides it should have been? Put this way, these questions lead to never-ending discussions in which each argument seems to retain its validity. So may I take the liberty of imposing some limits on the questions based on a dual distinction: the difference between a theoretical question and

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE UNCONSCIOUS

This paper is an attempt to offer a phenomenological approach to unconsciousness without trying to reduce it to conscious intentional processes. I shall offer a phenomenological model of intentional acts and shall try to show that unconsciousness (non-intentional content) can be grasped in its specifity.