Patrik Fridlund

Double Religious Belonging and Some Commonly Held Ideas about Dialogue and Conversion

There is often a perceived tension between dialogue on the one hand and conversion on the other hand. This article suggests that this tension may be related to religious conviction and religious belonging being seen as monolithic. A basic idea of this article is that there are suggestive empirical findings and relevant conceptual arguments about double religious belonging in a large sense, which lead to a profound questioning, which undermines established views of religion as comprehensive systems. This has implications for conceptions of dialogue and conversion. It is suggested that a consequence of taking into consideration double religious belonging in a broad sense is that established ideas of religions as comprehensive interpretative schemes are undermined. Instead, one would have to acknowledge the fragmented, partial, and contextual character of religion. Accordingly, interreligious dialogue and conversion must also be understood as diversified, variegated and fragmented phenomena. Dialogue is addressed to specific issues, in precise contexts, regarding particular concerns, and the same could generally be said of the aim to convert others.

I See that from Both Sides Now: On the Intricate Relation between Dialogue and Conversion

There seems to be a double track in the relationship to the other. On the one hand, there is dialogue—an attitude of seeing the other as she is. On the other hand, we all seem to have some kind of worldview implying that My Way is the Best Way, at least in a certain respect—there seem to be certain points where I would like other people to see things in the same way as I do. I argue that these two seemingly opposite attitudes need not necessarily be connected to opposite values. No, both attitudes may be traced to similar ethical grounds. There is an ethic of dialogue, and there is an ethic of conversion, as it were. W. K. Clifford’s classical text ‘The Ethics of Belief’ is taken as a point of entry together with William James’ reply ‘The Will to Believe.’ However, instead of picking up the traditional epistemological debate regarding Clifford and James, this article uses these texts in an argument that the relation between dialogue and conversion is an intricate one from an ethical point of view. Intricate indeed, as an ethical perspective is also related to theological standpoints and to views of religion in an inter-dependent fashion. Here Dorothee Solle is given as an illustrative example. (Less)

Responding to Syncretism

Syncretism seems to disturb, and make uncertain what is taken for granted. Whether this is out of ‘logic’ or out of ‘jealousy’ is important in my reading. In this paper I suggest that logic is unhelpful in analyses of syncretism. Many religiously grounded refutations and condemnations of syncretism are based on jealousy, I suggest. I also suggest that jealousy as ground for judging syncretism, syncretic comportment, or syncretic ideas entails a relational aspect, giving place to sentiment, and to emotion. hence, jealousy requires judgements when a purported syncretic phenomenon is dealt with. Making a judgement implies therefore possible negotiations, changed views, and compromise. A judgement invites ethical perspectives.

Index of Names and Subjects

Theological and Philosophical Responses to Syncretism: Beyond the Mirage of Pure Religion by Patrik Fridlund and Mika Vahakangas (eds.) elaborates the consequences of admitting the unavoidable syncretic nature of religions in theology and philosophy of religion.

Theological and Philosophical Responses to Syncretism: Beyond the Mirage of Pure Religion

Theological and Philosophical Responses to Syncretism: Beyond the Mirage of Pure Religion by Patrik Fridlund and Mika Vahakangas (eds.) elaborates the consequences of admitting the unavoidable syncretic nature of religions in theology and philosophy of religion.

Derrida, Abraham and Responsible Subjectivity

Secrecy is a theme in Genesis 22, in Derrida’s reading of the story, in which God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. It is about keeping a secret, not secret as in hiding, but rather the secret of an exclusive relationship. This is embarrassing as it is excluding. Accepting this unique relationship by keeping the secret, Abraham demonstrates his willingness to enter into a relationship based on unconditional love. An essential part of this unconditionality and uniqueness is Abraham not referring to anybody or anything outside. He thus takes the responsibility entirely. This may be seen as being centred upon the individual as well as a question of taking responsibility, deciding, and taking a stand. Interestingly enough, Abraham must be capable of failing, or capable of deciding not to obey the command. The call is for a unique relationship, but there must be a possibility of not responding to the call. Or, must there?