Ole Elgström

Negotiations in the EU: Bargaining or problem-solving?

EU negotiations are characterized bythe coexistence of a bargaining and a problem-solving approach. The permanence of EU negotiations discourages tough bargaining behaviour, as does the prevalence of strong consensus norms. On the other hand, evidence exists of very confrontational behaviour that often leads to lowest common denominator solutions. We argue that the mode of negotiation to be found in the EU decision-making processes is contextually determined. Empirically it is demonstrated that day-to-day negotiations in the EU are to a large extent problem-solving exercises. Under certain circumstances, however, conflictual bargaining occurs. The pattern varies with, therefore, level of politicization and type of policy, and according to the stage in the decision-making process. We also suggest that processes of learning have resulted in changes in the EUs negotiation style: problem-solving has become increasingly institutionalized within the EU machinery.

Norm negotiations. The construction of new norms regarding gender and development in EU foreign aid policy

The aim of this article is to explain norm change regarding gender and development in the EU. I trace the policy process from initiation to implementation to clarify how new norms were introduced and spread. The article combines a constructivist approach to norm diffusion with a negotiation perspective. Constructivist accounts underline the role of norm entrepreneurs and how they persuade others to internalize new norms. Insufficient attention is, however, paid to norm resistance. A focus on strategic negotiations is therefore needed to understand norm diffusion processes fully. Gender entrepreneurs were confronted by less convinced colleagues in Council committees. The new norms had to fight their way into institutional thinking, competing with traditional norms like economic growth. Norm negotiations took two major forms: text negotiations and implementation negotiations. After a gender resolution was taken, the new document became an important reference point, which has facilitated the institutionalization of gender norms in the EU.

Coalitions in EU negotiations

Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition-building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure. This article raises important research questions: What characterizes coalition building in the EU? How important are coalitions? What coalition patterns are discernible?Using data from a questionnaire to Swedish participants on EU committees, it is shown that coalitions are more frequent when majority voting occurs than when unanimity rules. Coalition behaviour is, however, important also under unanimity. The existence of consensus norms diminishes the propensity to form coalitions. As regards coalition patterns, there is a prevalence of coalitions based on policy interests and/or on cultural affinity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consistent and durable coalition patterns seem to exist. The north–south divide is one such persistent pattern. The Swedish respondents thus reveal a close cooperation between the Nordic member states and Great Britain, whereas France and Spain are seldom approached for coalition-building purposes. As to future research, evidence from other member states and from case studies is needed in order to learn more about the bases for coalition building in EU negotiations.

The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to 'leadiator'

We start with two puzzles: first, how to explain the European Union (EU)s decline as a climate change leader at the Copenhagen summit? Second, how to understand the partial revival of its leadership position at the Durban climate summit? We advance a twofold explanation, focusing on changes in relative power relations among major powers but also on negotiation strategies and coalition building. In Copenhagen, the EU had a normative agenda and unrealistic expectations and thereby failed to forge any bridge-building coalitions. In Durban, it had moved towards a pragmatic strategy, attuned to the realities of changing power constellations. The EU approached developing countries that shared its desire for a legally binding regime covering all major emitters and probed compromises with veto players, such as China and the US. This bridge-building strategy was combined with a conditional pledge to agree to an extension of the Kyoto Protocol. In sum, the EU acted as a ‘leadiator’, a leader-cum-mediator.

Still a green leader? The European Union’s role in international climate negotiations

Since the early 1990s, the European Union (EU) has presented itself as a leader on climate change. Recently, however, this picture has been challenged in the media and by non-governmental organization representatives. The aim of our article is to evaluate the Union’s present role in the area of international climate politics. We do this by scrutinizing the EU’s own role conception, but also, and primarily, by investigating the perceptions and expectations of government representatives from outside the Union itself. Our results — reflecting external perceptions of the EU after COP 14 (Conference of the Parties) in December 2008 — demonstrate that the EU is indeed still seen as a green leader. Officials from both developing states and major powers share the view of the Union as a largely coherent and credible leader, though some observers question the correspondence between what the EU says and what it does. The EU is mainly perceived to lead by example by being a role model for other state actors. We discuss how these results fare in the light of the COP 15 Copenhagen meeting in December 2009.

Images of the EU Beyond its Borders: Issue‐Specific and Regional Perceptions of European Union Power and Leadership

This article systematically investigates both regional and issue‐specific variation in external perceptions of the European Union (EU) as a global power and an international leader. While most studies on EU external perceptions focus on a one‐dimensional vision of EU leadership and/or great‐powerness, it is argued here that these perceptions are highly issue‐specific, multilayered and differentiating. This study draws on data collected through elite interviews in three regions: the Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa. The findings make a contribution to the debate on the perception of third states on the international role of the EU.

Culture and International Mediation: Exploring theoretical and empirical linkages

Culture is undoubtedly one of the most significant aspects of identity, yet our understanding of the concept and particularly of its consequences for international conflict management is underdeveloped. In this article, we test the hypothesis that cultural differences between parties reflect diversity and contradictions, and that these differences compound the difficulties faced by conflicting parties in finding effective mediated outcomes. Several theories that deal with cultures impact on conflict management are presented and a model is introduced that permits us to test the hypothesis empirically. Five variables that measure culture are examined; these include geographical proximity, nature of the political system, political rights, civil rights and religion. The analysis suggests that all but one (nature of the political system) have a significant impact on mediation outcomes.

Free to Trade? Commission Autonomy in Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations

In this article, we suggest that the degree of (dis)unity – both between the member states (MS) in the Council and within the Commission – is a key factor in affecting the balance between Commission autonomy and MS control in international trade negotiations. We shed empirical light on this issue, and on the relative influence of MS and the Commission in general, through a case study of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. We suggest that the differing preferences and priorities among MS and the relative cohesiveness of the Commission provided the Commission with quite a high degree of autonomy during all phases of the EPA negotiations. The informational and procedural advantages given by its institutional position as sole negotiator also contributed to the significant autonomy of the Commission.

Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements

Abstract Ensuring coherence in the European Union’s relations with other actors is no easy task and particularly difficult when several distinct policy areas are handled within one and the same international negotiation. Such was the case in the recently concluded negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with regional groupings of Asian, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The aim of this article is to analyse the challenges facing the EU when struggling to ensure coherence in its relations with developing countries and to shed light on the institutional characteristics that either prevent or promote coherence. It is argued that the highly compartmentalized character of EU policy fields and the disjointed decision‐making machinery constitute historically grounded institutional obstacles to coherence. At the same time, however, both external institutional linkages — primarily to the WTO — and the internal institutional definition of EPA negotiations as trade negotiations have a logic of their own, which favour a coherent approach. The result is a process of “imposed coherence”: while the EU formally acts as one united body in the negotiations, the disjointed character of EU policy making means that the negotiation stance of the Union is fundamentally ambiguous and characterized by significant tensions and conflicts between policy objectives.

Development and democracy. What have we learned and how

How much is democracy dependent upon supportive economic and social conditions? This question, which has occupied political scientists and sociologists for almost half a century, has attracted special attention in the last ten years as more and more countries have engaged in efforts to democratise. This volume is the first collection to take stock of current literature and put it into context. This book highlights the principal new gains of knowledge as well as continuing gaps in our understanding of the relationship between development and democracy. The chapters cover key issues in the field of comparative politics such as: * economic development and democracy * globalisation and democracy * class and democracy * state and democracy * civil society and democracy * and various institutional arrangements and democratic governance Development and Democracy confirms the robust relationship between levels of economic development and democracy, but suggests that globalization is a key variable in determining the tenuous nature of this relationship in the periphery of the world economy. It raises new questions about the role of social classes in democratization, and points to the importance of including the nature of the state as a factor in the study of democratisation. A further important finding is that countries with mixed legal systems correlate less positively with democracy than do countries with more homogenous legal systems. Moreover, Development and Democracy shows conclusively that the way researchers design their studies has a major impact on their findings.