Oisin Suttle

What Sorts of Things are Public Morals? A Liberal Cosmopolitan Approach to Article XX GATT

Existing theories of WTO law cannot adequately explain the form or content of the GATT exceptions, in particular Article XX(a) Public Morals. Nor, in consequence, can they satisfactorily answer the interpretive questions they raise. This article explains Article XX in terms of self‐determination as a political and moral value, and the choices it mandates peoples make for themselves. Drawing on debates in contemporary political philosophy, it distinguishes three categories of argument for self‐determination: intrinsic, expressive and instrumental, each having implications for the scope of the choices a self‐determining community must make for itself. This account of self‐determination in trade regulation is used to reconstruct Article XX, both explaining the individual provisions, and suggesting how these might be developed and interpreted. It concludes by examining Article XX(a) in detail, highlighting the interpretive questions public morals pose, and how understanding Article XX in terms of self‐determination suggests these should be answered.

Debt, Default and Two Liberal Theories of Justice

There is a fundamental disconnect between the public discourse about sovereign and external debt in comparison to private domestic debt. The latter is predominantly viewed through a Humean lens, which sees economic morality in terms of contingent social institutions, justified by the valuable goods they realize; while sovereign and external debt is viewed through a Lockean lens, which sees property, contract, and debt as possessing an intrinsic moral quality, independent of social context or consequences. This chapter examines whether this Lockean perspective on sovereign and external debt is compatible with the dominance of Humean approaches to the domestic economy. It considers and rejects the most plausible argument for reconciling these views, which emphasizes the different qualities of cooperation in the international and domestic economies. It further argues that many standard objections to a Humean approach to sovereign debt suggest, not the Lockean approach, but rather a Hobbesian international moral skepticism. Concluding that the Lockean approach is unmotivated, this chapter instead advances a Humean account of sovereign debt and default. It shows how taking seriously the demand for institutional justification and the idea of persons and peoples as free and equal provides an account of the duties of states—whether creditors, debtors or third parties—in sovereign debt crises. It further examines the implications of each approach for democratic choice about sovereign default.