Özgür Arslan

Credit risks and internationalization of SMEs

The purpose of the paper is to identify common attributable factors causing credit risks to domestic and international SMEs of an emerging market in Turkey. We call domestic firms as the ones only making local sales and international firms as the ones also making sales abroad. Therefore in this study, cross‐border sales are assumed to lead the firms to internationalization. We study totally 1,166 SMEs for the year 2007, which coincide with an economic expansion in Turkey. We find that different factors affect credit risks for the two types of firms. For domestic firms, our results present a direct relationship between the likelihood of corporate default and trade credits, corporate tax, financial expenses and net profit margin yet the relationship turns negative for gross profit margin. For international firms, likelihood of corporate default increases with the ratio of inventories to total assets but decreases with net profits and net sales.

Trade Credits and Bank Loans for SMEs in the Textile Sector

Abstract We investigate the relationship between trade credits and bank loans for on average 493 Turkish SMEs in the textile sector. Our study period extends from the year 1997 to 2005, totaling 1973 observations. The results indicate, interestingly, a non-linear relationship between trade credits and bank loans. Specifically, at low levels of trade credits, bank loans increase with the rise in trade credits, confirming the complementing argument. Whereas at higher levels of trade credits, by corroborating the substitution argument, banks become reluctant to grant external finance to firms. Moreover, we do not detect that outside and domestic financial crises alter the pattern of the non-monotonic relationship. Furthermore, while firm size, firm age and foreign sales have a positive impact on bank loans, profitability has a fairly adverse influence. Finally, we find a modest speed of adjustment to target bank loans for the firms.

Minimally Frozen Elephant Trunk

Background: While surgery involves high surgical mortality and morbidity in complex thoracic aortic diseases, surgical exposure is very important, and it is necessary to explore the area as wide as possible. Increased experience in minimal invasive surgery and advances in hybrid stent graft technologies allow us to perform easy and successful operations through a limited incision area. A 39year-old male patient applied to our clinic with hoarseness and back pain complaints, and was diagnosed with chronic Type-I aorta dissection. Methods: We described how we treated the patient successfully by applying Bentall de Bono, arcus aorta restoration, and frozen elephant trunk procedures through mini j sternotomy. For better manipulation of the aortic arch branches, after the placement of 24/29Fr Carpentier two-stage bicaval femoral venous cannula from innominate vein through to inferior vena cava, left innominate vein was divided. Results: Patient was discharged at 6th post-operative day without any neurological deficit and hoarseness. No upper extremity swelling or neurological complications were observed due to left innominate vein division. Conclusion: With increasing usage of hybrid methods in aortic surgery, we believe that partial J mini-sternotomy implementations can be carried out successfully and safely in arc us aorta and proximal descending aorta operations, involving even type-1 aortic dissections.

Tackling with Natural Monopoly in Electricity and Natural Gas Industries

This chapter attempts to provide a theoretical work on natural monopoly versus perfect markets through concentrating on the energy sector. In specific we discuss the natural monopolistic structure of Turkish natural gas and electricity markets by comparing those of various countries in Europe. In this vein, our chapter starts with the introduction of natural monopoly in both electricity and natural gas markets and the tools and regulations that targets on tackling this imperfection. Furthermore we present the historical phases of regulations to tackle natural monopoly in Turkish electricity and natural gas markets. Both price-demand and income-demand relationships are important guides for developing energy efficient programs for governments and hence income and price elasticities are channels for the relevant regulations. Armed with this in order to provide comparison, our chapter concludes with discussing the extent of the natural monopoly in each country through demonstration of income and price elasticities of demand for both electricity and natural gas.

Introduction: Financial Aspects in Energy

European energy markets have been becoming increasingly integrated and competitive; take for instance the markets for renewable energy and emission allowances. Prices on spot markets and futures markets follow suit and a new pricing regime emerges. Also, whereas the supervision as to e.g. energy contracts remains in their hands, European states hand over much sovereign power to the European Union. While governmental controls in energy industries thus remain valid, firms have an opportunity to create economic value in this regulatory framework. In this vein, this book provides a timely guidance armed with chapters covering a wide spectrum of financial aspects of energy, particularly regarding the scope of a speedily changing environment.

IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE: A SURVEY OF TURKISH FIRMS

This paper investigates the relationship between insider ownership and capital structure decisions made by managers for an emerging market. Therefore, we survey managers of 103 firms listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). Our findings lend considerable support to our expectation that leverage, debt maturity and dividend issues reduce ability of managers to divert resources from value maximisation. However the same monitoring and disciplining tax is not observed for stock issues. Also, our findings document that managers of firms listed in the ISE do not opt to dividend smoothing policy. Finally, the results are in line with our expectation that, the more willing are the managers to reduce asymmetric information between them and shareholders, the higher their ownership level in