Ola Svenson

ARE WE ALL LESS RISKY AND MORE SKILLFUL THAN OUR FELLOW DRIVERS

In this study subjects were asked about their competence as drivers in relation to a group of drivers. The results showed that a majority of subjects regarded themselves as more skillful and less risky than the average driver in each group respectively. This result was compared with similar recent findings in other fields. Finally, the consequences for planning and risk taking of seeing oneself as more competent than others were discussed briefly.

Process descriptions of decision making

Abstract This paper introduces a representation system for the description of decision alternatives and decision rules. Examples of these decision rules, classified according to their metric requirements (i.e., metric level, commensurability across dimensions, and lexicographic ordering) in the system, are given. A brief introduction to process tracing techniques is followed by a review of results reported in process tracing studies of decision making. The review shows that most decision problems are solved without a complete search of information, which shows that many of the algebraic models of decision making are inadequate. When the number of aspects of a decision situation is constant, an increase in the number of alternatives (and a corresponding decrease in the number of dimensions) leads to a greater number of investigated aspects. Verbal protocols showed that decision rules belonging to the different groups were used by decision makers when making a choice. It was concluded that process tracing data can be fruitfully used in studies of decision making but that such data do not release the researcher from the burden of constructing theories or models in relation to which the data must then be analyzed.

Differentiation and consolidation theory of human decision making: a frame of reference for the study of pre- and post-decision processes

Abstract Differentiation and Consolidation Theory of decision making models human decision making as an active process in which one alternative is gradually differentiated from other available alternatives. The theory is based on the assumption that it is not sufficient to choose the best alternative, but that a decision involves the selection and creation of a candidate that is sufficiently superior for a decision. This is achieved in differentiation processes which are wholistic, structural or process related. To exemplify, structural differentiation includes both facts and attractiveness restructuring. Following a decision, the theory predicts consolidation processes which work in favor of the chosen alternative. Both differentiation and consolidation are driven by the fact that through experience with the impredictability of the future, a decision maker has learned to prepare for threats against the chosen alternatives. The further this alternative has been differentiated and consolidated, the less the risk of post-decision ambiguity, regret or decision reversal. The study is concluded with references to othee decision theories some of which are viewed as subtheories of Differentiation and Consolidation Theory.

Decision making : cognitive models and explanations

Part 1 Fundamentals Introduction to Part I 1. Cognitive Process Models and Explanations of Decision Making Ray Crozier and Rob Ranyard 2. Psychometric and Methodological Aspects of Process Tracing Research Johanna M. Harte and Pieter Koele Part II Values and Involvement Introduction to Part II 3. Personal Involvement in Human Decision Making: Conceptualisations and Effects on Decision Processes Bas Verplanken and Ola Svenson 4. Aspects of Compatability and the Construction of Preference Marcus Selart 5. Perspectives and Emotions in Personal Decision Making Anna Blom Kendal and Henry Montgomery 6. Is Hate Wiser than Love? Cognitive and Emotional Utilities in Decision Making Maria Lewicka Part III The Risk Dimension Introduction to Part III 7. Anticipating the Future: Appraising Risk and Uncertainty Karl Halvor Teigen and Wibecke Brun 8. Theoretical Conceptions of Framing Effects in Risky Decisions Anton Kuhberger 9. Beyond Gambles and Lotteries: Naturalistic Risky Decisions Oswald Huber Part IV The Time Decision Introduction to Part IV 10. Influences on the Past of Choices of the Future Tommy Garling, Niklas Karlsson, Joakim Romanus and Marcus Selart 11. The Effects of Time Pressure on Human Judgement and Decision Making A. John Maule and Anne C. Edland 12. Decision Making in Dynamic Task Environments Jose H. Kerstholt and Jeroen G.W. Raaijmakers 13. Turning Prior Disadvantages into Advantages: Differentiation and Consolidation in Real-life Decision Making Ola Svenson and Teci Hill 14. Post-decisional Confidence - Can It Be Trusted? Dan Zakay Index

Perceived driving safety and seatbelt usage

Swedish and U.S. subjects judged their own driving skills and safety in relation to other drivers. As in earlier studies, most subjects showed an optimism bias: a tendency to judge oneself as safer and more skillful than the average driver, with a smaller risk of getting involved and injured in an accident. Different measures of the optimism effect were strongly correlated with one another, with driving experience and with the judged importance of human factors (as opposed to technical and chance factors) in causing accidents. Degree of optimism was positively, but weakly, correlated with reported seatbelt usage and worry about traffic accidents. Seatbelt usage was positively related to the extent to which belts are judged to be convenient and popular, and more modestly related to the belts perceived contributions to safety. These results suggest that providing more information about the effectiveness of seatbelts may not be as efficient a way of increasing seatbelt usage as emphasizing other factors, such as comfort and social norms, which cannot be outweighed by optimism.

Process and structure in human decision making

Part 1 Theory: information-processing operators in decision making, Oswald Huber from cognition to action - the search for dominance in decision making, Henry Montgomery rules and strategies in decision making - a critical analysis from phenomenological perspective, Gunnar Karlsson. Part 2 Method: eliciting and analyzing verbal protocols in process studies of judgement and decision making, Ola Svenson illustrating verbal protocol analysis - individual decisions and dialogues preceding a joint decision, Ola Svenson three methods for analyzing decision making using written documents, Irmtraud N.Gallhofer and Willem E.Saris. Part 3 Experimental studies: a think-aloud study of dominance structuring in decision processes, Henry Montgomery and Ola Svenson information search and evaluative processes in decision making - a computer-based process-tracing study, Ulf Dahlstrand and Henry Montgomery positive and negative decision frames - a verbal protocol analysis of the Asian disease problem of Tversky and Kahneman, A.John Maule preselection, uncertainty of preferences and information processing in human decision making, Tadeusz Tyszka structuring and evaluating simple monetary risks, Rob Ranyard information search and decision making - the effect of information displays, Gunilla A.Sundstroem change of preferences under time pressure - choices and judgements, Ola Svenson and Anne Edland. Part 4 Societal decision making: scenario analysis and energy politics - the disclosure of causal structures in decision making, Anders Biel and Henry Montgomery the credibility of inflation-related scenarios of different lengths, Goran Nilsson postdecisional justification - the case of De Lorean, Ray Crozier decision trees and decision rules in politics - the empirical decision analysis procedure, Irmtraud N.Gallhofer and Willem E.Saris.

Judgment and Decision Making Under Time Pressure

The aim of the present chapter is to provide a review of empirical studies involving time pressure, judgment, and decision making, which have been published during the past three decades. The chapter will not cover theoretical approaches to decision making and judgment or biological aspects related to time pressure because these issues are well covered elsewhere in this volume (the chapters by Maule & Svenson; Lundberg; Maule & Hockey). Svenson (1990, 1991) suggests that higher level decision processes involve problem-solving processes, and therefore a few references including time pressure from that research area will also be cited as examples of relevant research.

Patient‐focussed decision‐making in early‐stage prostate cancer: insights from a cognitively based decision aid

Purpose  To study the cognitive processes of early‐stage prostate cancer patients as they determined which treatment they preferred, using our cognitively based decision aid.

Choices and judgments of incompletely described decision alternatives under time pressure

Abstract The effects of time pressure were investigated on choices and judgments of pairs of partially described alternatives. Subjects judged which of two students would be more qualified to follow a university program for school psychologists. Subjects indicated the preferred candidate and the rated attractiveness difference between candidates in each pair, based on information about high school grades in Swedish, Psychology and Natural Sciences. Each candidate in a pair was described by grades in only two of these attributes — one common for the two candidates and one unique. The exposure time for each pair was systematically varied so that time pressure was imposed in some conditions. Contrary to expectations, it was found that common attribute information was used less under time pressure. No support was found for the expected increased importance of negative information under time pressure. Instead, time pressure resulted in a shift toward greater preference for the candidate with the maximum grade. This result is opposite to the ‘harassed decision maker effect’ (Wright 1974). A process model capturing the most frequent decision rules and the effects of time pressure is presented.

Framing and Time Pressure in Decision Making

This study investigates the effect of time pressure on decision framing. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced the term decision frame for a decision maker’s representation of a decision problem including acts outcomes and contingencies associated with different alternatives (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). They showed that different decision frames can be induced from the same factual information. Two versions of a particular decision problem may be constructed that are formally identical, yet the wording of each is slightly different by emphasizing either the gains or the losses.