Paolo Roma

Biopharmaceutical Alliances And Competition: A Real Options Games Approach

The competitive landscape where pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies operate has changed radically due to a scientific/technological progress that has revolutionised the process by which drugs are developed. In fact, pharmaceutical industry more and more relies on advances in biochemistry and molecular biology. As a consequence, the number of partnerships between pharmaceutical and biotech firms has grown significantly. Research contributions addressing the biopharmaceutical alliances design have also focused on the optimal timing to sign a partnership. In this paper, we introduce and analyse the effect of competition in biotechnology industry by modelling the decisions of whether and when ally with a pharmaceutical company through a real options game. We find that the timing decisions depend on the level of the competition, synergies obtained through the alliance and contract terms offered by the pharmaceutical company as well. Also, we show that the first mover might not always pre-empt the follower in partnering with the pharmaceutical company.

Revenue models, in-app purchase, and the app performance

The effect of revenue models on app performance depends on the app store.The effect of in-app purchase on app performance depends on the app store.Paid, freemium and in-purchase models are shown to be effective in app store.Freemium and in-app purchase models are shown to be less effective in Google Play.App category influences the effects of both revenue models and in-app purchase. In this paper, we empirically examine how the revenue model (paid, free, or freemium) adopted for a given app affects the app revenue performance as measured by the app daily revenue rank. We also study the impact of in-app purchase on this measure of performance. Moreover, we study how such relationships are contingent upon the distribution platform where the app is marketed as well as the type of category to which the app belongs. We test our hypotheses relying on a large sample of top grossing apps from the two major app stores, namely Apples App Store and Google Play. Our findings reveal that in the Apples App Store, paid and freemium models are equivalent and both are more effective than the free model in terms of app revenue performance. On the other hand, in Google Play no significant differences between paid and free revenue models emerge, whereas the freemium model is shown to be less effective even than the free model. Moreover, while in-app purchase is shown to positively influence the app revenue performance in Apples App Store, this effect is reversed in Google Play. Finally, the type of category is also shown to influence the effects of the revenue model and in-app purchase (the latter to a lesser extent) on the app performance.

A real options game of alliance timing decisions in biopharmaceutical research and development

In this article we examine the alliance timing trade-off facing both pharmaceutical and biotech firms in a stochastic and competitive environment. Specifically, we introduce a real options game (ROG), where a pharmaceutical company can choose between two competing biotech firms by sequentially offering a licensing deal early or late in the new drug development process. We find that, when the alliance raises the drug market value significantly, the agreement is signed late in the drug development process. This suggests that the postponement effect implied by the use of real options prevails over the biotech firms’ competition effect, which would instead play in favor of an early agreement for pre-emption reasons. When the alliance does not raise the drug market value significantly, the optimal timing depends on the level of royalties retained by the pharmaceutical company. In particular, an early agreement is signed in the presence of a low level of royalties. In this case, indeed, the competition effect becomes predominant because the pharmaceutical company can substantially reduce the upfront payment and thus the potential loss incurred if the biotech partner does not exercise her option to continue the new drug development process. We also show that the alliance timing outcomes of our real options game considerably differ from those obtained when both parties use the net present value (NPV) to assess their payoffs.

An empirical analysis of online price dispersion in the Italian airline industry

Firms operating in the electronic marketplace set and adjust prices to affect demand and profitability. In service markets, such as airline markets, different prices are commonly offered by diverse firms to accommodate to a variety of market segments having particular sets of consumer attitudes. This variation in prices is the price dispersion and is based on market distinctiveness deriving from customer heterogeneity as well as the peculiar competition in the specific market arena. In this paper we use a panel dataset from the Italian airline market to investigate the role of competition and different online channels in the emergence of price dispersion. Specifically, we examine the unclear role of competition in price dispersion with novel data collected from different online channels, namely direct and Online Travel Agency (OTA) channels. We find that price dispersion is higher in routes where competition is higher even in presence of only one segment, namely the business segment. Our results also show that price dispersion significantly differs across different types of online channels.

Understanding the price drivers of successful apps in the mobile app market

In this paper, we take the perspective of app developers. Specifically, based on a sample of top paid apps from three major app stores, i.e., App Store, Google Play, and Blackberry World, we construct a hedonic price model to examine the role of relevant factors in price formation in the app market. Our results suggest a strong evidence of two-sided market effects. In fact, the lower price charged for apps operating as two-sided markets reflect the strategy of subsidising users, due to the positive cross-side externalities they exert on valuable third parties. Surprisingly, the effects of trialability, in-app purchase and mechanisms to build reputation are not significant in the context of successful apps. Finally, we find weak evidence that developers of top paid apps prefer price skimming to penetration price strategies.

Reward-Based Crowdfunding Campaigns: Informational Value and Access to Venture Capital

We consider an entrepreneur who designs a reward-based crowdfunding campaign when the campaign provides a signal about the future demand for the product and subsequent venture capital is needed. We find that both the informativeness of the campaign and considerations related to gaining access to venture capital funding affect the entrepreneur’s choice of campaign instruments, as well as her decision of whether to run a campaign. In particular, entrepreneurs should launch the campaign either when it is highly informative or when it is not informative at all. For relatively low levels of informativeness, but not so low that the venture capitalist (VC) completely ignores the campaign outcome in his funding decision, our study suggests that the entrepreneur might forgo the opportunity of acquiring information via crowdfunding because the benefits of crowdfunding are insufficient to offset the risk of campaign failure. We also find that the preference of entrepreneurs in favor of crowdfunding is stronger than ...