Olivier Sterck

Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims

Has immigration been securitised at the EU level? The question has been hotly discussed, but no consensus has been reached. This article claims that two shortcomings – one methodological, one theoretical – in the empirical conduct of securitisation theory (ST) have provoked this lack of consensus. Taking this situation as an opportunity, a quantitative method is introduced that addresses these two shortcomings, thereby helping to reach a stronger claim on the securitisation of immigration at the EU level. By measuring the intensity of the security framing in EU legislation on immigration, the method helps avoid simplistic binary statements of (non-)securitisation and encourages the scholar to acknowledge the complex, multifaceted reality of vast political fields. The results contribute to accrediting the thesis according to which immigration has been securitised at the EU level, but nuances it by demonstrating a significant variation between the various subfields of the policy (e.g. asylum, legal immigration).

From Rebellion to Electoral Violence. Evidence from Burundi

What causes electoral violence in postconflict countries? The theoretical literature emphasizes the potential role of (1) ethnic grievances, (2) political competition, and (3) specialists in violence. Our study is the first to test these three hypotheses simultaneously. Using a unique data set on electoral violence in Burundi, we study variations in the intensity of electoral violence between neighboring municipalities, relying on the fact that these are more likely to have similar unobservable characteristics. Interestingly, we find that electoral violence did not result from ethnic grievances, which goes against the commonly held view that this factor necessarily plays a key role in violence in the region. Rather, we show that electoral violence is higher in municipalities characterized by acute polarization between demobilized rebel groups, fierce political competition, and a high proportion of Hutu. The effect of political competition is stronger in the presence of numerous demobilized rebels.

Theorizing and Measuring Emotions in Conflict

While recent research has demonstrated the key role played by emotion in conflicts, the interplay between the individual and collective dimensions of this variable has not yet been fully conceptualized and satisfyingly measured. Focusing on the 2011 Palestinian statehood bid at the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, this article highlights the circular character of group-based emotional dynamics and stresses the importance of “emotional worldviews” and “emotional configurations.” We subsequently provide an innovative, robust, and repeatable quantitative method for the direct measuring of these two components. This threefold contribution—theoretical, methodological, empirical—completes recent models (chiefly the appraisal-based framework) and unfolds new research avenues for the study of the role of individual and collective emotions in conflicts.

Why are Testing Rates so Low in Sub-Saharan Africa? Misconceptions and Strategic Behaviors

Abstract Voluntary testing and counseling (VTC) is a popular method for fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The purpose of VTC is to reduce the incidence of the virus in a two-fold manner. First, testing provides access to health care and antiretroviral therapies that diminish the transmission rate of the virus. Second, counseling encourages safer behavior for not only individuals who test HIV-negative and wish to avoid HIV/AIDS infection but also altruistic individuals who test HIV-positive and wish to protect their partners from becoming infected by HIV. Surprisingly, DHS surveys that were conducted in sub-Saharan Africa provide empirical evidence that testing services are underutilized. Moreover, it is rare for both partners in a couple to be tested for HIV. This paper proposes a theoretical model that indicates how misperceptions about the HIV/AIDS virus may explain these puzzles. More specifically, this study demonstrates that individuals who are at risk of HIV infection may act strategically to avoid the cost of testing if they overestimate the risk of HIV transmission or believe that health care is not required if HIV is asymptomatic. The correction of false beliefs and the promotion of self-testing are expected to increase HIV testing rates.

Security through numbers? Experimentally assessing the impact of numerical arguments in security communication:

Numerical arguments are increasingly present in security communication and are widely assumed to possess a distinct capacity to make an argument convincing, thereby contributing to the dynamics of securitization. Yet, does the inclusion of numbers really enhance the strength of rhetorical attempts to convince an audience that something or someone is a security problem? We examine this question by developing an experimental design that connects cognitive theories of information processing with theories of security and risk communication. Contrary to a widely shared view, our results suggest that numbers do not have a direct, unambiguous, or unconditional impact on the strength of security rhetoric. Quantitative information only enhances direct attempts to securitize issues under very specific circumstances and, even in these cases, has ambiguous effects. Factors such as the legitimacy of the individual who makes the argument may play an important role in determining the impact of numbers in security communication.

Allocation of development assistance for health: is the predominance of national income justified?

Abstract Gross national income (GNI) per capita is widely regarded as a key determinant of health outcomes. Major donors heavily rely on GNI per capita to allocate development assistance for health (DAH). This article questions this paradigm by analysing the determinants of health outcomes using cross-sectional data from 99 countries in 2012. We use disability-adjusted life years (Group I) per capita as our main indicator for health outcomes. We consider four primary variables: GNI per capita, institutional capacity, individual poverty and the epidemiological surroundings. Our empirical strategy has two innovations. First, we construct a health poverty line of 10.89 international-

Rethinking international and domestic financing for HIV in low- and middle-income countries

per day, which measures the minimum level of income an individual needs to have access to basic healthcare. Second, we take the contagious nature of communicable diseases into account, by estimating the extent to which the population health in neighbouring countries (the epidemiological surroundings) affects health outcomes. We apply a spatial two-stage least-squares model to mitigate the risks of reverse causality. Our model captures 92% of the variation in health outcomes. We emphasize four findings. First, GNI per capita is not a significant predictor of health outcomes once other factors are controlled for. Second, the poverty gap below the 10.89 health poverty line is a good measure of universal access to healthcare, as it explains 19% of deviation in health outcomes. Third, the epidemiological surroundings in which countries are embedded capture as much as 47% of deviation in health outcomes. Finally, institutional capacity explains 10% of deviation in health outcomes. Our empirical findings suggest that allocation frameworks for DAH should not only take into account national income, which remains an important indicator of countries’ financial capacity, but also individual poverty, governance and epidemiological surroundings to increase impact on health outcomes.

Financing the HIV response in sub-Saharan Africa from domestic sources: Moving beyond a normative approach

The scaling up of treatment for HIV across the world has been one of the most significant recent achievements in international health. But the commitment on antiretroviral treatment also creates a financial liability which is large and insufficiently recognized. In this article, we explore how this financial liability could be met by domestic and international sources. We argue that (1) governments and donors should recognize the magnitude of the problem and develop tools to manage the liability, (2) allocation of aid should be more rational, transparent and sustainable, (3) more fiscal space should be created domestically, (4) borrowing offers some limited potential for prevention interventions characterized by high returns on investment, and (5) efficiency gains, while not in themselves likely to bridge the resourcing gap, should be energetically pursued.