Olive Emil Wetter

Adaptive Computer-Based Training Increases on the Job Performance of X-Ray Screeners

Due to severe terrorist attacks in recent years, aviation security issues have moved into the focus of politicians as well as the general public. Effective screening of passenger bags using state-of-the-art X-ray screening systems is essential to prevent terrorist attacks. The performance of the screening process depends critically on the security personnel, because they decide whether bags are OK or whether they might contain a prohibited item. Screening X-ray images of passenger bags for dangerous and prohibited items effectively and efficiently is a demanding object recognition task. Effectiveness of computer-based training (CBT) on X-ray detection performance was assessed using computer-based tests and on the job performance measures using threat image projection (TIP). It was found that adaptive CBT is a powerful tool to increase detection performance and efficiency of screeners in X-ray image interpretation. Moreover, the results of training could be generalized to the real life situation as shown in the increased detection performance in TIP not only for trained items, but also for new (untrained) items. These results illustrate that CBT is a very useful tool to increase airport security from a human factors perspective.

External and internal influences on the security control process at airports

In past years, a lot of research has been done in the field of airport security control. Mostly, researchers that focused on human factor issues looked very closely at the x-ray screening process or at covert testing. However, it has to be taken into account that security control is typically integrated in a competitive, market-oriented environment. Thus, facilitation aspects, such as the maximal capacity (also known as throughput) of a security control line, clearly reflect one important key performance index. In a series of studies, the impact of external factors, for instance seasonal variability of temperature or number of manual baggage inspections, as well as the impact of internal factors, such as the allocation of tasks within security control crew members, were measured. The scenarios with varied internal factors consisted of different manipulations in the work process without changing given security rules, protocols or changes in infrastructure. For example, the Security Officer helping passengers preparing their bags at the roller table has been taken away from this position and assigned as second person for baggage inspection. Implications of these scenarios on measures of efficiency, such as throughput, as well as on subjective measures, such as ratings of workload and stress, have been assessed. Results show that external factors correlate with throughput remarkably and that even slight changes in the process can have a significant impact on the mentioned domains. Experiences made are discussed in order to provide suggestions of useful and feasible optimizations of the security control process.

Covert testing at airports: Exploring methodology and results

Large efforts are made in order to enhance human factors in airport security, but one very important area, namely covert or infiltration tests, are often neglected. Covert tests are most important not only for quality control and risk analysis, but also for training purposes, such as for example the training of appropriate reactions in dangerous situations. Therefore, conducting covert tests at airports is a very useful approach for assessing the effectiveness of the security control and offers a possibility to uncover weaknesses in the security process by simulating the case of emergency. Its main benefit is the high ecological validity almost unparalleled by other methods. The present scientific exploratory applied study is one of the first of its kind worldwide, which analyses the results of covert tests collected at a large European airport over a period of fourteen calendar months. Statistical analyses were performed using Mann-Whitney u-tests, chi-square tests and binary logistic regression analysis. Results will focus on differences in detection performance between different test objects and different places of concealment. Additional factors included in the analyses will be time taken for pat-down search, sex, age, work experience, as well as the security officerpsilas reaction to weapon detection. Methodological problems will be discussed and suggestions made for further research in this area.

Bringing adversaries together: The importance of a common management-level approach in complex work domains

Ensuring smooth operation of an airport is a complex task with many stakeholders involved that have to work together closely in order to achieve optimal results. In particular, the field of security control harbors diverging interests of different entities that share responsibility for secure and timely flights. These entities usually comprise governmental organizations (e.g., legislative authorities, police) and private companies (e.g., airport operators, private security companies). Due to conflicting interests between these entities, managers might perceive each other as adversaries rather than as partners for collaboration. To our knowledge, the present report is the first one to relate procedure and results of a fruitful collaboration on management level between representatives of these different entities at an airport, including a governmental organization as the executive, i.e., carrying out the security control, and a private company (the airport operator). In the setting of the security control at a large European airport, the Productivity Measurement and Enhancement System (ProMES) methodology [1] was chosen to identify stakeholders in the security control process as a first step in order to be able to define their interests, demands, and needs in a second step. Subsequently, justified demands were grouped and categorized into six goal domains. For each goal domain, key performance indicators were developed. Last but not least, the indicators were prioritized by weighing their relevance against each other in order to resolve conflicting interests. This process can be rather quick and efficient provided it is well prepared and monitored. It is further suggested to have an independent facilitator supervise and moderate the process. This study highlights the importance of bringing together high level managers of different organizational entities with a systematical approach in order to pave the way for good cooperation in complex work domains. As a result, stakeholders and demands can be identified, conflicting demands can be discussed, and priorities set. Subsequently, those guidelines can be handed over to the next lower level in the organizational hierarchy. Supervisors on this next level can then define goals for their respective domains using the guidelines provided by the management.

What Is Suspicious When Trying to be Inconspicuous? Criminal Intentions Inferred From Nonverbal Behavioral Cues.

The present study investigates whether nonverbal behavioral cues to hidden criminal intentions during the build-up phase of a criminal act can be measured. To this end, we created recordings of actors once in a search situation and once committing a mock crime (theft or bomb placing) in a public crowded area. For ecological validation, we used authentic CCTV footage of real crimes in Experiment 1. In this experiment, the two behavioral clusters pattern of movement in space and nonverbal communication behavior were analyzed. The results showed a deviance in pattern of movement in space for offenders’ compared with the nonoffenders’ condition as well as a bystanders’ baseline. There was no significant difference between nonverbal communication behavior in the offenders’ and nonoffenders’ conditions. Experiment 2 was conducted to examine the two behavior clusters use of object- and self-adaptors while controlling for interpersonal differences. The results showed an increased use of object- and decreased use of self-adaptors during the build-up phase of a mock crime compared with a control condition (search). Thus, nonverbal behavior of offenders seems to differ from nonverbal behavior of nonoffenders. However, this holds only under the conditions of a valid baseline and of judging not only a single, typical behavioral cue but a whole cluster of nonverbal behaviors, such as pattern of movement in space or use of object-adaptors in general.

Terrorism research: should we focus on the opponent or on our own people?

In terrorism research, three different sources of information and data exist: the terrorists and their environment; the incidents; and the population. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of research that is concerned with, or relies on, any of the mentioned sources. An in-depth understanding of the methodological issues that come with these sources is important to correctly interpret results from scientific studies. It is highlighted how the different scientific approaches add to a holistic view of terrorism as a phenomenon. Furthermore, the double-edged sword of information in the field of terrorism is discussed. From these deliberations, guidance concerning the future work of both scholars and decision-makers can be deducted.

Erratum to: A holistic approach for evaluating liquid explosive detection systems

Consequently, the wording of the 4th paragraph of the discussion has to be slightly adapted: lines 4–8: “We found a relation between the subjective overall impression of the devices and their rate of ‘problematic cases’ (i.e., LAGs that either produced a false alarm or could not be scanned). Another relation was found between the overall impression and the judgment of “how easy to operate” the device was.” J Transp Secur (2013) 6:389 DOI 10.1007/s12198-013-0127-x