Pål Andreas Pedersen

ESTIMATING THE INEFFICIENCY IN THE NORWEGIAN BUS INDUSTRY FROM STOCHASTIC COST FRONTIER MODELS

A stochastic cost frontier function based on data from 170 of the 175 Norwegian subsidized bus companies is estimated under two alternative presumptions regarding the distribution of the inefficency among the bus operators. When the inefficiency is assumed to be half-normally distributed, the average inefficiency in the industry is estimated to be 13.7 per cent. This calculated value is nearly halved (7.2 per cent) when the exponential distribution is applied, while the ranking of the companies according to inefficiency is unchanged. By regressing the estimated inefficiency values for each company on some exogenous variables describing its ownership structure and the subsidy policy which it faces, it is seen that inefficiency of the companies which negotiate with the public authorities over the subsidy amounts is slightly higher than the inefficiency of the companies which face a subsidy policy based on cost norms. Our analysis gives, however, no significant differences in the efficiency between privately owned bus companies and publicly owned bus operators, and shows only minor economies of scale.

On the optimal fare policies in urban transportation

This paper focuses on welfare optimal transport policies in a public transport market where positive externalities from the route supplier to the travellers as well as negative externalities within group of consumers exist. Additionally, there might be capacity constraints of two types. Firstly, the actual numbers of travellers in a period cannot be above the actual seat capacity supplied by the operator. Secondly, the number of seats supplied by the operator cannot exceed the maximum seat capacity given by the fleet of vehicles the operator controls in the period. Among other things, the paper shows that in the case where there is excess seat and route capacity, the fares should be equal to sum of the short run marginal operational costs and the costs an additional passenger is causing on the other travellers. In the long run, however, fares should be equal to sum of the long run marginal operational costs and the costs an additional passenger is causing on other travellers minus the gain in reduced time costs for all of the passengers that the final unit of supply brings.

Risk Attitudes and Individual Transferable Quotas

An analysis of ITQ fisheries management is offered in which two different groups of agents facing uncertain harvesting costs take part. The first group, termed as the coastal fleet, is risk averse, while the second group, interpreted as the ocean fleet, is risk neutral. In contradiction to what is seen in deterministic models of quota markets, given strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion amongst the coastal fleet members, it is found that the initial quota allocation affects the equilibrium quota price and the final catch distribution influencing the economic efficiency in the fishing industry.

Crowding Effects and Work Ethics

This paper analyses optimal contracts in a principal-agent model where the agent is intrinsically motivated, and there is an endogenous relationship between the structure of incentive payments and intrinsic motivation (crowding effects). The analysis shows that crowding effects have implications for the optimal contract, and that, under some conditions, the principal can make better achievements without implementing any economic incentives. Furthermore, it is shown that when high-powered incentives reduce intrinsic motivation (crowding-out), the first-best solution in a principal-agent framework is unattainable. Copyright 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation 2006 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Taking Up Positions And Meeting Pressure

This paper portrays voluntary agreements as a Nash-bargaining game between the authorities and the polluting industry. Before bargaining starts, the authorities threaten to introduce emission licences if the negotiations come to nothing, while industry, by the use of lobbying campaigns, can make it politically costly to regulate by law. The most likely game of the ones considered is characterized by the authorities first announcing a level of licensing, whereupon industry will adjust its lobbying activity. This game results in a relatively defensive industry and authorities than other games under consideration.

Airport Charges – Interactions between Airlines and Airports

Abstract A substantial part of airports’ revenues relates to charges covering the costs of services supplied by the airport. Charges are imposed on carriers, which in turn pass them or a percentage of them, on to passengers. In the present chapter, special attention is given to regional airports characterized by low traffic volumes, enabling only one or a few carriers to serve each destination. A classic economic model is presented to analyze how the pass-on rate depends on supply and demand characteristics and market structure. Some illustrative examples assuming combinations of common specifications for market characteristics are also presented, showing pass-on rates ranging from 50% to more than 100%. Consequently, market structure and characteristics of carriers and passengers are decisive for how passengers experience changes in airport charges. The differences between the optimal charge from the perspectives of the airport and the welfare of society are specifically addressed. It is demonstrated that knowledge of the pass-on rate in the monopoly cases may be sufficient to infer how the mark-up will be affected by a change in marginal costs. Consequently, the understanding of the pass-on rate is relevant for airport owners and for decision-makers when considering the welfare of passengers and other politically stated goals.