Omar W. Nasim

Observation, working images and procedure : the 'Great Spiral' in Lord Rosse's astronomical record books and beyond

This paper examines the interrelations between astronomical images of nebulae and their observation. In particular, using the case of the ‘Great Spiral’ (M51), we follow this nebula beginning with its discovery and first sketch made by the third Earl of Rosse in 1845, to giving an account, using archival sources, of exactly how other images of the same object were produced over the years and stabilized within the record books of the Rosse project. It will be found that a particular ‘procedure’ was employed using ‘working images’ that interacted with descriptions, other images and the telescopic object itself. This stabilized not only some set of standard images of the object, but also a very potent conception of spirality as well, i.e. as a ‘normal form’. Finally, two cases will be contrasted, one being George Bonds application of this spiral conception to the nebula in Orion, and the other Wilhelm Tempels rejection of the spiral form in M51.

Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian philosophers : constructing the world

time of writing. As a result, Nietzsche may appear to the student or novice reader – who is, after all, the intended audience – as almost miraculously original and even prescient with respect to his observations on cognition and linguistics. If this volume is to provide readers with a backdrop for the developmental movements of his published writings, then the general omission of these influences wrongly presents Nietzsche as the icon of the inspired and isolated genius, an image long ago abandoned. This volume, in sum, will serve students as a handsome and ably translated update of the Breazeale edition and will widen the avenue of inquiry into Nietzsche’s early work. If it stands as their only impression of Nietzsche’s early writing, it will have inculcated a skewed image of the philosopher in the ways outlined above. If, however, it inspires the novice to dig more deeply into the wealth of available materials and to examine the recent scholarship on the early Nietzsche, then it will have done a significant service to the field. Anthony K. Jensen CUNY/Lehman College a 2010, Anthony K. Jensen

The Spaces of Knowledge: Bertrand Russell, Logical Construction, and the Classification of the Sciences

What Russell regarded to be the ‘chief outcome’ of his 1914 Lowell Lectures at Harvard can only be fully appreciated, I argue, if one embeds the outcome back into the ‘classificatory problem’ that many at the time were heavily engaged in. The problem focused on the place and relationships between the newly formed or recently professionalized disciplines such as psychology, Erkenntnistheorie, physics, logic and philosophy. The prime metaphor used in discussions about the classificatory problem by British philosophers was a spatial one, with such motifs as ‘standpoints’, ‘place’ and ‘perspectives’ in the space of knowledge. In fact, Russell’s construction of a perspectival space of six-dimensions was meant precisely to be a timely solution to the widely discussed classificatory problem.

The Methods of Construction

We have seen some ways in which Russell’s notion of sense-data was informed by the problems of the Controversy. In this chapter, I now want to relate an application of Russell’s method of logical construction to some of the issues already discussed. Russell applies this method to the old problem of the external world. What I wish to suggest in this chapter, however, is that even though this problem has a long and venerable history among philosophers certain features of both the problem and the solution offered by Russell are influenced by the dialectics of the Controversy. Obviously such a problem has links, for example, with the various articulations of the Early Modern Empiricist philosophers, like Hume.286 This ancestry is extremely important to keep in mind, but not at the expense of missing distinguishing aspects of Russell’s doctrine. One way to go about sifting out these aspects is simply to compare Russell’s articulation of the problem of the external world and his proposed solution with the articulations and solutions of the old Empiricist Philosophers.

Extending the Gaze: The Temporality of Astronomical Paperwork

Argument Keeping records has always been an essential part of science. Aside from natural history and the laboratory sciences, no other observational science reflects this activity of record-keeping better than astronomy. Central to this activity, historically speaking, are tools so mundane and common that they are easily overlooked; namely, the notebook and the pencil. One obvious function of these tools is clearly a mnemonic one. However, there are other relevant functions of paperwork that often go unnoticed. Among these, I argue, is the strategic use made of different procedures of record keeping to prolong observational time with a target object. Highlighting this function will help us to appreciate the supporting role played by the notebook and the pencil to extend the observational time spent with a target object. With objects as delicate, faint, and mysterious as the nebulae, the procedures used to record their observations helped nineteenth-century observers overcome the temporal handicaps and limitations of large and clumsy telescopes, mounted in the altazimuth manner. To demonstrate the importance of paper and pencil, I will closely examine the observing books, the drawings found therein, and the telescopes of three nineteenth-century observers of the nebulae: Sir John F. W. Herschel, Lord Rosse, and William Lassell.

The Method of Logical Construction

Many in the Controversy proposed some sort of construction as an answer to the problem of the external world. Stout, Alexander and Nunn tried to do this explicitly to eschew inference and mere postulation, in order to find some more holistic and fundamental way of connecting our immediate experiences to the physical world. But we have also seen some of the limitations of these constructions, such as the open reliance on wholly psychological processes, and the general and sometimes incomplete procedure of these constructions. This latter point is important to stress, because as we shall now see, Russell believed he could provide a more definite procedure of construction. Russell made both these points, against those in the Controversy, after describing the general details of his logical constructions, he says in OKEW that the problem which the above considerations are intended to elucidate is one whose importance and even existence has been concealed by the unfortunate separation of different studies which prevails throughout the civilized world. Physicists, ignorant and contemptuous of philosophy, have been content to assume their particles, points, and instants in practice, while conceding, with ironical politeness, that their concepts laid no claim to metaphysical validity … Psychologists, who have done invaluable work in bringing to light the chaotic nature of the crude materials supplied by the unmanipulated sensation, have been ignorant of mathematics and modern logic, and have therefore been content to say that matter, space, and time are ‘intellectual constructions’, without making any attempt to show in detail either how the intellect can construct them, or what secures the practical validity which physics shows them to possess. Philosophers, it is to be hoped, will come to recognise that they cannot achieve any solid success in such problems without some slight knowledge of logic, mathematics, and physics.374

British New Realism The Language of Madness

In this chapter I will use G.F. Stout’s doctrine as a pivotal point from which I can examine as much of the Controversy as possible. In many ways this approach will also reflect the historical situation in which Stout played a central role in articulating his own position in response to challenges from various philosophers. I shall also examine some of the salient features of Samuel Alexander’s position, which developed in counter-reaction to Stout’s articulations. I will then move on in the next chapter to exploring T.P. Nunn’s New Realism in light of the writings of both Alexander and Stout.

Stout’s Proto-New-Realism

In this chapter I will examine Stout’s solution to the problem of the external world. Specifically, I will be looking at how he tried to solve this problem within a series of articles that began with one published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in 1904.17 This series of articles continued well into the middle of the second decade. This momentum was mainly due to the vast amount of interest generated by some of the articulations and solutions advanced by Stout. Many of Britain’s brightest philosophers engaged Stout’s doctrine head on. This dialectic is what I have called the Controversy.

Russell and the Nature of Sense-Data

In the first three chapters I have tried to outline three related points in connection with the Controversy. The first point was with regard to the way in which Stout not only played a central and influential role in the development of this Controversy, but also in the very articulation of his adversaries’ doctrines, and thereby, in the formation of the British New Realism. The second point I tried to disentangle was the respective ways the three philosophers discussed so far tried to solve the problem of the external world. And finally, the third point, extensively discussed, was the nature of sensible objects, whether they were mental or non-mental. Especially in relation to Bertrand Russell and the notion of sense-data, it will be this last point that I will now focus on.

British New Realism The Language of Common-Sense

In the 1910 volume of PAS, Alexander’s was not the only response to Stout’s 1909. We also find T.P. Nunn’s reply to Stout’s objections to Alexander. This reply by Nunn was positioned directly against Stout’s 1904 and 1909 papers, and served not only as a defence of Alexander’s New Realism, but also as an independent articulation of the British New Realism. Nunn’s paper was read as a part of a symposium, along with a response from F.C.S. Schiller. I will not be examining Schiller’s thoughts on the question, rather I will attempt to briefly outline some of the salient features of Nunn’s paper.