Patrice Gélinas

Single- and Multi-Ideology Marketing in the Province of Quebec in the Early Twentieth Century

In this article, the authors examine the marketing strategies that stove manufacturers implemented in the province of Quebec at the beginning of the twentieth century where the French and English Canadian nationalist ideologies coexisted. More specifically, the authors document evidence that a multi-ideology marketing framework mixing English and French Canadian nationalisms was used by French Canadian producers while English Canadian producers developed advertising campaigns exhibiting references to a single ideology. The analyses further suggest that the nationalist ideologies that producers tried to embed in stoves were consistent with their differentiation strategies. Overall, the authors conclude that advertising campaigns designed by members of a threatened ideological minority are more sensitive to all ideologies forming a population than are campaigns designed by members of an unthreatened ideological majority. More broadly, this study provides support for the widespread claim that the social context in which marketing is to occur ought to be taken into consideration.

Disclosure regulation, situational risk, situational ethics, and earnings management

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to explain an economic incentive to manage earnings derived from the intersection of disclosure theory and equity theory and to discuss its behavioral implications. Design/methodology/approach - This is a theoretical paper. Findings - A taxonomy of possible managerial reactions to increased disclosure regulation shows that deception (e.g. earnings management) bears relatively low-situational-ethics and high-situational-risk. Research limitations/implications - The taxonomy suggests that deceptive behavior would be better explained by broadening the traditional agency model with a situational ethics component and by relaxing its risk-aversion assumption. Practical implications - Theoretical findings suggest that the implementation of additional mandatory disclosure is not an appropriate strategy to limit earnings management in a context where the production of information is implicitly costly for managers, and where information asymmetry exists between managers and investors. However, regulations that raise managers’ awareness regarding personal risks involved with earnings management, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, appear likely to reduce the prevalence of earnings management. Originality/value - This paper is one of the first to focus on economic incentives, ethical considerations, and personal risk considerations simultaneously.

The value of job security: a lower‐bound estimate from a human capital perspective

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present an approach to quantify the monetary value of job security.Design/methodology/approach – The paper is theoretical and based on a financial economics human capital model. Empirical estimates of the annualized value of job security at three large corporations and at the government of the USA are also developed for an illustrative employee profile.Findings – A financial economics human capital model can be used to derive a lower‐bound estimate for the monetary value of job security and empirical estimates can be calculated straightforwardly to help managers who allocate economic resources to fulfill organizational labor requirements or negotiate labor agreements.Research limitations/implications – The model presented provides a lower‐bound estimate only. Future research could suggest approaches to calculate more precise estimates.Practical implications – This paper provides a tool for managers and workers who wish to include the monetary value of relative job...

CEO target compensation and performance standards in privately- and publicly-held firms through a disclosure regulation change

In this paper, the authors investigate whether CEOs from publicly-traded firms have higher target bonuses, higher target total cash compensation and smoother abnormal bonuses than CEOs in private firms. The authors also analyse the impact of disclosure regulation on performance standards that boards set for CEOs of both publicly-traded and private firms. Relying on samples containing both publicly-held and privately-owned firms, the authors show that the advent of mandated disclosure of executive compensation has imposed an additional compensation cost upon the shareholders of publicly-held firms without necessarily leading managers to achieve higher performance standards. The results suggest that executive compensation determination may reflect, beyond agency, managerial power and rent extraction considerations, both institutional (impression management) and governance pressures.

Are Canadian CEOs Compensated for International Responsibilities

Relying on proprietary Canadian data, we determine a positive relationship between the level of Canadian CEO compensation and the existence of significant international components among a CEO’s array of responsibilities. Our findings are consistent with agency and human capital theoretical arguments. Results imply that executive pay premiums should be anticipated and budgeted for in the planning and implementation of international ventures.