Ole Therkildsen

Public sector reform in a poor, aid‐dependent country, Tanzania

African public sectors went through many changes during the 1960s and 1970s in response to political, economic and social pressures. They expanded in size but remained, at least in design, hierarchical and centralized. Their formal relations to society did not undergo any significant changes either. Generally, the reforms now under way are significantly different from earlier ones. Most are inspired by the new public management (NPM) paradigm. They are also much more radical in their aims, among which are: to reduce the core functions of the state; redraw the boundaries between political and administrative responsibilities; emphasize efficiency; redefine relations between public and private sectors; strengthen accountability; reduce corruption; reorganize organizations and staff; change values and attitudes; and exploit new technologies. This article focuses on a paradox of reform in Tanzania: multiple changes are pursued in the public sector despite fragile domestic political support to the reform package as a whole and despite few service delivery improvements on the ground. It is argued that this is the result of substantial external influences, fragmented domestic policy making, weak links between policy making and implementation, and questionable assumptions about some of the key NPM-inspired reform measures. Moreover, the analyses highlight a number of differences with some of the recent reform literature. Copyright

Autonomous Tax Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Case of the Uganda Revenue Authority

Abstract According to standard New Public Management propositions a (semi) autonomous revenue authority is a remedy for many problems that plague the public sector, such as multiple layers of principals and agent, Byzantine rules, low pay, and poor and distorted incentives, which all contribute to unfair and inefficient revenue collection. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), established in 1991, is the oldest of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa. The analyses presented in this article indicate that URA autonomy initially increased but later declined. Paradoxically, real autonomy attracts political and bureaucratic attention that may, in turn, undermine it. Thus the decline in the URAs autonomy has come both from below, with the loss of the agencys legitimacy from the perspective of taxpayers, and from above, with a loss of formal and informal authority vis-à-vis the Ministry of Finance and state elites. The Presidents role in the decline of URA autonomy has been especially significant. That of donors has been ambiguous—strengthening the agencys autonomy in some respects, weakening it in others. In addition, autonomy has been eroded as a consequence of declining staff motivation and clientelistic personnel practices. Revenue collection has suffered as a result.

Elections and landmark policies in Tanzania and Uganda

Much of the relevant literature on Africa downplays the salience of elections for policy-making and implementation. Instead, the importance of factors such as clientelism, ethnicity, organized interest groups, and donor influence, is emphasized. We argue that, in addition, elections now motivate political elites to focus on policies they perceive to be able to gain votes. This is based on analyses of six landmark decisions made during the last 15 years in the social, productive, and public finance sectors in Tanzania and Uganda. Such policies share a number of key characteristics: they are clearly identifiable with the party in power; citizens are targeted countrywide; and policy implementation aims at immediate, visible results.

The Economics and Politics of Local Content in African Extractives: Lessons from Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique

Extractive foreign direct investment (FDI) is heralded as the new development opportunity in Africa. A key precondition for FDIs contribution, however, is that foreign investors create ‘local content’ by linking up to the local economy. Consequently, African host governments are contemplating ways in which they can promote local content. This paper examines local content policies and practices in three African countries – Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique – all countries with huge expectations for extractive based economic development. It is found that in spite of high ambitions and strong expectations, local content is limited, shallow and inefficient. The paper explores why local content apparently is so difficult to achieve in these African countries. It is argued that conventional economic explanations, focusing on market failures and weak institutions, are partial at best and therefore must be complemented with political explanations. Hence, it is proposed that local content practices in the three countries can be understood partly as the results of ruling elites’ efforts to build and maintain stable political coalitions.

Decentralization, participation and spatial equity in rural tanzania: A comment☆

Abstract “Decentralization”, a structural reform of Tanzanias subnational political-administrative system, started in 1972 and was abolished in 1984. It was evaluated by Maro (1990) in this journal. He found that the reform promoted participation and decreased spatial inequalities. These findings, however, contradict other research findings. Moreover, the impact of various national policies are disregarded. In several cases the findings are not supported by his own data. Finally the impact of donor involvement is ignored. The positive assessment of this structural reform must therefore be considerably qualified.

Short-term resource mobilization for recurrent financing of rural local governments in Tanzania

Abstract Rural local governments in Tanzania were reintroduced in 1984. They face the serious problem of financing the operation and maintenance of basic services. The problems have accumulated over the last two decades due to macroeconomic imbalances, past development policies, and institutional problems. Estimates of the additional funds needed for adequate financing of salary and nonsalary recurrent expenditures components are provided. The short-term possibilities of raising these funds domestically are analyzed at the village, district and central levels. Various economic, political and institutional constraints are identified. Competing claims on public sector revenues are discussed. It is concluded that without short-term external assistance for recurrent financing of local governments, basic services are likely to deteriorate even further. Such assistance will probably become increasingly important in the 1990s. Without it the domestic policy changes and administrative improvements needed to mobilize resources in the long run will be difficult to achieve.

Working in Neopatrimonial Settings: Public Sector Staff Perceptions in Tanzania and Uganda

This chapter focuses on staff perceptions of the use of merit principles in staff management. It focuses specifically on hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion practices in the public sector in Tanzania and Uganda and on how such practices influence organisational performance and staff motivation to work in such ostensibly neopatrimonial settings. The chapter briefly introduces some of the main features of public service in Tanzania and Uganda. The concept of NP is presented and discussed, and the methods used to study it with respect to staff management are presented in the chapter. It shows that how variation in adherence to bureaucratic rule is clearly associated with variation in organisational performance. The chapter points out that the legal foundation for legal-rational behaviour is often weak, and that it can be analytically and conceptually difficult to distinguish whether practices are driven by merit principles, patronage or clientelism. Keywords: clientelism; neopatrimonialism; staff management; Tanzania; Uganda