Øistein Røisland

Robustifying optimal monetary policy using simple rules as cross-checks

There are two main approaches to modelling monetary policy; simple instrument rules and optimal policy. We propose an alternative that combines the two by extending the loss function with a term penalizing deviations from a simple rule. We analyze the properties of the modified loss function by considering three different models for the US economy. The choice of the weight on the simple rule determines the trade-off between optimality and robustness. We show that by placing some weight on a simple Taylor-type rule in the loss function, one can prevent disastrous outcomes if the model is not a correct representation of the underlying economy.

The Influence of the Taylor rule on US monetary policy

We analyze the influence of the Taylor rule on US monetary policy by estimating the policy preferences of the Fed within a DSGE framework. The policy preferences are represented by a standard loss function, extended with a term that represents the degree of reluctance to letting the interest rate deviate from the Taylor rule. The empirical support for the presence of a Taylor rule term in the policy preferences is strong and robust to alternative specifications of the loss function. Analyzing the Feds monetary policy in the period 2001-2006, we find no support for a decreased weight on the Taylor rule, contrary to what has been argued in the literature. The large deviations from the Taylor rule in this period are due to large, negative demand-side shocks, and represent optimal deviations for a given weight on the Taylor rule.

Capital income taxation, equilibrium determinacy, and the Taylor principle

Abstract The Taylor principle disregards nominal capital income taxation. The paper derives a ‘tax-adjusted Taylor principle’ and shows that empirical studies on monetary policy rules tend to reach too strong conclusions concerning the appropriateness of the monetary policy response to inflation.

Time Inconsistency and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy

This paper analyses time-inconsistency problems related to the exchange rate channel of monetary policy. Within a simple open-economy macroeconomic model, where the exchange rate is the only forward-looking variable, we show that a difference emerges between optimal policy under discretion and under commitment. Moreover, the nature of the time-inconsistency problem resembles that resulting from standard New Keynesian models: when cost-push shocks occur, the exchange rate channel gives rise to excessive output stabilisation and insufficient inertia in monetary policy under a discretionary policy.

Inflation inertia and the optimal hybrid inflation/price-level target

A hybrid inflation/price-level target combines elements of both inflation and price-level targets. The paper derives an optimal hybrid target within a New Keynesian model with inflation persistence due to price indexation. The result generalizes a result by Vestin (forthcoming) that the optimal policy could be implemented with a price-level targeting regime. We show that the optimal price-level drift in the hybrid target is equal to the degree of price indexation. If there is complete indexation, the optimal monetary regime is inflation targeting.

Exchange rate versus inflation targeting: a theory of output fluctuations in traded and non-traded sectors

This paper develops a basic model for output fluctuations in traded and non-traded sectors under two alternative monetary policy regimes; exchange rate targeting (or monetary union) and inflation targeting. The conventional wisdom from one-sector models says that inflation targeting gives better output stabilization than exchange rate targeting when demand shocks occur, but the opposite when supply shocks occur. In a model with a traded and a non-traded sector, we show that the conventional wisdom holds for the non-traded sector. However, for the traded sector, we show that inflation targeting destabilizes output compared with exchange rate targeting when both supply and demand shocks occur. The only shocks where inflation targeting provides the better output stability for the traded sector are shocks to world market prices. The two-sector structure introduces new mechanisms that may turn around earlier results for aggregate production. For instance, a demand shock may induce higher aggregate output fluctuations with inflation targeting than with exchange rate targeting. Furthermore, a positive demand shock may prove to be contractionary under inflation targeting.

Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting

Several countries face the choice between targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. The present paper extends the theory of optimum currency areas to deal with this choice. In contrast to the conventional theory, countries might form more of an optimum currency area the more asymmetric supply shocks are.

The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy

The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non-monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.

Monetary Policy Decisions - Comparing Theory and 'Inside' Information from MPC Members

How do monetary policy committee (MPC) members form their views about the appropriate interest rate? To what extent do they change their minds during the deliberations in the interest rate meeting? How important is the Chairman? The theoretical literature makes assumptions about these issues. We have asked actual MPC members in Sweden and Norway. This paper reports the results from this unique survey and discusses how well existing theories on monetary policy by committee capture the reality.

Choosing a Monetary Policy Regime: Effects on the Traded and Non-Traded Sectors

The paper considers alternative monetary policy regimes within a calibrated macroeconomic model with a traded and a non-traded sector. Two classes of regimes are considered: inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting. When the target variable is completely stabilized, both rules have poor stabilizing properties for all real variables--nominal exchange rate targeting is even dynamically unstable. When the monetary authority places some weight on output stabilization in addition to the primary target variable, inflation targeting outperforms exchange rate targeting in terms of output stability in both the traded and the non-traded sectors.