Patrick Flavin

Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States

Government representation of public opinion is a central component of democracy. Previous studies have documented a robust congruence between aggregated public opinion and public policies in the American states. However, an equally important question for evaluating the quality of democracy is “Who does government respond to when formulating public policies?” I investigate differential policy representation based on citizens’ household incomes and find that citizens with low incomes receive little substantive political representation (compared with more affluent citizens) in the policy decisions made by their state governments. This unequal policy representation occurs for both the general liberalism of state policies and on specific social issues like the death penalty and abortion. These findings suggest that examining the variation in political inequality across the 50 states can help scholars to better understand and explain “unequal democracy” in the United States.

From the Schoolhouse to the Statehouse Teacher Union Political Activism and U.S. State Education Reform Policy

Elementary and secondary education policy making in the U.S. states is heavily influenced by the political bargaining of various actors, with teacher unions one of the most important actors. Yet previous studies that assess the impact of teacher unions on education reform use problematic measures of their direct political influence, instead opting for broader measures of membership or collective bargaining power. By contrast, the authors measure teacher union political activity by calculating the percentage of campaign contributions to candidates for state office that come from teacher unions. Using this measure, the authors find that increased teacher union political activity greatly reduces the chances that states enact reform-oriented education policies such as school choice and performance pay for teachers, while previous measures of teacher union strength bear little relationship to a state’s adoption of these reform policies. These findings highlight the importance of paying careful attention to how political influence is operationalized in studies that assess the role organized interests play in shaping U.S. state policies.

How Citizens and Their Legislators Prioritize Spheres of Representation

The authors uncover evidence that citizens’ priorities about various spheres of legislative representation differ across demographic groups and that these differences are subsequently reflected in the in-office behavior of their elected officials. Specifically, African Americans and Latinos are less concerned than whites with policy representation—the attentiveness of elected officials to citizens’ policy preferences—but place more emphasis on their district receiving its fair share of federal money. Citizens with higher incomes place a higher priority on policy representation and less on constituency service than do those with lower incomes. Importantly, these priorities map onto their member of Congress’s behavior.

Two Distinct Concepts Party Competition in Government and Electoral Competition in the American States

American state politics scholars have generally relied on Ranney’s measure of the partisan composition of state legislatures and governors’ offices to evaluate competition between parties for control of state government, and Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure of the competitiveness of individual state legislative elections to evaluate the degree of electoral competition in a state. Both measure “competition” and were previously correlated with one another, so researchers might be tempted to consider them two measures of the same concept. This would be mistaken, however, because they are measuring two distinct concepts. We use new data on state legislative partisan balance and election returns to compute (and make publicly available) the two measures of competition from 1970 to 2003, a time span that is significantly longer than any previous study. We show that the relationship between the two measures has drastically changed over the last 30 years. Although the two measures were positively correlated in the 1970s and 1980s, they are now (as we might expect, given they are different concepts) negatively correlated. We investigate one possible explanation for this change and conclude by discussing a set of practical recommendations for scholars who plan to incorporate a measure of competition in future studies.

Policy, Preferences, and Participation: Government's Impact on Democratic Citizenship

Do government policy decisions impact citizens’ involvement in politics? Using panel data, we assess the extent to which variation in levels of political participation among citizens between 2000 and 2004 is linked to the nexus of citizens’ preferences and government policy. We show that two policy decisions—military intervention in Iraq and the Bush tax cuts—did affect citizens’ subsequent political participation, mobilizing the biggest policy winners and galvanizing the greatest policy losers to increase their political activity. However, the mechanism that explains increased participation differs between winners and losers. We also uncover evidence that policy realization, or citizens’ retrospective perceptions of how well a policy played out, and political knowledge both moderate the effect of policy winning and losing on political participation.

The Political Foundations of the Black–White Education Achievement Gap

More than 50 years after Brown v. Board, African American students continue to trail their White peers on a variety of important educational indicators. In this article, we investigate the political foundations of the racial “achievement gap” in American education. Using variation in high school graduation rates across the states, we first assess whether state policymakers are attentive to the educational needs of struggling African American students. We find evidence that state policymaking attention to teacher quality—an issue education research shows is essential to improving schooling outcomes for racial minority students—is highly responsive to low graduation rates among White students, but bears no relationship to low graduation rates among African American students. We then probe a possible mechanism behind this unequal responsiveness by examining the factors that motivate White public opinion about education reform and find racial influences there as well. Taken together, we uncover evidence that the persisting achievement gap between White and African American students has distinctively political foundations.

Campaign Finance Laws, Policy Outcomes, and Political Equality in the American States

Laws that regulate the financing of campaigns are one attempt to attenuate the role of money in politics and promote more egalitarian policy outcomes. Do states with stricter campaign finance regulations represent citizens’ interests more equally? Using data on state spending priorities from 1977 to 2008, this article finds that states with stricter campaign finance laws devote a larger proportion of their annual budget to public welfare spending in general and to cash assistance programs in particular. In contrast, there is no relationship between the strictness of campaign finance laws and spending decisions for non-redistributive policy areas. I also investigate possible causal mechanisms and uncover evidence that stricter campaign finance laws alter incentives for candidates to respond to wealthy constituents by lessening the proportion of contributions that originate from business interests. These results suggest that laws that regulate the financing of political campaigns can play an important role in promoting the interests of disadvantaged citizens and enhancing political equality.

Lobbying Regulations and Political Equality in the American States

Laws that regulate the conduct of professional lobbyists in statehouses across the nation are one attempt to ensure that citizens’ opinions receive more equal consideration when elected officials make policy decisions. Do states with stricter lobbying regulations actually display more egalitarian patterns of political representation? Using public opinion measures from the National Annenberg Election Surveys and data on state policies, this article first demonstrates that state policy decisions are consistently more proximate to the opinions of affluent citizens. I then evaluate the relationship between the stringency of state lobbying regulations and representational equality across the states and find evidence that states with stricter regulations weigh citizens’ opinions more equally in the policymaking process. These findings suggest that lobbying regulations can play an important role in promoting greater political equality.

Does higher voter turnout among the poor lead to more equal policy representation

Abstract The belief that elected officials are most responsive to the opinions of the wealthiest members of society is often assumed but has only recently begun to be tested. This paper examines a common explanation for why this disparity in political representation occurs: wealthy citizens vote at much higher rates than citizens with low incomes. Utilizing variation across states in voter turnout levels among the rich and poor, there is little evidence that increased voting among citizens with low incomes improves representation of their political opinions in the Senate. These findings cast doubt on the proposition that increased voter turnout among the poor is an avenue for promoting greater political equality in the United States.

Religion and Government Corruption in the American States

One way to measure the quality of government is to assess the extent to which political officials are corrupt (i.e., use their public office for private gain). This study presents a set of theoretical expectations for why states with a larger proportion of religious citizens will have lower levels of government corruption and then tests this proposition using cross-sectional data from the American states. Despite reasons to expect otherwise, the religiosity of a states population is not related to instances of government corruption. This result is robust as related to multiple measures of both corruption and religiosity. This article concludes with a discussion of how these findings increase understanding of the impact of societal characteristics on the quality of government.