Olivier Guyader

Distributional issues in the operation of rights-based fisheries management systems

Rights-based management regimes are considered by economists as an important solution to the problems of excess capacity and biological over-harvesting of fisheries. In practice, adoption of such regimes, and particularly of those relying on individual quota allocations, has often met with resistance from within the fisheries concerned. A key reason for this resistance appears to be the distributional conflicts which arise in the process of implementing the regimes. An economic analysis of the nature of these conflicts in the different contexts in which they have been observed is proposed. The approach centres on the way in which distributional conflicts can influence the operation of management systems and their impacts on fisheries, from the country to the individual firm level. As an illustration, an analysis of the economic processes at firm level is developed based on the simulation of a fishery managed under individual transferable quotas.

A bioeconomic analysis of the impact of decommissioning programs: Application to a limited-entry french scallop fishery

The objective of this paper is to assess the benefits and costs of decommissioning policies aimed at reducing fleet capacity through premiums offered by the public authority to fishermen to scrap their vessels. A case study, the limited entry scallop fishery of the Saint Brieuc Bay, France, is used to consider the problem of excess capacity and to model the bioeconomic consequences of disinvestment behavior. Special attention is paid to the assessment of fishermens willingness to leave the fishery and to the implementation of public policy in terms of budget level and premiums offered to the fishermen. Spreadsheet simulations show that the impact of decommissioning programs is positive in terms of net surplus, even in the case of increasing technical efficiency of the vessels.

Simulating the Effect of Regulatory Systems in a Fishery, An Application to the French Driftnet Albacore Fleet

With a thin economic component, most bio-economic models of fisheries failto assess the effects of the regulation systems on firms. In order to analysethe short term consequences of different management schemes, a simulationmodel is applied to the French driftnet albacore fleet: licence allocation withdriftnet regulation, individual quotas, and individual transferable quotaswithout any input control. Vessel technology is estimated by using the datacollected, and groups of vessels are distinguished according to criteria ofperformance. We present the adjustment within firms and between groupsunder different scenarios (limited entry with and without driftnetregulation, individual quotas and individual transferable quotas allocation),and we compare their results in terms of quasi-rent value and otherindicators such as hake harvests or dolphin by-catches.

Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution

ABSTRACT Most fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions. JEL Codes: Q22, J33, M52.

Capacity and Scale Inefficiency: Application of Data Envelopment Analysis in the Case of the French Seaweed Fleet

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models are applied to the main French seaweed fleet to examine capacity output, capacity utilization, and scale inefficiency. Coastal seaweed vessels target only one output—kelp—with the same gear but with different input level combinations. The fishery is seasonal and subject mainly to input regulations, especially a one trip per day regulation implemented in 1987. The consequence was a decline in total observed output and a fall in capacity output and efficient output. Only the largest vessels and a few small vessels harvesting without this regulatory constraint operate at the optimal scale. The question of a change in regulation, especially a shift to an individual quota system, is raised.

Managing fleet capacity effectively under second-hand market redistribution

Fishing capacity management policies have been traditionally implemented at national level with national targets for capacity reduction. More recently, capacity management policies have increasingly targeted specific fisheries. French fisheries spatially vary along the French coastline and are associated to specific regions. Capacity management policies, however, ignore the capital mobility associated with second-hand vessel trade between regions. This is not an issue for national policies but could limit the effectiveness of regional capacity management policies. A gravity model and a random-effect Poisson regression model are used to analyze the determinants and spatial extent of the second-hand market in France. This study is based on panel data from the French Atlantic Ocean between 1992 and 2009. The trade flows between trading partners is found to increase with their sizes and to be spatially concentrated. Despite the low trade flows between regions, a net impact analysis shows that fishing capacity is redistributed by the second-hand market to regions on the Channel and Aquitaine from central regions. National capacity management policies (constructions/destructions) have induced a net decrease in regional fleet capacity with varying magnitude across regions. Unless there is a change of policy instruments or their scale of implementation, the operation of the second-hand market decreases the effectiveness of regional capacity management policies in regions on the Channel and Aquitaine.

Existing Territories and Formalization of Territorial Use Rights for Moored Fish Aggregating Devices: The Case of Small-Scale Fisheries in the La Désirade Island (France)

ABSTRACT Moored fish aggregating devices (MFADs) are used by small-scale fishers to access fish species difficult to harvest in large numbers. In the case of Guadeloupe (Caribbean area), the use of MFADs has increased considerably and this is causing congestion in these fishing areas and creating conflict between fishers. The aim of this article is to understand how informal fishing territories around the La Desirade Island were established and examine these territories through the lens of economic defendability theory. Results of semistructured interviews show that MFAD fishers display territoriality along MFAD tract lines forming quasi-privatized areas. Territoriality in this article is based on the following factors: the type of targeted resources, the cost of harvesting, the defending of territories, and the acknowledgment of territories by the fishing community. Conflicts and utilization of MFADs (overcapacity) have raised an opportunity to create co-managed legalized territorial use rights for fisheries.

Information on sellers and buyers characteristics: added value to explain price formation at primary fish markets in managed French scallop fisheries

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to explore, through a hedonic approach, the factors that might explain the price variability for the French-managed fishery of scallop at primary fish markets. In addition to factors classically identified in the current literature like intrinsic product characteristics or markets situation, the characteristics of operators are tested. The relationships of loyalty between sellers and buyers, and market assiduity are notably considered.