Oren Gazal-Ayal

Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group Bias in Judicial Decisions - Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment

Does ethnic identity affect judicial decisions? We provide new evidence on ethnic biases in judicial behavior by examining the decisions of Arab and Jewish judges in first bail hearings of Arab and Jewish suspects in Israeli courts. Our setting avoids the potential bias from unobservable case characteristics by exploiting the random assignment of judges to cases during weekends and by focusing on the difference in ethnic disparity between Arab and Jewish judges. The study concentrates on the early-stage decisions in the judicial criminal process, controlling for the states position and excluding agreements, thereby allowing us to distinguish judicial bias from other sources of ethnic disparities. We find systematic evidence of in-group (same ethnic group) bias in detention decisions. However, in cases where the decision is to detain, no ethnic bias was found in the length of the detention. Possible interpretations and implications of these findings are discussed.

Statutory Sentencing Reform in Israel: Exploring the Sentencing Law of 2012

Israel Law Review / Volume 46 / Issue 03 / November 2013, pp 455 479 DOI: 10.1017/S0021223713000162, Published online: 23 September 2013 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0021223713000162 How to cite this article: Julian V Roberts and Oren Gazal-Ayal (2013). Statutory Sentencing Reform in Israel: Exploring the Sentencing Law of 2012. Israel Law Review, 46, pp 455-479 doi:10.1017/ S0021223713000162 Request Permissions : Click here

Imbalances of Power in ADR

In recent decades, Alternative Dispute Resolution processes have gained worldwide recognition, a growing role in legal practice, and academic attention. Despite their professed advantages they have also faced fierce opposition. In a seminal article, Owen Fiss argued that ADR exacerbates imbalances of power between the parties. But while the theoretical argument has been widely discussed and developed in academic literature, empirical evidence has remained scant. This Article purports to bridge the gap. It empirically examines the impact of two seemingly relevant factors in inherently imbalanced legal disputes: representation and dispute resolution method. Arguably, professional representation of weaker parties may reduce the effects of inequality, whereas less formal, transparent and adjudicatory processes may exacerbate them.