Pascale Crama

Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing

We study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensees valuation of the innovation, and limited control over the licensees development efforts. A licensing contract typically contains an up-front payment, milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase, and royalties on sales. We use principal-agent models to formulate the licensors contracting problem, and we find that under adverse selection, the optimal contract structure changes with the licensees valuation of the innovation. As the licensees valuation increases, the licensors optimal level of involvement in the development---directly or through royalties---should decrease. Only a risk-averse licensor should include both up-front and milestone payments. Moral hazard alone is not detrimental to the licensors value, but may create an additional value loss when combined with adverse selection. Our results inform managerial practice about the advantages and disadvantages of the different terms included in licensing contracts and recommend the optimal composition of the contract.

Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R&D licensing contracts

We examine how a licensor can optimally design licensing contracts for multi-phase R&D projects when he does not know the licensee’s project valuation, leading to adverse selection, and cannot enforce the licensee’s effort level, resulting in moral hazard. We focus on the effect of the phased nature typical of such projects, and compare single-phase and multi-phase contracts. We determine the optimal values for the upfront payment, milestone payments and royalties, and the optimal timing for outlicensing. Including multiple milestones and accompanying payments can be an effective way of discriminating between licensees holding different valuations, without having to manipulate the royalty rate, which induces licensees to invest less, resulting in lower project values and socially suboptimal solutions. Interestingly, we also find that multiple milestone payments are beneficial even when the licensor is risk-averse, contrary to standard contract theory results, which recommend that only an upfront payment should be used. In terms of licensing timing, we show that the optimal time depends on the licensor’s risk aversion, the characteristics of the licensee and the project value.

The Newsvendor Problem with Advertising Revenue

We study a modified newsvendor model in which the newsvendor obtains a revenue from sales to end users as well as from an advertiser paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions for both a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertiser has private information about its willingness to pay for advertisements. We find that the newsvendors optimal policy excludes advertisers with low willingness to pay and distorts the price and quantity from its system-efficient level to screen the advertiser. Our analysis reveals the different roles that pricing and production quantity play as screening instruments. We perform a numerical analysis to investigate the value of information and the impact of the model parameters.

Licensing Contracts: Control Rights, Options and Timing

Research and development (RD the innovator may, under certain conditions, prefer to grant launch control rights or buyout options to the marketer despite the fact that both terms restrict its downstream actions. We demonstrate that a menu of contracts is not necessary to address the adverse selection problem because the menu can be replicated by a single option contract. We show that timing, through renegotiation or delayed contracting, as well as the careful allocation of control rights and options can have a significant influence on the value of collaborative R&D. We provide recommendations on the optimal contract structure and timing based on two project char...

Ad Revenue Optimization in Live Broadcasting

In live broadcasting, the break lengths available for commercials are not always fixed and known in advance (e.g., strategic and injury time-outs are of variable duration in live sports transmissions). Broadcasters actively manage their advertising revenue by jointly optimizing sales and scheduling policies. We characterize the optimal dynamic schedule in a simplified setting that incorporates stochastic break durations and advertisement lengths of 15 and 30 seconds. The optimal policy is a “greedy” look-ahead rule that accounts for the remaining number of breaks; in this setting, there is no value to perfect information at the scheduling stage, and hence knowing the duration of all breaks would not change the schedule. We present heuristics to help solve scheduling problems of even greater complexity. The performance of these heuristics under various scenarios is tested by running simulations calibrated using industry data. The simple greedy heuristic is shown to perform well except when revenues are concave in ad length, in which case the look-ahead aspect of the optimal schedule becomes more important. Finally, we recommend ways for broadcasters to balance their portfolio of booked ads by determining the optimal overbooking level and mix of ads as a function of their associated revenues generated and penalties incurred. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management .

Research and Development Project Valuation and Licensing Negotiations at Phytopharm plc

We describe a research and development project-valuation model developed for Phytopharm plc, a pharmaceutical development and functional food company based in Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom. Phytopharm uses the model to value the projects in its research and development portfolio, and in licensing negotiations with potential product development and marketing partners. We include different valuation methods, including net present value, decision analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation. We also consider the technological risks of product development, as well as the uncertainty of commercial success. In addition to determining a value for a product in development, the model proposes appropriate licensing contract structures. A typical licensing contract specifies milestone payments and royalties to be paid by the licensee to the licensor. The contract structures adhere to an agreed-upon equitable split of the project value between the two parties. The model also generates critical information during the negotiation meetings, including break-even analyses, trade-offs, and bargaining zones. Phytopharm is currently deploying the model for use with its entire project portfolio.

The Newsvendor's Optimal Incentive Contracts for Multiple Advertisers

We consider a newsvendor who earns a revenue from the sales of her product to end users as well as from multiple advertisers paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions of a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertisers have private information about their willingness to pay. We focus on the impact of the number of advertisers on the newsvendor’s optimal decisions. We find that regardless of the number of advertisers, the newsvendor may exclude advertisers with a low willingness to pay and distort the price and inventory from their system-efficient levels to screen the advertisers. Moreover, the newsvendor’s decision to exclude an advertiser is based exclusively on that advertiser’s characteristics, and the newsvendor’s optimal decision thus reveals independence among the advertisers. Nonetheless, the profits of the newsvendor and the advertisers also display network effects as both increase in the number of advertisers. Finally, our numerical results show that the newsvendor prefers an equivalent single advertiser to multiple advertisers due to the pooling effect.

Managing Technology Risk in R&D Project Planning: Optimal Timing and Parallelization of R&D Activities

An inherent characteristic of R&D projects is technological uncertainty, which may result in project failure, and time and resources spent without any tangible return. In pharmaceutical projects, for instance, stringent scientific procedures have to be followed to ensure patient safety and drug efficacy in pre-clinical and clinical tests before a medicine can be approved for production. A project consists of several stages, and may have to be terminated in any of these stages, with typically a low likelihood of success. In project planning and scheduling, this technological uncertainty has typically been ignored, and project plans are developed only for scenarios in which the project succeeds. In this paper, we examine how to schedule projects in order to maximize their expected net present value, when the project activities have a probability of failure, and where an activitys failure leads to overall project termination. We formulate the problem, show that it is NP-hard and develop a branchand- bound algorithm that allows to obtain optimal solutions. We also present polynomial-time algorithms for special cases, and present a number of managerial insights for R&D project and planning, including the advantages and disadvantages of parallelization of R&D activities in different settings.

Encouraging Help Across Projects

Companies struggle with timely project execution despite employing sophisticated management methods. Although help across projects is critical for time performance, it has not been explicitly incor...