Patrick M. Morgan

The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today

In comparison with the Cold War era, deterrence in international politics has changed significantly, even though many of the basic components of that deterrence still exist and continue to have an impact. Deterrence is now less salient in national security policies and international security management, more recessed, particularly nuclear deterrence. This is primarily due to the huge changes in international politics ushered in by the end of the Cold War, particularly in great-power political relationships, and which are continuing to unfold. Important developments are underway with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, collective actor deterrence, and other aspects of international system security. While many old topics pertaining to deterrence continue to be studied and generate continuing controversies, often along the same lines as in the past, some important investigations and theoretical analyses have also emerged on pivotal deterrence, the deterrence of cyberattacks, terrorism, and international crime. What is needed most is analysis on how to develop and apply deterrence strategy and practice in new ways as a central contribution to global and regional system security maintenance and management, a function deterrence performed during the Cold War but in ways now largely out of date. Also needed is careful attention to the possibility of the return of more traditional international politics, particularly if this were to occur in relations among the major states, and careful consideration of how best to use deterrence to hedge against such a development.

Taking the long view of deterrence

One of the most interesting aspects of deterrence during the Cold War is how East – West, particularly superpower, deterrence gradually took on many of the trappings of a resource for international system management, so much so that it is often referred to as a regime. It is important that we keep this in mind and consider how the basic idea of deterrence as a security management resource for the system can be relevant today and in the future. In this connection, the most interesting of the subjects Lawrence Freedman tackles in Deterrence is his conception of ‘internalized deterrence’, particularly his assertion that ‘The challenge for strategic deterrence is to create internalized deterrence in its targets’ (p.32). Freedman links internalized deterrence to the inculcation of norms in the target: ‘A norms-based approach [to deterrence] requires reinforcing certain values to the point where it is well understood that they must not be violated’ (p.4). This is a stimulating notion because it blends two concepts one might otherwise consider antithetical, internalized norms and internalized deterrence. It is important to specify how the two might be related because adherence to norms of behavior as right and proper would seem to eliminate any need for, and thus the existence of, deterrence. Only when what is internalized is fear of the consequences of violating certain norms is deterrence at work. As Freedman notes, ‘Deterrence is

Deterrence and System Management: The Case of North Korea:

The recent North Korean crisis is the latest phase in a lengthy U.S.-North Korean deterrence relationship. That relationship, particularly its problems and limitations, is reviewed and the effectiveness of each sides contemporary deterrence posture is assessed. It is noted that deterrence and compellence have not prevented the emergence of the Norths nuclear proliferation efforts, nor has it brought North Korea a large improvement in security. The recent crisis is also examined to assess the mistakes in U.S. efforts to further pursue deterrence and compellence to end the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Lessons of the crisis for the use of deterrence for system security management are briefly discussed.

NATO and European security: the creative use of an international organization

This essay deals with Europes experience in regional security building. In the authors view, it is hard to find much comfort for the Middle East in the modern history of security management in Europe. Certain basic elements which made the process work in Europe are lacking in the Middle East. Morgan discusses at length NATOs role in and contribution to the emergence of a pluralistic security community in Western Europe. It did so by developing a level of advanced multilateralism verging on integration, and by supplying the framework through which the powerful military capabilities of states with long histories of past conflicts and rivalries could coexist without provoking traditional fears and insecurities.

National and international security: Theory then, theory now

This article argues that theory in international relations remains quite relevant for foreign policy‐making. However, after indicating how theory widely shapes foreign policy discussion and analysis today, it cites Cold War era examples to demonstrate that theory is often used badly or very unevenly by political leaders and officials. It also demonstrates that IR theory has been uneven in predicting and explaining important developments. This is now the case because, with the changes since the end of the Cold War, various basic concepts and theoretical perspectives need reexamination and refinement including hegemony, hegemonic stability, and multilateral management. In particular, we need to look into the concept of a collective hegemony to better understand how the international system runs today. On balance, solid theoretical analysis is as necessary to good foreign policy‐making as ever.

Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats and Deterrence by Diplomacy

Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. By Daryl G. Press. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 218p.

Getting the “Liberalist Transition” under Way: The Experience of the East Asian Regional International System

32.50. Deterrence by Diplomacy. By Anne E. Sartori. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 176p.

International security : problems and solutions

32.50. In Cold War deterrence, nothing was more important or disturbing than the credibility problem. Success depended on conveying credible threats, yet it was hard to see how to make retaliatory threats credible in mutual nuclear deterrence, particularly in extended deterrence or to prevent conventional attacks. It was also hard to make nuclear retaliation threats credible against nonnuclear powers; nuclear use would arouse condemnation, set an awful precedent, and stimulate nuclear proliferation. In fact, how were retaliatory threats of any sort made credible?

The impact of the revolution in military affairs

Abstract This article suggests that the achievement of a benign general security situation in East Asia should receive greater attention than it has from theorists in international politics. In terms of steps to resolve or ease conflicts, relax tensions, expand cooperative endeavors and build significant ties among previously hostile governments the East Asian regional system has made remarkable gains. The change might even be termed an important step in a “liberalist transition,” which involves movement of an international system away from traditional international politics. The usual explanations as to how such a situation could come about, explanations that can be found in both the realist and liberalist traditions, do not seem to fit the record in this regional system very well. The article explains why existing explanations are deficient, and offers an outline of a new approach. Developing a better understanding of the East Asian experience in improving regional security is important not only for the...