Patrick Sentis

Insider trading, pricing and the long-run performance of IPOs: evidence from the French market during the high-tech bubble

This article empirically examines the relationship between insider (entrepreneurs and venture capitalists) trading and underpricing and long-run performance in a sample of 120 initial public offerings (IPOs) that took place on the Nouveau Marché in France during the high-tech bubble. We hypothesize that insiders were better informed than the market about the future prospect of the firms, particularly during the high-tech bubble characterized by strong information asymmetry. Trading activity was measured at the IPO date and over a three-year period after this date. We find no evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists knowingly issue overvalued equity at the IPO date. However, there is weak, but statistically significant, evidence that suggests that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists acquire private information during the first years of flotation and have the ability to take advantage of it by selling overvalued equity. Both these types of insider seem to be the best informed on the future value of the firm. However, changes in ownership of banks and other shareholders are not followed by significant change in the firms long term value.

Long-run performance of IPOs and the role of financial analysts: some French evidence

This paper examines the long-run performance of French initial public offerings (IPOs) carried out between 1991 and 2005. Using various methodologies, we found that IPOs in our sample performed poorly relative to the comparison portfolios over the 1991–2005 horizon in contrast to that reported by prior studies of the French market. This abnormal long-run performance is more severe for orphan IPOs (those without financial analysts’ recommendations) than for non-orphan IPOs the first year following the offerings (a statistically significant difference). In contrast to the widely held belief, this evidence suggests that analyst coverage is indeed not important to the issuing firm. Investors pay more attention to non-orphan IPOs when they are not book built, venture capital backed, underwritten by a large syndicate and less underpriced. Over the 1991–2005 period, an analysts affiliation does not appear to matter. This result is inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis. During the first year of issuance, analysts’ recommendations are associated with the success of a newly public firm. However, once we extend the horizon to 3 or 5 years after the issuance, we can find that analysts’ recommendations are not significantly related to the long-run performance of IPOs.

Linking Branding Strategy to Ownership Structure and Financial Performance and Stability: Case of French Wine Cooperatives

This research explores the relationship between the branding and financial performance of a firm while taking into account its ownership structure. Using decisional theory, we apply a normative approach to better explain the incentives and constraints of branding in two types of firms: cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs). We then perform a quantitative analysis using a survey of 207 French firms in the wine sector and financial information data. We show that cooperatives are more constrained to private branding. As a consequence, they invest more in labelling, whereas IOFs are more likely to invest in private branding. Additionally, we find that branded (private and labelling) firms have poorer financial and commercial performance, as measured by return on assets and return on sales ratios, respectively. Finally, we find that the main factor contributing to the stability of financial performance is a cooperative ownership structure rather than the branding strategy.

Analyst Coverage of IPO Firms and Securities Laws: A Cross-Country Analysis

We examine, over the period from 1991 to 2010, the influence of legal environment on the ability of financial analysts to discriminate between good and bad IPOs. We find, after controlling for IPO firm-specific characteristics as well as country-specific characteristics, significant difference in the long-run returns of non-orphan and orphan IPOs carried out in countries with high-legal-environment. The opposite result appears in countries with low-legal-environment. This evidence suggests that financial analysts may discriminate between good and bad IPOs only in countries with high-legal-environment. Hence, analyst coverage is informative only for IPO firms which evolve in such countries.