Pablo La Porte

Civil-Military Relations in the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco: The Road to the Spanish Civil War, 1912-1936

This article focuses on civil-military relations in the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco in the early decades of the twentieth century. Its aim is not only to recover a historical approach to civil-military relations that seems underrepresented in recent studies, but also to contribute to an explanation of the origins of the Spanish Civil War using current civil-military relations theory. It is argued that the rebellion against the Second Republic in Morocco (July 1936), which triggered the Spanish Civil War, was a consequence of a long-term struggle between civilians and the military in the Protectorate rather than a sudden reaction of the Colonial Army prompted by threats of social revolution in mainland Spain. It is also argued that the attitude of the Moroccan population was crucial to explain its success.This article focuses on civil-military relations in the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco in the early decades of the twentieth century. Its aim is not only to recover a historical approach to civil-military relations that seems underrepresented in recent studies, but also to contribute to an explanation of the origins of the Spanish Civil War using current civil-military relations theory. It is argued that the rebellion against the Second Republic in Morocco (July 1936), which triggered the Spanish Civil War, was a consequence of a long-term struggle between civilians and the military in the Protectorate rather than a sudden reaction of the Colonial Army prompted by threats of social revolution in mainland Spain. It is also argued that the attitude of the Moroccan population was crucial to explain its success.

Spanish Military Cultures and the Moroccan Wars 1909-36

Four main military cultures existed within the Army of Africa: Africanist, Juntero, peninsular and political. Although they coexisted, each enjoyed a period of hegemony within the Army as a result of the course of military action in Morocco or the colonial strategy of the Spanish government. Africanist culture, divided over colonial strategy, was united around authoritarianism and a right-wing mythology of patriotism. Juntero culture focused at first mainly on professional military structure and not on strategy or mission. Peninsular culture was the replication in the colonial army of practices and mentalities characteristic of the peninsular army. Political culture derived from the appointments made by the Second Republic to ensure the colonial army’s loyalty. The Army of Africa was not therefore a united, homogenous bloc. But the last years of the colonial campaign saw the hegemony of the Africanist culture among colonial officers and it was this politically interventionist caste that played a fundamental role in overthrowing the Republic.

Humanitarian assistance during the Rif War (Morocco, 1921–6): the International Committee of the Red Cross and ‘an unfortunate affair’†

This article focuses on the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) in the Rif War (Morocco, 1921–6) and places humanitarian action in three inter-related contexts: the complexity of the international scenario after the First World War, the institutional architecture of the Red Cross and the developments in international humanitarian law. Challenging simplistic approaches to an otherwise historically overlooked affair, the article argues that the rather undignified role of the I.C.R.C. during the conflict was a result both of Eurocentric assumptions and international manipulation.

‘Rien à ajouter’: The League of Nations and the Rif War (1921—1926)

Despite the fact that the Rif War (Morocco, 1921—1926) and its international repercussions have been frequently explored by historians, not much attention has been devoted to the stance of the League of Nations during the conflict, probably because the League simply declared its lack of authority to intervene in the matter when its intervention was suggested. The aim of this article is to provide a more detailed analysis of the reasons given by the League of Nations to justify its role in the conflict. It will argue that the League of Nations acted in accordance with international legislation of the time when it declined to become involved in the Rif War without being explicitly requested to do so either by the Sultan of Morocco or by the protecting powers (France, Spain). However, it will also highlight the tenuousness of these arguments and the contradictory stances the League took at certain stages of the conflict, especially during the period when the Spanish army was publicly accused of using chemica...Despite the fact that the Rif War (Morocco, 1921—1926) and its international repercussions have been frequently explored by historians, not much attention has been devoted to the stance of the League of Nations during the conflict, probably because the League simply declared its lack of authority to intervene in the matter when its intervention was suggested. The aim of this article is to provide a more detailed analysis of the reasons given by the League of Nations to justify its role in the conflict. It will argue that the League of Nations acted in accordance with international legislation of the time when it declined to become involved in the Rif War without being explicitly requested to do so either by the Sultan of Morocco or by the protecting powers (France, Spain). However, it will also highlight the tenuousness of these arguments and the contradictory stances the League took at certain stages of the conflict, especially during the period when the Spanish army was publicly accused of using chemical warfare in Morocco. The article concludes by showing how the complex, multifaceted conflict in the Rif encapsulated many of the problems and difficulties of the post-war colonial system, and forced the League of Nations to deal with a series of dilemmas which foreshadowed the difficult circumstances which it would be faced with in the 1930s.