Orestes P. Hastings

Socioeconomic Variation in the Effect of Economic Conditions on Marriage and Nonmarital Fertility in the United States: Evidence From the Great Recession

The United States has become increasingly characterized by stark class divides in family structure. Poor women are less likely to marry than their more affluent counterparts but are far more likely to have a birth outside of marriage. Recent theoretical and qualitative work at the intersection of demography and cultural sociology suggests that these patterns are generated because poor women have high, nearly unattainable, economic standards for marriage but make a much weaker connection between economic standing and fertility decisions. We use the events of the Great Recession, leveraging variation in the severity of the crisis between years and across states, to examine how exposure to worse state-level economic conditions is related to poor women’s likelihood of marriage and of having a nonmarital birth between 2008 and 2012. In accord with theory, we find that women of low socioeconomic status (SES) exposed to worse economic conditions are indeed somewhat less likely to marry. However, we also find that unmarried low-SES women exposed to worse economic conditions significantly reduce their fertility; economic standing is not disconnected from nonmarital fertility. Our results suggest that economic concerns were connected to fertility decisions for low-SES unmarried women during the Great Recession.

Not a lonely crowd? Social connectedness, religious service attendance, and the spiritual but not religious.

Using the 2006-2014 General Social Survey and 2006-2012 Portraits of American Life Study, I find that on three dimensions of social connectedness: social interaction frequency, core discussion network size, and number of close ties, that religious service attenders are more connected than religious non-attenders and then either spiritual nor religious, but there are few differences between attenders and the spiritual but not religious. Difference-in-differences and fixed-effects models show little evidence that switches between categories are associated with changes in connectedness, and additional models show that prior social connectedness explains only a small amount of future switches. This paper challenges assumptions that the non-religious are a homogenous group lacking the benefits provided though the social networks of religious congregations and has implications for research on what it means to be spiritual, measuring religion and spirituality, and understanding the role of formal organizations in social life.

Income Inequality and Class Divides in Parental Investments

Historic increases in income inequality have coincided with widening class divides in parental investments of money and time in children. These widening class gaps are significant because parental investment is one pathway by which advantage is transmitted across generations. Using over three decades of micro-data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the American Heritage Time Use Survey linked to state-year measures of income inequality, we test the relationship between income inequality and class gaps in parental investment. We find robust evidence of wider class gaps in parental financial investments in children—but not parental time investments in children—when state-level income inequality is higher. We explore mechanisms that may drive the relationship between rising income inequality and widening class gaps in parental financial investments in children. This relationship is partially explained by the increasing concentration of income at the top of the income distribution in state-years with higher inequality, which gives higher-earning households more money to spend on financial investments in children. In addition, we find evidence for contextual effects of higher income inequality that reshape parental preferences toward financial investment in children differentially by class.

Keeping up with the Joneses: How Households Fared in the Era of High Income Inequality and the Housing Price Bubble, 1999–2007:

Sociologists conceptualize lifestyles as structured hierarchically where people seek to emulate those higher up. Growing income inequality in the United States means those at the top bid up the price of valued goods like housing and those in lower groups have struggled to maintain their relative positions. We explore this process in the context of the U.S. housing market from 1999 to 2007 by analyzing over 4,000 residential moves from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Houses are the ultimate status symbol. Their size, quality, and location signal to others that one has (or has not) arrived. We show that in areas where income inequality was higher, all movers went deeper into debt and increased their monthly housing costs to live in more desirable neighborhoods. But because people at the top of the income distribution had so much more money, they were able to take on less debt to keep their position in the status queue. Everyone below them who made a move to buy a house took on more debt, particularly in areas with higher income inequality. This evidence suggests that growing inequality implies that those at the top buy the best homes while others struggle to keep pace amid rising housing costs.

Less equal, less trusting? Longitudinal and cross-sectional effects of income inequality on trust in U.S. States, 1973–2012

Does income inequality reduce social trust? Although both popular and scholarly accounts have argued that income inequality reduces trust, some recent research has been more skeptical, noting these claims are more robust cross-sectionally than longitudinally. Furthermore, although multiple mechanisms have been proposed for why inequality could affect trust, these have rarely been tested explicitly. I examine the effect of state-level income inequality on trust using the 1973-2012 General Social Surveys. I find little evidence that states that have been more unequal over time have less trusting people. There is some evidence that the growth in income inequality is linked with a decrease in trust, but these effects are sensitive to how time is accounted for. While much previous inequality and trust research has focused on status anxiety, this mechanism receives the little support, but mechanisms based on social fractionalization and on exploitation and resentment receive some support. This analysis improves on previous estimates of the effect of state-level inequality on trust by using far more available observations, accounting for more potential individual and state level confounders, and using higher-quality income inequality data based on annual IRS tax returns. It also contributes to our understanding of the mechanism(s) through which inequality may affect trust.

Recession, religion, and happiness, 2006-2010

The General Social Survey panel of 2006-2010 tracked Americans’ reactions to the election of Barack Obama and the Great Recession (officially lasting from December 2007 to March 2009) as well as to events in their personal lives. Americans were less happy in 2010 than in 2006; the percent “very happy” decreased by four percentage points and the percent “not too happy” increased almost as much. In the cross section, standard predictors — including church attendance, family income, and marital status — continued to matter. Looking from the dynamic perspective of the panel study, though, we see that job loss and changing family incomes mattered far more. Changes in marital status were also important for changing morale; marrying made people happier while divorcing made them unhappy. The subjective sense that finances were improving mediated a significant portion of the income-happiness association. The effects of unemployment and marriage are estimated in a way that supports the inference that finding a job or a mate actually causes happiness to increase. Recession, Religion, and Happiness, 2006–2010