Patrice C. McMahon

From International Courts to Grassroots Organizing: Obstacles to Transitional Justice in the Balkans

Most research on transitional justice in the Balkans focuses on international mechanisms, particularly the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Little attention has been given to domestic responses because, until recently, there has been relatively little domestic participation and organizing around the topic of transitional justice. Our study seeks to fill this gap by examining the establishment of the Regional Truth Commission for the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM), which began officially in 2006. Using insights from social movement theory and literature on transnational advocacy networks, we identify the conditions necessary for a regional justice movement to succeed. Drawing upon interviews, survey research, as well as secondary material, we provide an interpretive analysis of RECOM, identifying the obstacles to its development, as well as the impact and role of international actors. We contend that although justice and peace are moving forward in the Balkans, ongoing dilemmas underscore important lessons about transitional justice; specifically, grassroots efforts to promote transitional justice must overcome significant challenges in defining issues, creating coalitions, and engaging the state. While international actors have thus far focused primarily on the ICTY, they can and should support grassroots efforts.

What Have We Wrought?: Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia

Although the Dayton accords have flaws, Western fatigue and Bosnian resentment are fueled by unrealistic expectations and impatience.

Home Court Advantage? Domestic Trials and Transitional Justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Many justifications are made for the use of international criminal prosecution to address mass atrocities and human rights violations in post-conflict societies. Domestic courts are easily politicized; rule of law within these countrie is usually weak, and domestic institutions and leaders are generally considered to be less credible than representatives of the international community. As discussed in Chapter 6, these and other arguments led to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993. This organization was also seen as an evidence of the globalization of democratic norms and the triumph of liberal legalism (Bass 2000, 20; Hagan and Kutnjak Ivkovic 2006). Yet within a decade, the United Nations (UN) Security Council acknowledged the shortcomings of these assumptions and the need for other instruments to lay the foundation for a durable peace in the Balkans. The Completion Strategy adopted by the UN in August 2003 reflected this thinking. By 2010, the ICTY’s work would be concluded and remaining cases would be transferred to domestic courts in the Balkans. Thus. domestic trials, rather than an international justice system, would become the primary mechanism to address the past and to encourage justice and reconciliation in the future.

Ethnic peace in the east: Transnational networks and the CSCE/OSCE

Abstract While a great deal is made of the international communitys inability to prevent ethnic violence in Yugoslavia, little attention has been paid to international efforts to manage ethnic conflicts in the years since. With an emphasis on the spearheading initiatives of the CSCE/OSCE, this article fleshes out the meaning of the so-called ‘Bosnia effect’. It contends that, by the middle of the 1990s, a transnational network of governmental and non-governmental organizations had adopted overlapping, reinforcing strategies and principles to encourage ethnic cooperation in Eastern Europe. While this transnational network focused on ethnic conflict management did not prevent violence everywhere, this article explains the unique networking behaviour of transnational actors and demonstrates its effect on the transformation of ethnic politics in a case study of Latvia.

Managing Ethnicity : The OSCE and Trans-National Networks in Romania

It would be an exaggeration to say that Eastern Europe was ever awash with violent ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, communisms demise did contribute to about a dozen ethnic conflicts, and by the early 1990s numerous crisis points emerged. Yugoslavia was undeniably the worst case scenario, but ethnic tensions had reached a dangerous level in several other states, including Romania, Latvia, and Estonia. As these problems unfolded, some scholars predicted that the West would simply leave Eastern Europe and its problems to itself. Fortunately, this did not happen, and throughout the 1990s, European regional organizations, in particular, made the prevention and management of ethnic conflict a priority. Given both the continued need to prevent ethnic-based conflicts and the dearth of research on ethnic cooperation, it is worthwhile recalling how the West responded to this new security threat. Which organizations led these efforts? What strategies were used? Most importantly, what were the effects of these initiatives? My research contends that ethnic disputes in Eastern Europe were shaped fundamentally by a transnational network of public and private organizations that worked in complementary, reinforcing ways to manage ethnic conflicts. It would be simplistic and empirically incorrect to assert that international factors alone explain the changes associated with ethnic relations in Eastern Europe, and this is not the argument that I make. Instead, I contend that while domestic politics within Eastern European countries were casually important to the timing of accommodating policies and the international communitys influence had to coincide with the preferences of domestic elites, transnational involvement was, nonetheless, crucial. The involvement of regional organizations, governments, and NGOs was important for putting -and keeping ethnic conflict management and minority rights on domestic agendas.

After Violent Conflict: Justice, Well-being, and International Criminal Courts

This article contributes to the empirically-based research on transitional justice by comparing different sectors associated with the ICTY’s multidimensional mandate in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia. Our central proposition is that given the initial differences between Balkan states over the establishment of the court and varied levels of international involvement throughout the region, changes associated with the ICTY’s long-term mission, what we call transitional justice outcomes, should vary and there should be some clear differences in transitional justice outcomes in the Balkans. Yet, we find that this is not the case and outcomes related to progressive political change and transitional justice are fairly uniform throughout the region.

Managing Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia: International Solutions to Domestic Problems

One of the most important but least recognized changes in the last decade is the shift from violent ethnic conflict to the management of ethnic disputes.2 Nearly two dozen violent ethnic conflicts were sparked by the end of the Cold War, and by the early 1990s more than 100 ethnic groups were relying on violence to achieve their goals.3 Yet, by the decade’s end, ethnic conflict started to wane and nationalist groups were more likely to rely on compromise and diplomacy than on guns and force. This is particularly true in the post-communist world where speeches laden with references to democracy and joining the West quickly replaced nationalist rhetoric. Even in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where ethnic strife turned to genocide, concentration camps, and over 200,000 casualties, stability and peace now reign. While hardly resolved, how have ethnic differences been managed?

The power of international criminal courts: Strategic behavior and accountability networks

ABSTRACT International criminal courts are often given mandates without the authority or resources to enforce those directives. Given this, how do they achieve their objectives? We argue that in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the court strategically developed an accountability network comprised of governmental and nongovernmental actors, using its expertise and position to provide information and a framework of accountability. Simultaneously, it reached out to a range of actors to ensure that governments and international organizations would push Balkan states to cooperate with the ICTY, thereby amplifying the courts power. Utilizing correspondence data, we create a unique dataset that traces the development of this accountability network, demonstrating how this institution engaged networks to pursue its goals. In general, we demonstrate that, although institutions may lack compulsory power, they can engage in strategic behavior using networks to project their productive power.