Paul E. Dux

The attentional blink: A review of data and theory

Under conditions of rapid serial visual presentation, subjects display a reduced ability to report the second of two targets(Target2; T2) in a stream of distractors if it appearswithin200-500 msec of Target 1 (Tl). This effect. known as the attentional blink(AB),has been central in characterizing the limits of humans’ ability to consciously perceive stimuli distributed across time. Here, we review theoretical accounts of the AB and examine how they explain key findings in the literature. We conclude that the AB arises from attentional demands of Tl for selection, working memory encoding, episodic registration,and response selection, which prevents this high-level central resource from being applied to T2 at shortT1-T2 lags. Tl processing also transiently impairs the redeployment of these attentional resources to subsequent targets and the inhibition of distractors that appear in close temporal proximity to T2. Although these findings are consistent with a multifactorial account of the AB,they can also be largely explained by assuming that the activation of these multiple processes depends on a common capacity-limited attentional process for selecting behaviorally relevant events presented among temporally distributed distractors. Thus, at its core, the attentional blink may ultimately reveal the temporal limits of the deployment of selective attention.

Isolation of a Central Bottleneck of Information Processing with Time-Resolved fMRI

When humans attempt to perform two tasks at once, execution of the first task usually leads to postponement of the second one. This task delay is thought to result from a bottleneck occurring at a central, amodal stage of information processing that precludes two response selection or decision-making operations from being concurrently executed. Using time-resolved functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), here we present a neural basis for such dual-task limitations, e.g. the inability of the posterior lateral prefrontal cortex, and possibly the superior medial frontal cortex, to process two decision-making operations at once. These results suggest that a neural network of frontal lobe areas acts as a central bottleneck of information processing that severely limits our ability to multitask.

Training improves multitasking performance by increasing the speed of information processing in human prefrontal cortex

Our ability to multitask is severely limited: task performance deteriorates when we attempt to undertake two or more tasks simultaneously. Remarkably, extensive training can greatly reduce such multitasking costs. While it is not known how training alters the brain to solve the multitasking problem, it likely involves the prefrontal cortex given this brain regions purported role in limiting multitasking performance. Here, we show that the reduction of multitasking interference with training is not achieved by diverting the flow of information processing away from the prefrontal cortex or by segregating prefrontal cells into independent task-specific neuronal ensembles, but rather by increasing the speed of information processing in this brain region, thereby allowing multiple tasks to be processed in rapid succession. These results not only reveal how training leads to efficient multitasking, they also provide a mechanistic account of multitasking limitations, namely the poor speed of information processing in human prefrontal cortex.

Applications of transcranial direct current stimulation for understanding brain function

In recent years there has been an exponential rise in the number of studies employing transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) as a means of gaining a systems-level understanding of the cortical substrates underlying behaviour. These advances have allowed inferences to be made regarding the neural operations that shape perception, cognition, and action. Here we summarise how tDCS works, and show how research using this technique is expanding our understanding of the neural basis of cognitive and motor training. We also explain how oscillatory tDCS can elucidate the role of fluctuations in neural activity, in both frequency and phase, in perception, learning, and memory. Finally, we highlight some key methodological issues for tDCS and suggest how these can be addressed.

A Unified attentional bottleneck in the human brain

Human information processing is characterized by bottlenecks that constrain throughput. These bottlenecks limit both what we can perceive and what we can act on in multitask settings. Although perceptual and response limitations are often attributed to independent information processing bottlenecks, it has recently been suggested that a common attentional limitation may be responsible for both. To date, however, evidence supporting the existence of such a “unified” bottleneck has been mixed. Here, we tested the unified bottleneck hypothesis using time-resolved fMRI. Experiment 1 isolated brain regions involved in the response selection bottleneck that limits speeded dual-task performance. These same brain regions were not only engaged by a perceptual encoding task in Experiment 2, their activity also tracked delays to a speeded decision-making task caused by concurrent perceptual encoding (Experiment 3). We conclude that a unified attentional bottleneck, including the inferior frontal junction, superior medial frontal cortex, and bilateral insula, temporally limits operations as diverse as perceptual encoding and decision-making.

Cognitive Load Disrupts Implicit Theory-of-Mind Processing:

Eye movements in Sally-Anne false-belief tasks appear to reflect the ability to implicitly monitor the mental states of other individuals (theory of mind, or ToM). It has recently been proposed that an early-developing, efficient, and automatically operating ToM system subserves this ability. Surprisingly absent from the literature, however, is an empirical test of the influence of domain-general executive processing resources on this implicit ToM system. In the study reported here, a dual-task method was employed to investigate the impact of executive load on eye movements in an implicit Sally-Anne false-belief task. Under no-load conditions, adult participants displayed eye movement behavior consistent with implicit belief processing, whereas evidence for belief processing was absent for participants under cognitive load. These findings indicate that the cognitive system responsible for implicitly tracking beliefs draws at least minimally on executive processing resources. Thus, even the most low-level processing of beliefs appears to reflect a capacity-limited operation.

An Attentional Blink for Sequentially Presented Targets: Evidence in Favor of Resource Depletion Accounts

Several accounts of the attentional blink (AB) have postulated that this dual-target deficit occurs because of limited-capacity attentional resources being devoted to processing the first target at the expense of the second (resource depletion accounts; e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995). Recent accounts have challenged this model (e.g., Di Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005; Olivers, van der Stigchel, & Hulleman, 2007), proposing instead that the AB occurs because of subjects’ inability to maintain appropriate levels of attentional control when targets are separated by distractors. Accordingly, the AB is eliminated when three targets from the same attentional set are presented sequentially in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream. However, under such conditions poorer identification of the first target is typically observed, hinting at a potential trade-off between the first and subsequent target performances. Consistent with this hypothesis, the present study shows that an AB is observed for successive targets from the same attentional set in an RSVP stream when the first target powerfully captures attention. These results suggest that resource depletion contributes significantly to the AB.

The Meaning of the Mask Matters Evidence of Conceptual Interference in the Attentional Blink

The rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) experiment reported here investigated the role of conceptual interference in the attentional blink (AB). Subjects were presented with RSVP streams that contained five stimuli: Target 1, a distractor, Target 2, a second distractor, and a symbol mask. Target 1 was a green letter, Target 2 was a red letter, and the distractors were either white letters or white digits. The stimuli were presented in a font typically seen on the face of a digital watch. Thus, “S” and “O” were identical to “5” and “0,” respectively. This allowed us to present streams that were conceptually different even though featurally identical: The two letter targets were followed by distractors that were recognized either as “5” and “0” or as “S” and “O.” The AB was substantially attenuated when subjects were told the distractors were digits rather than letters. This result indicates that conceptual interference plays a role in the AB.

Improved multitasking following prefrontal tDCS

We have a limited capacity for mapping sensory information onto motor responses. This processing bottleneck is thought to be a key factor in determining our ability to make two decisions simultaneously - i.e., to multitask (Pashler, 1984, 1994; Welford, 1952). Previous functional imaging research (Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006; Dux et al., 2009) has localised this bottleneck to the posterior lateral prefrontal cortex (pLPFC) of the left hemisphere. Currently, however, it is unknown whether this region is causally involved in multitasking performance. We investigated the role of the left pLPFC in multitasking using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). The behavioural paradigm included single- and dual-task trials, each requiring a speeded discrimination of visual stimuli alone, auditory stimuli alone, or both visual and auditory stimuli. Reaction times for single- and dual-task trials were compared before, immediately after, and 20 min after anodal stimulation (excitatory), cathodal stimulation (inhibitory), or sham stimulation. The cost of responding to the two tasks (i.e., the reduction in performance for dual- vs single-task trials) was significantly reduced by cathodal stimulation, but not by anodal or sham stimulation. Overall, the results provide direct evidence that the left pLPFC is a key neural locus of the central bottleneck that limits an individuals ability to make two simple decisions simultaneously.

Delayed Reentrant Processing Impairs Visual Awareness An Object-Substitution-Masking Study

In object-substitution masking (OSM), a sparse, common-onset mask impairs perception of a target when the mask’s offset is later than the target’s offset and spatial attention is dispersed. OSM is thought to reflect the interaction of feed-forward and reentrant processes in the brain: Upon stimulus presentation, a low-resolution representation of the target and mask progresses from sensory to anterior brain regions, triggering reentrant processing to confirm stimulus identity. It is hypothesized that dispersing spatial attention prolongs the required reentrant iterations, increasing the likelihood that only the lingering mask stimulus will remain physically present and thus substitute for the target in consciousness. However, empirically, it remains unclear whether substitution stems from delayed feed-forward or reentrant processing. Here, we demonstrate that delayed reentrant processing causes OSM, by showing that a task tapping high-level brain regions involved in reentrant processing leads to a spatially attended target being replaced by the mask. Our results confirm a key role for reentrant processing in conscious perception.