Patrick A. Messerlin

The ec antidumping regulations: A first economic appraisal, 1980–85

ZusammenfassungDie Antidumpingregeln der EG: Eine erste Bewertung für die Jahre {dy1980} bis 1985. - Der Aufsatz enthÄlt systematische Belege dafür, da\ die gegenwÄrtigen GATT-konformen Antidumpinggesetze wie z. B. die entsprechenden EG-Bestimmungen einen stark protektionistischen Inhalt haben. Die Antidumpingma\nahmen, die einem durchschnittlichen Wertzoll von ungefÄhr 23 vH entsprechen, vermindern die Importmengen um 40 vH. Die dadurch hervorgerufenen Renten erscheinen Firmen in IndustrielÄndern als hoch, Firmen in Entwicklungs- und SchwellenlÄndern aber als niedrig. Einige Absprachen zwischen EG-Unternehmen scheinen „effizient” zu sein, wenn es darum geht, Protektion zu erlangen oder Marktstrukturen zu gestalten. Als Ergebnis ist festzuhalten, da\ LÄnder, die eine Protektionspolitik verfolgen, anstelle von „freiwilligen ExportbeschrÄnkungen” Antidumpingma\nahmen vorziehen sollten.RésuméLes règlements antidumping de la CE: Une première évaluation économique, 1980-85. - Cette étude fournit l’évidence systématique que les antidumping lois actuelles qui sont conformes aux règles de GATT telles que les règlements de la CE ont un contenu très protectioniste. Les mesures antidumping qui représentent un ad valorem équivalent de 23 pour cent en moyenne réduisent les importations (en volume) par 40 pour cent. Les profits créés sont hauts pour les entreprises aux pays industrialisés, mais modérés pour les entreprises aux PVD et aux NPI. Quelques coalitions des entreprises de la CE semblent Être efficientes si elles veulent obtenir une protection et former la structure d’un marché. Le résultat est que les pays en faveur du protectionisme devraient préférer des actions antidumping aux restrictions volontaires à l’exportation.ResumenEl reglamento antidumping de las CC.EE.: una primera evaluación económica del período 1980–85. - Este trabajo provee evidencia sistemática que demuestra que los reglamentos antidumping actuates consistentes con el GATT, como el de las CC.EE., tienen un fuerte contenido proteccionista. Las medidas antidumping que representan un arancel ad valorem medio equivalente a aproximadamente un 23 por ciento redujeron las cantidades importadas en un 40 por ciento. Las rentas creadas parecen ser substanciales para empresas de los países industrializados, mas modestas para empresas de países en desarrollo o de los NICs. Algunas coaliciones de empresas de las CC.EE. parecen ser “eficientes” en cuanto a la obtención de protection y de influencia sobre las estructuras de los mercados. Como consecuencia, los países en bÚsqueda de protección prodrían preferir medidas antidumping en vez de “contingentes voluntarios de exportation”.

Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s

Trade protection costs the European Community between 6 and 7 percent of its gross domestic product, or the equivalent of the annual economic output of Spain. Continuing the Institutes series on trade protection in major countries (which already includes the United States, Japan, Korea, and China), this study by Patrick A. Messerlin is the first attempt to measure the impact of all types of protection in the European Union.Messerlin uses partial equilibrium methods to assess the costs to consumers and to evaluate the political economy of European protection. He also examines in detail the intricate relations between the major EC domestic policies--from the Common Agricultural Policy to the Single Market in services--and EC commercial policy. He aims to assess their dynamic evolution for the decade to come, which will be marked by the first accessions of Central European countries to the EC and by the debate on the European political union. The study provides a valuable agenda for the upcoming round of WTO negotiations and underlines their role as a support for domestic reforms that the EC should undertake for its own benefit.

Price, quality and welfare effects of European VERs on Japanese autos

Abstract This paper examines the impact of the VERs negotiated by the U.K., France and Germany with Japanese car makers. Market share analysis shows that the VERs did not arrest the declines in apparent consumption by local producers. Further analysis from a sample of Japanese (and other) cars sold on the French and German markets indicates quality upgrading between 1981 and 1983. The data also suggest that the VER was strictly binding in France starting around 1984 but not in Germany until 1985, the end of the sample period. Finally, the paper shows that the French, German and Japanese car producers supplied an increasingly similar product mix on the French market throughout the sample period (1979–1985) but the Italian producers shifted towards a lower (fiscal) horsepower mix.

Agriculture in the Doha Agenda

The author looks at the OECD domestic political economy associated with ongoing WTO farm negotiations, focusing on the OECD-based coalitions which could be helpful for WTO negotiators. Support from individual final consumers and taxpayers is far from guaranteed because consumers are spending less and less on food, and because taxpayers support, more or less willingly, non-trade concerns, such as environment or food safety, that they tend (wrongly) to associate with domestic farmers. As a result, trade negotiators should look at other allies. A natural candidate is a powerful group of consumers-the agribusiness industries-for which a reduction of the still high protection of their products under the Doha Round requires a corresponding reduction of protection in their farm inputs. They should also talk to farmers, hence sharpen their arguments, in particular by focusing on the distinction between small and large farmers, the latter being by far the main beneficiaries of the current OECD farm protectionist policies.

The political economy of protectionism : The bureaucratic case

ZusammenfassungDie politische ökonomie des Protektionismus: Die Rolle der Bürokratie. — Dieser Aufsatz versucht zu analysieren, welche Rolle die Bürokratie auf dem politischen Markt der Protektion spielt. Bisher wurden in der Literatur ausschlieΒlich Politiker und WÄhler als bestimmende KrÄfte behandelt. Alle Argumente, die in diesem Aufsatz vorgebracht werden, unterstützen die Ansicht, daΒ Bürokraten die Protektion stÄrker befürworten als Politiker. Wenn man eine Behörde als einen partiellen Diktator ansieht, der eine bestimmte Industrie überwacht, dann wird sie notwendigerweise einen höheren Protektionsgrad als den theoretisch optimalen wÄhlen. Wenn die Bürokraten weniger als die Politiker Gelegenheit haben, einen Gewinn (Reichtum) aus den protektionistischen AktivitÄten zu ziehen — und das kann erwartet werden-, dann werden sie für eine höhere Protektion sein als die Politiker. Diese Neigung zugunsten der Protektion wird noch verstÄrkt, wenn man die Informationskosten in die Betrachtung einbezieht. Ein anderes Ergebnis dieses Aufsatzes ist, daΒ jede Rangordnung protektionistischer MaΒnahmen, welche die Angebotsseite des Marktes für Protektion nicht in vollem Umfang berücksichtigt, völlig irreführend sein kann.RésuméL’économie politique du protectionnisme: Le cas bureaucratique. — Cet article essaie d’analyser le róle joué par les bureaucrates sur le marché politique de protectionnisme. Jusqu’à présent les agents publiques considérés dans la littérature étaient exclusivement des politiciens et des votants. Tous les arguments élaborés dans cet article supportent l’idée que les bureaucrates soutiennent le protectionnisme plus fortement que les politiciens. Si nous regardons un bureau comme dictateur partiel supervisant une industrie spécifique’un tel bureau nécessairement choisira un niveau de protection qui est plus haut que l’optimum de la théorie. Si les bureaucrates ont moins souvent l’opportunité de tirer des gains (richesse) des activités protectrices que les politiciens — comme on pourrait l’attendre — ils soutiendront une protection plus haute que les politiciens. Le biais en faveur de la protection augmente si nous considérons aussi les coûts d’information. Un autre résultat de cet article est que chaque essai de classifier les mesures protectrices qui ne considère pas l’offre sur le marché de protection toute entière peut tromper totalement.ResumenLa politica econömica del proteccionismo: El caso burocrático. — Este articulo trata de analizar el roi jugado por los buröeratas en el mercado politico de la protection. Hasta aqui, los agentes püblicos considerados en lu literatura fueron exclusivamente politicos y votantes. Todos los argumentes propuestos en este trabajo dan fuerte apoyo a la idea que los buröeratas están más a favor de la proteeeiön que los polfticos. Si se mira una oficina püblica como un dictador parcial que supervisa una industria determinada, esta elegirá necesariamente un nivel de proteeeiön más alto que el teöricamente Optimo. Si los buröeratas tienen menos oportunidades para captura ganancias (riqueza) de las actividades protegidas que los politicos, como es de esperar, entonces ellos van a favorecer una proteeeiön más alta que los politicos. Este sesgo hacia la proteeeiön se incrementará si, además, se consideran los costos de information. Otro resultado de este articulo es que cualquier clasificaeiön entre dispositivos protectivos que no toma completamente en cuenta el lado de la oferta del mercado por proteeeiön puede ser bastante engañoso.

The law and economics of contingent protection in the WTO

In this important book, three of the leading authors in the field of international economic law discuss the law and economics of the three most frequently used contingent protection instruments: anti-dumping, countervailing measures, and safeguards. When discussing countervailing measures, the authors also discuss legal challenges against prohibited and/or actionable subsidies. The authors’ choice is mandated by the fact that the effects of a subsidy cannot always be confined to the market of the WTO Member wishing to react against it. Assuming there are effects outside its market, an injured WTO Member can challenge the scheme as such before a WTO Panel. Taking the three agreements for granted as a starting point, the book provides comprehensive discussion of both the original contracts, and the case law that has substantially contributed to the understanding of these agreements.

Export credit subsidies

Export credit subsidies Jacques Melitz and Patrick Messerlin In recent years governments have increasingly resorted to export credit subsidies. The major motivation for the proliferation of such schemes seems to be macroeconomic rather than microeconomic in nature. The conventional argument – namely that they simultaneously increase demand and improve the current account – is fundamentally flawed in ignoring the second-round effects on prices and the exchange rate. The authors investigate whether there is a valid macroeconomic case for export credit subsidies and find that temporary measures can be useful in reducing the recessionary costs of a disinflationary program by permitting a larger appreciation of the exchange rate during the initial stages of the program. They also present detailed evidence on the impact across different industries of export credits in France. These are heavily concentrated on a small number of industries – specifically machine tools, construction, metalworking, aircraft/ships and electrical equipment. The distortionary effect on industrial structure is consequently large, and any beneficial macroeconomic benefits are likely to be outweighed by the microeconomic costs. The case for export credit subsidies is not persuasive.

Climate, Trade and Water: A ‘Grand Coalition’?

The paper argues first that the climate, trade and water communities should leave aside their prejudices, and it provides clear evidence that the three communities confront the same vested interests when trying to solve their common problem of free riding. Then, it argues that such strong similarities speak in favour of “sister” world regimes in these three domains. These sister regimes should first share the key principles of non-discrimination (national treatment and most favored nation) embodied in the WTO. Second, by contrast, the climate and water communities should review the other WTO rules in order to adapt them to their specific demands when needed. Interestingly, when doing so, these two communities may provide much needed inspiration for improving some rules of the current trade regime. Finally, the climate and water regimes may also adopt provisions on pricing that are not needed by the trade regime which deals mostly with well functioning markets.

France and trade policy: is the ‘French exception’ passée?

Drawing attention to the marked similarities between the French stance in the negotiations leading up to the Franco-British treaty of 186o and its attitude during the GATT Uruguay Round of the early 199os, the author investigates the roots of French protectionism in domestic issues. He stresses the weakness of the constitutional system in France that has led to a search for stability in other arenas which in turn has inhibited progress towards freer trade. He identifies a new strand in French thinking on trade which takes a more positive view of multilateralism, andfocuses on the importance of establishing a reasoned and reasonable debate in France on trade issues.

United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China : never ending zeroing in the WTO?

Despite many legal rulings to clarify the WTO inconsistency of zeroing practices, in practically all aspects of antidumping proceedings, the United States declined to categorically rectify the illegal antidumping duties based on zeroing calculation methods. This dispute is merely example of a number of disputes where the US government had to exhaust the whole process for proper implementation of the WTO rulings under its domestic legal system. The US approach is starkly contrasted with the position taken by the European Union that categorically terminates zeroing practices pursuant to the WTO rulings. While the WTO system indeed recognizes individual Members peculiar regulatory systems and policies during implementation phases, the current situation in which WTO Members must individually resort to the dispute settlement system in order to rectify the US zeroing practices raises a serious concern regarding the legitimacy and integrity of the WTO dispute settlement system. Maybe it is time for WTO Members to agree on better implementation mechanisms before more Members try to develop overly burdensome and complicated regulatory processes for compliance.