Pasuk Phongpaichit

Thaksin's populism

Abstract Thaksin Shinawatra was not a populist when he rose to power in 2001, but became so in intensifying stages over the next five years. His populism went beyond redistributive policies to include rhetorical rejection of Thailands political elite, and denigration of liberal democracy in favour of personalised authoritarianism. Fears provoked by this populism helped to mobilise the urban middle-class rejection of Thaksin which was background to the 2006 coup. Thaksins populism was a response to the demands and insecurities of the large informal mass created by an outward-orientated strategy of development. Thaksins populism resembles the neo-populism prevalent in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. Also like these regimes, Thaksin made no investment in mass organisation, and fell precipitately when subject to elite attack. In Latin America, this phase has been superseded by leaders with a more ideological message and greater investment in organisation.

Business Populism in Thailand

Abstract:Thailand’s politics have changed dramatically under Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party since 2001. The business-based party has gradually come to resemble the “neo-populist” regimes of Latin America. It appeals to the “disorganized” mass in the rural economy and urban informal sector by launching redistributive policies, distancing itself from old leaders, and simultaneously undermining democratic institutions and liberal values. The party’s stance is a reflection of Thailand’s political economy under globalization marked by externally dominated economy, embattled local capitalism, and large informal sector.

The political economy of the Thai crisis

Abstract This paper looks at the background to Thailands crisis of 1997 from the viewpoint of the local political economy. The policy regime which had managed stable growth before 1985 was destroyed by a coalition of newly empowered technocrats, new business groups, and the neoliberal World Bank/IMF. This coalition promoted financial liberalization, but had neither the ideological coherence nor the political power to manage the consequences. The neoliberal enthusiasm for free markets, especially in finance, is based on a naive view of political realities and of the relationship between politics and business.

Inequality, Wealth and Thailand’s Politics

ABSTRACT Acemoglu and associates argue that resistance to democratisation will be stronger where inequality is high. Piketty shows that shifts at the upper end of the distribution may be historically more significant than overall measures of inequality. In Thailand, the high level of income inequality has eased slightly since 2000, but there is a “1% problem” as peak incomes are growing faster than the average. Newly available data show that inequality of wealth is very high. At the top of the wealth pyramid, family holdings of commercial capital are growing. A significant proportion of top entrepreneurs have emerged within the past generation. A second tier of the wealth elite has developed over the past generation from rising property values, financial investments and professional incomes. Although their individual wealth is much less than the corporate elite, their numbers are much greater. The existence of the prospering “1%” and the emergence of the second-tier wealthy may corroborate Acemoglu’s proposition, but there are tensions within the wealth elite which may favour democracy.

The Thai village economy in the past

Authors Preface to the TranslationTranslators NoteThe Thai Village Economy in the PastPreface1.From the Primordial Village Community to the Village under the SakdinaSystem 2.The Subsistence Village Economy under the Sakdina System, 1455-1855 3.From the Subsistence Village Economy to the Commercial Economy in theCentral Region, 1855-1932 4.The Persistence of the Subsistence Village Economy in the North, South, andIsan, 1855-19325.ConclusionNotesAppendix 1: Question Guide for Interviewing VillagersAppendix 2: Details of IntervieweesAfterword: Chatthip and the Thai Village

Thailand’s Crisis: Neo-Liberal Agenda and Local Reaction

In the eighteen months following the flotation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997, analysis of the Asian Crisis went through dramatic changes. The neo-liberal faith in free markets and free capital flows, which framed both analysis and policy-making in the early stages, gave way to calls for ‘coordinated Keynesianism’ and restrictions on capital movements. The IMF’s hubris collapsed into a limited admission of error. The debate on the Crisis was conducted on a global scale, moved along by the statements of participants (Camdessus, Rubin, Stiglitz), landmark actions (Suharto’s fall, Mahathir’s revolt), and academic interventions (Krugman, Sachs, Bhagwati). However, the debate was also moved ahead more subtly by events within the key countries (Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea), specifically by the interaction between IMF policies and the realities of local political economy. Because Thailand was the first to collapse and because Thailand became the most apparently compliant subject of IMF tutelage, this interaction in Thailand was especially important.

Early Modern Siam as a Mainly Urban Society

Early modern Siam is usually portrayed as a predominantly rural, peasant society. This picture is assumed from the worldwide trend of rural-to-urban transition, rather than from study of Siam itself. The available sources have a striking lack of any evidence on rural society. This article explores the possibility that this absence may reflect a real-world difference, not just perception. Unlike in temperate zones, enough food could be produced without dedicating the efforts of a majority of the population to agriculture. Rice could be grown by part-time ‘commuter’ agriculture, and other foods found by everyday hunting and gathering. Cultural preference based on the instinct for survival may have reinforced an affinity for urban residence. The scant data on Siams demography suggest the majority of the population lived in urban places. Descriptions of the capital portray a commercial and industrial centre, capable of employing many in non-agricultural pursuits. The state systems for raising resources were tailored to an urban rather than a rural society. While the scarcity of data on early Siam makes any ‘proof’ impossible, the thesis that Siam was a predominantly urban society is worth exploring. From the early eighteenth century on, Siam was subject to a process of ‘ruralization’ that created the familiar peasant society that historians have projected back into the past.

Experience and Prospects of Financial Cooperation in ASEAN

In December 2000, the U.S. National Intelligence Council published a report on Global Trends 2015 which projected world “drivers and trends” as background for U.S. policy-makers to plan foreign, security, and military policies. The report paints a generally optimistic picture of world trends in the economy, resources, technology, politics and conflict, and expects the United States will face no major difficulty in managing the world over the next 15 years. However, at the very end, the report lists eight “significant discontinuities” that could “produce trends quite different from those presented in the body of the study.” These eight include: economic collapse in the Middle East; “the formation of an international terrorist coalition”; another global epidemic on the scale of AIDS; an ethnic/religious conflict in a strategically sensitive area; a powerful anti-globalization movement; a China (People’s Republic of China)—India—Russia pact against the United States; and the collapse of the Atlantic alliance. The last of these “significant discontinuities” reads: Major Asian countries establish an Asian Monetary Fund or less likely an Asian Trade Organization, undermining the IMF and WTO and the ability of the U.S. to exercise global economic leadership (National Intelligence Council 2000: 81).