Pål Thonstad Sandvik

Does Pregabalin (Lyrica®) Help Patients Reduce their Use of Benzodiazepines? A Comparison with Gabapentin using the Norwegian Prescription Database

Pregabalin (Lyrica(®) ) may have an anxiolytic effect. It has also been reported that the use of this drug helps prevent excessive use of benzodiazepines. The aim of the present study was to examine if pregabalin reduced the intake of benzodiazepines. In a pharmacoepidemiological study, we compared pregabalin to the older drug gabapentin (Neurontin(®) ) in the Norwegian Prescription Database. The database has total capture of all prescribed drugs outside institutions. We identified all prescriptions for the two drugs for patients aged 18-69 years between 2004 and 2007. Patients were grouped as psychiatric patients, patients with epilepsy, patients with neuropathic pain or non-specified users. We measured the use of benzodiazepines 182 days before and after the initiation of treatment with pregabalin and gabapentin. Between 15% and 29% of the patients were able to stop using benzodiazepines after starting pregabalin or gabapentin treatment. Psychiatric patients who started pregabalin were able to reduce the amount of benzodiazepines used by 48%, compared to only 14% among starters of gabapentin. This study shows that some patients reduced their use of benzodiazepines substantially after starting pregabalin.

Multinationals, host countries and subsidiary development: Falconbridge Nikkelverk in Norway, 1929–39

Multinational companies and their subsidiaries have been important actors in the world economy. However, we know relatively little about the evolution of subsidiaries and their adaption to host country conditions. This article is a case study of a Norwegian subsidiary of the Canadian mining multinational Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. It examines what autonomy the subsidiary had, how the autonomy was used, its development of knowledge and how it adapted to Norwegian ways of doing business. The article shows that subsidiaries may contribute significantly to the development of their mother companies. It highlights four factors that influenced the degree of autonomy and the evolution of subsidiaries in the inter-war era; namely host country politics, the line of business, the configuration of knowledge within the given multinational company and in case of acquisitions; the prehistory of the subsidiary.

Confronting market power: Norway and international cartels and trusts, 1919–39

Abstract The article examines the relationship between the Norwegian State and international cartels and trusts in the interwar years. In this period, Norway was at the forefront with regard to implementing legislation regulating cartels, yet the legislation was not an antitrust legislation in the modern sense. It was aimed not only at protecting consumer interests, but more importantly at defending domestic businesses against foreign monopolies and cartels. In the article we examine how the Norwegian authorities interacted with international cartels and trusts in seven different cases in the interwar period. The study shows that although there was a deep seated scepticism towards concentration of market power in Norway, cartels received support from the Norwegian government when they were deemed to be beneficial to Norwegian economic interests. The legislation was used to foster the development of domestic cartels, while at the same time it was employed as a tool to limit the operations of foreign cartels and trusts.

Big Business and Small States: Unilever and Norway in the Interwar Years

In 1930, Unilever tried to take control of Lilleborg, Norways most important producer of soap and vegetable oil, with the aim of wiping out most of Norways independent margarine and soap industry. However, as the purchase was dependent on government concession, Unilever became embroiled in a power struggle with the Norwegian political authorities. The company was strongly criticized by Norwegian nationalists. The question of whether or not to let Unilever go forward became one of the most contested questions in Norwegian politics in the period. In the end, Unilever was allowed to go ahead with the purchase, but in return the company was forced to make substantial concessions. Expanding on Joness framework for understanding the balance of power between multinationals and host governments, in this article it is argued that we must look beyond firm specific assets and a cost‐benefit oriented analysis of the relationship between multinationals and host countries to understand the end result. In this case, nationalism had a decisive impact. Unilevers acquisition of Lilleborg and the Norwegian response thus contributes to our understanding of the nature of multinational enterprise in the interwar period and of the political economy of foreign direct investment in general.

Facing Oligopoly and Protectionism: the fate of small producers in the inter-war nickel industry

In the inter-war era international cartels and oligopolies dominated several industries. At the same time trade barriers were increasing. This article explores the fate of two small nickel producers, the Canadian company Falconbridge and the Norwegian Raffineringsverket. Falconbridge operated a nickel refinery in Norway from 1929 onwards. The article shows that small firms could act as ‘free riders’ in the nickel market provided that they had sufficient ore resources, were vertically integrated and had low marginal costs. The article also demonstrates that the Great Depression, widespread rise of protectionism and the move towards autarchy had surprisingly limited impact on the international nickel industry. Somewhat similar developments can be found in several industries. The article thus offers some new perspectives on the growth of the Norwegian exports of metallurgical products and thereby on Norwegian economic performance in the 1930s.

Dealing with globalisation: the Nordic countries and inward FDI, 1900–1939

Abstract This article examines the different ways in which the four Nordic countries chose to regulate the inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI). By studying the laws regulating foreign ownership, as well as their implementation, it becomes clear that the four countries followed a pragmatic and tolerant policy towards inward FDI, but that the resource rich countries actively tried to prevent foreign ownership of their most important natural resources. The article also shows how the countries’ stricter policy on foreign ownership in the early twentieth century was not a casualty of World War I, but more predominantly a reaction to the increasing international economic integration before the war.

Avoiding the resource curse? : democracy and natural resources in Norway since 1900

Introduction 1. From Resource Curse to Rent Curse: A Theoretical Perspective 2. Scarcity, frontiers and the resource curse: a historical perspective 3. Botswana: caught in a natural resource trap 4. Oil as sweet as honey: Linking natural resources, government institutions and domestic capital investment in Nigeria 1960-2000 5. The USA as a Case Study in Resource-Based Development 6. Welfare States and Development Patterns in Latin America 7. Oil illusion and delusion: Mexico and Venezuela over the 20th Century 8. Public Finances and Natural Resources in Bolivia, 1883-2010. Is there a fiscal curse? 9. The long run development of Chile and the Natural Resources curse. Linkages, policy and growth, 1850-1950 10. Mixed Blessings: Mining in Indonesias Economy, 1870-2010 11. Land abundance, frontier expansion and appropriability: settler economies during the First Globalization 12. The Lucky Country Syndrome in Australia: Resources, Social Democracy, and Regimes of Development in Historical Political Economy Perspective 13. The Institutional Foundations of Natural Resource Based Knowledge Economies 14. Avoiding the resource curse? Democracy and natural resources in Norway since 1900 15. Water scarcity and agricultural growth in Spain: from curse to blessing?

Why Did Germany Not Fully Exploit the Norwegian Nickel Industry, 1940–45?

Nickel was one of the key strategic metals in both World Wars. It was a crucial steel alloy. Nickel made steel harder and more heat resistant and was used in armoured steel, gun barrels, torpedoes, aircraft engines and so on. During World War I, Germany experienced acute shortages of nickel. Nickel was therefore on the top of the list of materials that Germany needed to procure. All the major deposits were then under Entente control, mainly in New Caledonia in the South Pacific and in Canada. However, Germany was able to secure some wartime imports from Norway.

European, Global or Norwegian? The Norwegian Aluminium Companies, 1946–2005

Norwegian output of primary aluminium rose from 45,000 metric tons in 1950 to 520,000 tons in 1970 and to 850,000 tons in 1986.1 In 1971, Norway accounted for 18 % of the world’s primary aluminium export. Most of her production was sold on European markets.2 One of the Norwegian companies involved, Norsk Hydro, became in 2002 the world’s third largest producer of aluminium.