Ola Dahlman

Monitoring underground nuclear explosions

The first underground nuclear tests were carried out in 1957 by the United States and the Soviet Union. As discussed in Chapter 1, in 1963 the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which prohibited testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, and since 1980 all nuclear explosions have been conducted under ground. Of the 2,052 nuclear explosions that have been carried out, 1,501 have been conducted under ground, though as noted in Chapter 1, there are minor divergences in the number of reported explosions. Most of the explosions involved the development and testing of nuclear weapons, although about 150 were part of programs for socalled peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) (Nordyke 2000).

Establishing the Verification Regime

The CTBT verification regime is designed to provide confidence that nuclear explosions can be detected and identified as such anywhere and at any time. The monitoring component of this regime therefore needs to be global in its coverage and on the alert at all times to pick up signs of possible non-compliance with the Treaty. The system, now nearing its completion, is the most comprehensive technical system ever established to verify compliance with a treaty in the multilateral arena, and at the same time among the more ambitious undertakings ever to monitor all environments of the earth. The monitoring component of the regime is illustrated schematically in Fig. 6.1, which shows sensors of the International Monitoring System (IMS) providing data via the Global Communications Infrastructure to the International Data Center (IDC) of the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, which in turn provides analysis results and, if requested, also raw data to National Authorities for their use.

To Test or Not to Test

On July 16, 1945 the world changed and on August 6 the world knew. The “Trinity” nuclear test in the Alamogordo desert in New Mexico, USA marked the beginning of the military nuclear era. The destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima on August 6 and of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 demonstrated the overwhelming power of this new weapon. These explosions marked the end of the Second World War and the beginning of a nuclear arms race: an arms race that divided the world between those having nuclear weapons and those that decided not to have them or that so far have been unable to acquire them. Eight States have conducted in all more than 2000 nuclear test explosions involving some 2400 nuclear devices. The USA and the former Soviet Union have carried out the lion’s share of these tests.

On-Site Inspections

The on-site inspection (OSI) regime is the ultimate verification measure of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), comprising strong political, technical, and operational elements. It adds to the deterrence against clandestine tests and is an important measure to determine compliance. A state can request an OSI of an event of concern either following a process of consultation and clarification or without going through such a process. Either way, time is of the essence in the decisionmaking and conduct of an OSI. While some effects from a nuclear explosion may be long lasting, others can be short lived and thus time sensitive. This requires that an OSI inspection team and its equipment can be deployed and initiate inspection activities in a timely manner within the six-day time frame specified in the CTBT.

Monitoring Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions

A little more than 30 years ago, in October 1980, China conducted its last nuclear test explosion in the atmosphere. This marked the end of atmospheric testing by all countries. The United Kingdom, United States, and Soviet Union, as depositories, had already signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, which banned explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. France, the fourth country that conducted atmospheric tests, ended its testing in the atmosphere in 1974. A total of 517 nuclear explosions were carried out in the atmosphere: United Kingdom 21, China 22, France 50, United States 210, and Soviet Union 214. As noted in Chapter 1, the PTBT contains no verification provisions. There might be several reasons for that: explosions in the atmosphere are generally easy to detect, and national monitoring equipment, such as for atmospheric radionuclide surveillance, was already available and operational at the time the treaty was signed. The United States launched its satellite-based Vela project in 1963 to monitor atmospheric nuclear explosions, as discussed under national technical means (NTM) below. The three depositories of the PTBT were also ready to move testing underground to reduce radioactive fall-out and thereby also the information that other states might obtain from analyzing the fall-out.

The CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the World

The CTBTO Preparatory Commission has close relations with many global actors. States Signatories are the organization’s masters, providing the funds needed as well as getting back investments in the monitoring stations they host. States provide personnel to the PTS, which has an extensive program for training national experts. States are also the customers for the data and products produced by the PTS during the testing and provisional operation of the emerging global monitoring network.

A Long Journey to a Treaty

Test ban negotiations proved to be a 50-year journey from the first initiative until the CTBT was signed. Still, after more than another ten years, we have not yet reached the final destination; a CTBT that has entered into force. We may have learned two things from all these years. International negotiations take time, move in small steps and require patience and further, that the possibility of making progress is held hostage by the general political situation, especially among the key players.

National Technical Implementation of the CTBT

Institutions in States Signatories play crucial roles in the implementation of the CTBT. In this chapter we first look at various activities at these institutions, and then provide an assessment of the status of such activities ten years into the PrepCom phase.

The CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the PTS - an Organizational Perspective

In this chapter we look at the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the PTS from an organizational perspective, summarizing our experience and the results of the different reviews carried out of the PTS and its activities. Turning the spotlight closely on any organization brings out a number of things that can be improved upon and this case is no exception. This does not, in our view, mean that the PrepCom or the PTS have more problems or are less efficient than one might expect of any international organization. On the contrary, we want to recognize the demanding work carried out in Vienna and around the world to implement the CTBT verification regime and prepare for the entry into force of the Treaty. Our intent is not to criticize but rather to identify lessons to be learned. Lessons that may be used to improve the operation of the PTS and lessons relevant for the Technical Secretariat, to be established after entry into force. Some of this experience might also be useful when creating efficient organizations for treaties that might be negotiated in the future.

The Birth of An Organization

In the previous chapters we have described the CTBT and the negotiations that created the Treaty, a process that culminated with the opening for signature of the CTBT on 24 September 1996. During the final stages of the CTBT negotiations in the CD, the negotiators faced the additional challenge of laying the foundation for the organization that on behalf of all States Signatories would be entrusted with the task of preparing for the entry into force of the CTBT. The negotiations of the “Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization” (briefly, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, or, as also used in this book, the PrepCom) were successfully concluded in the CD. This text was then adopted in a resolution passed at a meeting of States Signatories in New York on 19 November, 1996, one day prior to convening the first session of this new organization.