P. F. Strawson

Logico-linguistic papers

Contents: Preface Introduction On referring Particular and general Singular terms and predication Identifying reference and truth-values The asymmetry of subjects and predicates Propositions, concepts and logical truths Grammar and philosophy Intention and convention in speech acts Meaning and truth Truth A problem about truth Truth: a reconsideration of Austins views Index.

Perception and its Objects

Ayer has always given the problem of perception a central place in his thinking. Reasonably so; for a philosopher’s views on this question are a key both to his theory of knowledge in general and to his metaphysics. The movement of Ayer’s own thought has been from phenomenalism to what he describes in his latest treatment of the topic as ‘a sophisticated form of realism’.1The epithet is doubly apt. No adequate account of the matter can be simple; and Ayer’s account, while distinguished by his accustomed lucidity and economy of style, is notably and subtly responsive to all the complexities inherent in the subject itself and to all the pressures of more or less persuasive argument which have marked the course of its treatment by philosophers. Yet the form of realism he defends has another kind of sophistication about which it is possible to have reservations and doubts; and, though I am conscious of being far from clear on the matter myself, I shall try to make some of my own doubts and reservations as clear as I can. I shall take as my text chapters 4 and 5 of The Central Questions of Philosophy; and I shall also consider a different kind of realism — that advocated by J. L. Mackie in his book on Locke.2 There are points of contact as well as of contrast between Ayer’s and Mackie’s views.

Singular terms and predication

The ideas of singular term and of general term in predicative position play a central part in Quine’s theory of canonical notation. I examine two attempts to explain these ideas, and I argue that they rest upon certain other notions whose role as foundations is not clearly acknowledged in Quine’s explanations.

The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

The Bounds of Sense is one of the most influential books ever written about Kants philosophy, and is one of the key philosophical works of the late Twentieth century. Although it is probably best known for its criticism of Kants transcendental idealism, it is also famous for the highly original manner in which Strawson defended and developed some of Kants fundamental insights into the nature of subjectivity, experience and knowledge. The book had a profound effect on the interpretation of Kants philosophy when it was first published in 1966 and continues to influence discussion of Kant, the soundness of transcendental arguments, and debates in epistemology and metaphysics generally.

May Bes and Might Have Beens

My subject in this paper is particular possibilities: the may-bes and the might-have-beens that relate essentially to particular individuals or situations. The topic is one which is apt to evoke very different responses from different philosophers. Some detect, or think they detect, an intoxicating scent of something more metaphysically interesting than either merely epistemic possibilities on the one hand or merely de dicto possibilities or necessities on the other. My remarks will not give much satisfaction to them. Some, on the other hand, are suspicious of modalities in general as being dubiously coherent notions. But it is clear that whether we believe there are such things as particular possibilities or not, we are in practice bound to take account of them.

GRAMMAR AND PHILOSOPHY

One who speaks his native language fluently and correctly has acquired over a period of time that mastery of the language which he now has. During this period he was exposed, no doubt, to many sentences produced by others and to some correction of sentences he produced himself. But his mastery of the language does not consist merely in his being able to reproduce the sentences produced by others and, in their corrected forms, the sentences earlier produced by himself. It consists in his being able also to produce indefinitely many new sentences, knowing what they mean, and in being able to understand indefinitely many new sentences which are produced to him. It consists also in his being able to distinguish between sentences of his language which are fully ‘correct’ and literally significant sentences — however elaborate or stylistically unusual they may be — and sentences which deviate, in various ways or degrees, from full ‘correctness’ or literal significance; and perhaps to remark, with more or less explicitness, on how the sentences which deviate from correctness do so deviate.

Comments on Some Aspects of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and Value

I have no significant quarrel with Peter Ungers central physical doctrine concerning personal human identity. The continuous physical realisation, in suitable physical structures, of basic psychological capacities does indeed seem to be (what we most profoundly believe to be) the core of strict personal survival, of the continued existence of the identical individual person. My few doubts relate, rather, to questions of choice, preference and value. First, I consider the Avoidance of future Great Pain test, seen simply as a test for whether or not one believes that the person who emerges from a certain process would or would not be identical with oneself. Suppose someone knows that his body is about to be submitted to one or other of two processes, about the outcome of each of which he possesses complete and certain knowledge. The processes have this in common, that the emerging person in both cases is an amnesiac idiot-lacking all memory of the original subjects previous life and all but the most rudimentary intellectual powers. But the processes-call them Process 1 and Process 2-differ in an important respect: Process 1 is identity-preserving, Process 2 is not. If I am subjected to Process 1, I become an amnesiac idiot; If I am subjected to Process 2, I cease to exist and am replaced by an amnesiac idiot. The processes, however, have another common feature: unless a certain condition is satisfied, the being who emerges from either process is going to suffer extreme and prolonged torture-terrible pain; the condition in question is that the being who enters the process suffers very considerable antecedent pain. Now, according to Ungers view of our common basic attitudes, someone who, in full knowledge of its character and outcome, knows he is going to be subjected to Process 1 will be prepared to undergo a considerable period of severe pain beforehand in order to spare himself terrible and prolonged pain afterwards; whereas someone who confidently believes he is going to be subjected to Process 2 will not be prepared to make that preliminary sacrifice in

Kant's Dialectic.

Preface 1. Introduction 2. Concepts and intuitions 3. Substances and reality 4. The substantiality of the soul 5. The simplicity of the soul 6. The identify of the soul 7. Infinity 8. Limits 9. Divisibility 10. Freedom 11. God 12. Reason Index.