Paolo M. Panteghini

Reforming Business Taxation: Lessons from Italy?

We carefully review the recent Italian reform of business taxation, compare it with other international experiences and theoretical proposals, and calculate its effects on the cost of capital and on the effective average corporate tax rate. We argue that the Italian reform is an original attempt to find a compromise between two conflicting aims, both of which are unavoidable in an open economy: the first is to reduce the average rate of taxation on profits, and the second is to reduce the financial and real distortions produced by corporate taxation. In assessing the initial evidence in the Italian case, we argue that too much weight has been given to the latter objective, and that further reductions in average taxation on profits may be needed.

The Johansson-Samuelson Theorem in General Equilibrium: A Rebuttal

The well-known Johansson-Samuelson Theorem proves that, in partial equilibrium, comprehensive income taxation with a uniform tax rate is neutral in terms of investment decisions, if fiscal depreciation allowances coincide with economic depreciation. In this article we show that this result does not hold in general equilibrium, unless fairly restrictive conditions are met.

Investment Size and Firm's Value Under Profit Sharing Regulation

In this article we analyse the effects of different regulatory schemes (price cap and profit sharing) on a firm’s investment of endogenous size. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not affect a firm’s start-up decision relative to a pure price cap scheme. Unless the threshold after which profit sharing intervenes is very high, however, introducing a profit sharing element delays further investments: this decreases the present value of total investment. We also evaluate the reduction in the firm’s value due to profit sharing, linking this reduction to the option value of future investments.

On Corporate Tax Asymmetries and Neutrality

Abstract This article discusses the effects of corporate tax asymmetries under investment irreversibility. We introduce a tax scheme where the tax base is given by the firms return net of a rate of relief. When the firms return is less than the imputation rate, however, no tax refunds are allowed. Unlike symmetric tax systems, the scheme proposed is neutral with respect not only to income uncertainty but also to policy uncertainty.

Corporate Tax Asymmetries Under Investment Irreversibility

This article studies the effects of corporate tax asymmetries on irreversible investment. We discuss an asymmetric tax scheme where the tax base is given by the firms return, net of an imputation rate. When the firms return is less than this rate, however, no tax refunds are allowed. Contrary to common winsdom, this asymmetric scheme may be neutral even when assuming a long-lasting income uncertainty. Neutrality holds even if we add both capital and political uncertainty.

Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies under Tax Rate Uncertainty

Abstract In this paper, we apply a real-option model to study the effects of tax-rate uncertainty on a firm’s decision. In doing so, we depart from the relevant literature, which focuses on fully equity-financed investment projects. By letting a representative firm borrow optimally, we show that debt finance not only encourages investment activities but can also substantially mitigate the effect of tax-rate uncertainty on investment timing.

Tax Evasion and Entrepreneurial Flexibility

The separation between a firm’s decision to evade taxes and its other choices fails to hold if an irreversible investment is introduced. This model applies the well-known Bernanke’s bad news principle, in which auditing is bad news for tax-evading firms. This article thus shows that evasion affects investment, which in turn determines production.

Italy's Ace Tax and its Effect on a Firm's Leverage

This article describes the new ACE-type system implemented in Italy since 2012. We have first shown that this system reduces but does not eliminate the financial distortion due to interest deductibility. Using a dataset of Italian companies, we analyzed the impact of this relief on Italian firm capital structure. Despite the permanence of a tax advantage and its gradual implementation, the ACE relief is estimated to reduce significantly leverage. By decreasing default risk it is also expected to reduce systemic risk.

The Distributional Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes: A Real Option Approach

This paper studies the effects of regulatory constraints on firms irreversible investment decisions. The RPI−x rule is compared to a profit sharing rule, which increases the x factor in case profits go beyond a given level.When the firm has an option to delay investment, these rules have the same impact on investment choices. As profit sharing has a greater ability to extract rents, however, it is more efficient than the RPI−x rule.

Accelerated Depreciation, Default Risk and Investment Decisions

In this article we focus on a representative firm that can decide when to invest under default risk. On the one hand, this firm can benefit from generous tax depreciation allowances, on the other hand it faces a default risk. Our aim is to study the effects of tax depreciation allowances in a risky environment. As will be shown in our numerical analysis, generous tax depreciation allowances lead to a decrease in a firm’s leverage and, in most cases, cause a reduction in default risk. This result has a strong policy implication, in that it shows that an investment stimulus pack is expected neither to increase the default risk nor to cause financial instability.