Oded Koenigsberg

Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturers profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturers marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.

Modeling Multiple Relationships in Social Networks

Firms are increasingly seeking to harness the potential of social networks for marketing purposes. Therefore, marketers are interested in understanding the antecedents and consequences of relationship formation within networks and in predicting interactivity among users. The authors develop an integrated statistical framework for simultaneously modeling the connectivity structure of multiple relationships of different types on a common set of actors. Their modeling approach incorporates several distinct facets to capture both the determinants of relationships and the structural characteristics of multiplex and sequential networks. They develop hierarchical Bayesian methods for estimation and illustrate their model with two applications: The first application uses a sequential network of communications among managers involved in new product development activities, and the second uses an online collaborative social network of musicians. The authors’ applications demonstrate the benefits of modeling multiple relations jointly for both substantive and predictive purposes. They also illustrate how information in one relationship can be leveraged to predict connectivity in another relation.

Research Note---The Role of Production Lead Time and Demand Uncertainty in Marketing Durable Goods

Firms often have to make their production decisions under conditions of demand uncertainty. This is especially true for product categories such as automobiles and technology goods where the lead time needed for manufacturing forces firms to make production decisions well in advance of the selling season. Once the firm has produced the goods, the available production volume affects the firms subsequent marketing decisions. In this paper, we study the relationship between the firms production and marketing decisions for a durable goods manufacturer. We develop a dynamic model of a durable product market in which the demand functions are developed from a micromodeling of consumer utility functions and an equilibrium analysis of consumer strategies. After taking into account the demand uncertainty as well as the potential for cannibalization of future sales, the manufacturer makes its production and sales decisions. We find that the firms optimal inventory level is U-shaped in the durability of the product and that the firm suffers a larger loss due to uncertainty when it is leases rather than sells its products. Furthermore, unlike the case for nondurables, for durable goods we find that the effect of uncertainty persists even after the uncertainty has been resolved.

Choosing a Digital Content Strategy: How Much Should be Free?

This paper analyzes optimal sampling and pricing of paid content for publishers of news websites. Publishers offer free content samples both to disclose journalistic quality to consumers and to generate online advertising revenues. We examine sampling where the publisher sets the number of free sample articles and consumers select the articles of their choice. Consumers learn from the free samples in a Bayesian fashion and base their subscription decisions on posterior quality expectations. We show that sampling enhances subscription demand only if consumers have low quality expectations in relation to actual quality. Taking advertising and subscription revenues into account, we find that the publisher should employ either a paid-only or a free content strategy when consumers have high quality expectations. When consumers have low quality expectations, employing a sampling strategy may be optimal for the publisher.

Forward Buying by Retailers

Conventional wisdom in marketing holds that (1) retailer forward buying is a consequence of manufacturer trade promotions and (2) stockpiling units helps the retailer but hurts the manufacturer. This article provides a deeper understanding of forward buying by analyzing it within the context of manufacturer trade promotions, competition, and demand uncertainty. The authors find that regardless of whether the manufacturer offers a trade promotion, allowing the retailer to forward buy and hold inventory for the future can, under certain conditions, be beneficial for both parties. Disallowing forward buying by the retailer may lead the manufacturer to lower merchandising requirements and change the depth of the promotion. In competitive environments, there are situations in which retailers engage in forward buying because of competitive pressures in a prisoners-dilemma situation. Finally, when the authors consider the case of uncertain demand, they find further evidence of strategic forward buying. In particular, the authors find cases in which the retailer orders a quantity that is higher than what it expects to sell in even the most optimistic demand scenario.

Package Size Decisions

We describe a model examining how a firm might choose the package size and price for a product that deteriorates over time. Our model considers four factors: (1) the usable life of the product, (2) the rates at which consumers use the product, (3) the relation between package size and the variable cost of the product, and (4) the minimum quantities consumers seek to consume for each dollar they spend (we call these reservation quantities). We allow heterogeneity in the usage rates and reservation quantities for the consumers. We show that when the cost increases as a linear or convex function of the package size, the firm should make packages of the smallest possible size. Smaller packages reduce waste and allow consumers to more closely match their purchases with desired consumption. This in turn allows the firm to charge a higher unit price and also sell more unit volume. The results imply that in a market with multiple package sizes (produced by the same or competing firms), at least one of the packages must have the smallest possible size, provided the fixed cost of making the product is sufficiently low. For concave cost functions, the firm may find it optimal to make larger than smallest-size packages.

Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives, returns, and negotiations

In many industries firms have to make quantity decisions before knowing the exact state of demand. In such cases, channel members have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. The decision about who should retain ownership depends on the balance of benefit and risk to each member. Ownership, after all, is costly. Whichever member owns the units accepts the risk of loss if more units are produced than can be sold. But ownership also grants firms the flexibility to respond to demand once it becomes known by adjusting price. In this study, we analyze ownership decisions in distribution channels and how those decisions are affected by demand uncertainty. We model demand based on micromodeling of consumer utility functions and capture demand uncertainty related to market size and price sensitivity. This study shows that as long as the degree of uncertainty about market size is intermediate, the retailer and the manufacturer both benefit when the manufacturer maintains ownership of the units. But when there is substantial uncertainty about market size, the retailer and the channel are better off if the retailer takes ownership but the manufacturer still prefers to maintain ownership. Thus, there is potential for channel conflict regarding ownership under high levels of uncertainty. We show that, using product returns, the manufacturer can achieve the same outcome under retailer ownership as under manufacturer ownership. This provides an additional new rationale for the prevalence of product returns. The first-best outcome (from the perspective of total channel profit), however, is under retailer ownership without product returns when uncertainty is high (i.e., product returns reduce the total channel profit). Negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome but only under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option (when an agreement cannot be reached) during the negotiation.

The Design of Durable Goods

The use of a durable good is limited by both its physical life and usable life. For example, an electric-car battery can last for five years (physical life) or 100,000 miles (usable life), whichever comes first. We propose a framework for examining how a profit-maximizing firm might choose the usable life, physical life, and selling price of a durable good. The proposed framework considers differences in usage rates and product valuations by consumers and allows for the effects of technological constraints and product obsolescence on a products usable and physical lives. Our main result characterizes a relationship between optimal price, cost elasticities, and opportunity costs associated with relaxing upper bounds on usable and physical lives. We describe conditions under which either usable life or physical life, or both, obtains its maximum possible values; examine why a firm might devote effort to relaxing nonbinding constraints on usable life or physical life; consider when price cuts might be accompanied with product improvements; and examine how a firm might be able to cross-subsidize product improvements.

Complementary Goods: Creating, Capturing, and Competing for Value

This paper studies the strategic interaction between firms producing strictly complementary products. With strict complements, a consumer derives positive utility only when both products are used together. We show that value-capture and value-creation problems arise when such products are developed and sold by separate firms “nonintegrated” producers. Although the firms tend to price higher for given quality levels, their provision of quality is so low that, in equilibrium, prices are set well below what an integrated monopolist would choose. When one firm can mandate a royalty fee from the complementor producer as often occurs in arrangements between hardware and software makers, we find that the value-capture problem is mitigated to some extent and consumer surplus rises. However, because royalty fees greatly reduce the incentives of the firm paying them to invest in quality, the arrangement exacerbates the value-creation problem and leads to even lower total quality. Surprisingly, this result can reverse with competition. Specifically, when the firm charging the royalty fee faces a vertically differentiated competitor, the value-creation problem is greatly reduced---opening the door for the possibility of a Pareto-improving outcome in which all firms and consumers benefit. It is worth noting that this outcome cannot be achieved by giving firms the option of introducing a line of product variants; competition serves as a necessary “commitment” ingredient.

Beyond Posted Prices: The Past, Present, and Future of Participative Pricing Mechanisms

Driven by the low transaction costs and interactive nature of the internet, customer participation in the price-setting process has increased. Today, platforms such as eBay have popularized online auctions on a global scale, Priceline has made headlines with its name-your-own-price (NYOP) business model, and Humble Bundle has enabled independent musicians and game developers to market their works through pay-what-you-want (PWYW) pricing. Advertising exchanges conduct several hundred million individual auctions per day to sell online advertising slots. The present paper contributes to the literature on participative pricing in three ways. First, we propose a definition of participative pricing mechanisms, as well as a useful taxonomy. Second, we discuss the current understanding by synthesizing conceptual and empirical academic literature. Third, we outline promising research questions with a key focus on the related behavioral aspects of buyers and sellers.