Pari Patel

Is Western Europe losing the technological race

Abstract Using a variety of indicators, this paper compares technological levels in Japan, the USA and W. Europe. There is no justification for assuming general European technological backwardness. Whilst it lags in electronics, and since 1975 has had a relatively slow rate of growth of innovative activities, it also has sectors of strength (chemicals, machinery, production engineering), and countries whose relative commitments of resources to innovative activities are at least equal - and sometimes superior - to those of Japan and the USA (FRG, Sweden, Switzerland). Its main policy challenges are to increase the rate of growth of innovative activities in lagging countries, and to ensure pervasive applications of information technology. Similarly, there is no convincing evidence that W. Europe is relatively backward in converting technology into economically efficient innovations. Some policy problems are significant in all three regions (skill shortages), whilst others are in the USA and W. Europe (short-term planning horizons of top management). Particular European problems are the effects of social legislation on worker flexibility and mobility, of national regulations on intra-European competition, and of slow rates of growth of output on the growth of innovative activities. Japan and the USA have their problems, with the latter continuously under challenge from the former, and increasingly specialised in defence - and raw materials - related technologies.

DNA patenting: the end of an era?

Debates on patenting DNA must evolve to reflect the global decline in filings and regional disparities in patenting activity.

The Innovative Performance Of The World'S Largest Firms: Some New Evidence ‡

Data on R & D expenditures and US patenting in the worlds 660 largest, technologically active firms both show a linear relation between firm size and the volume of innovative activities, despite some inconsistencies between the two measures. Technological diversity increases with firm size, but relatively weakly, especially in R & D-intensive sectors. Sectoral variations in the comparative technological advantage of large firms based in Japan, the USA and W. Europe are better explained by variations in rivalry in their home market than by variations in their size.

National Patterns of Technology Accumulation: Use of Patent Statistics

We use US Patent Statistics to depict national patterns of technology accumulation in Japan and EU countries. Two properties of country profiles are confirmed, namely, stability over time with a country and differentiation across countries. The main novelty introduced here is the combined analysis of overall technological advantage, performance in fast growing areas and impact. The results show that in many areas of technology in which EU countries have an overall relative advantage, their performance in the subfields of highest technological opportunity is weak. On the other hand, Japan seems to have a consistent level of performance both in aggregate and in fast growing areas.

Sources and directions of technological accumulation in France: a statistical comparison with FR Germany and the UK

Technological activities are an important determinant of national economic performance. Data on RD (2) concentration of technological strength in sectors dominated by state procurement and related RD (3) stronger performance in fast-growing technologies in defence, electrical products and fine chemicals, than in electronics and motor vehicles; (4) a relatively stable and speialized sectoral pattern of technological strengths and weaknesses; and (5) sectoral patterns of trading strengths and weaknesses that broadly reflect those in technology. These characteristics of Frances technological activities cannot be explained by their greater or lesser concentration, which is very similar to that found in both F...

The Technological Activities of the UK: A Fresh Look

Technological activities in Britain have been the subject of much recent debate, including discussion by the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (1986), and by The Times, that not only published a series of articles (16–19 February 1987), but also scolded the Prime Minister for what it considered an unsatisfactory Parliamentary answer on the subject (21 February 1987). Like the authors of a number of earlier reports, we compare Britain’s technological activities with those in other countries, but over a longer period of time, with a greater variety of indicators, and in greater detail. We also present detailed data on the technological activities of specific British firms. In doing this, our purpose is twofold: first, to explore the validity of a number of factors advanced to explain Britain’s relatively poor performance, including the strategies and performance of specific British firms; second, to provide new data that we hope will provoke both public debate and research.