Paul Helm

‘Structural Indifference’ and Compatibilism in Reformed Orthodoxy

In Reformed Thought on Freedom the Scotian apparatus of synchronic contingency, structural indifference, and logical moments is deployed in an attempt to show that the Reformed Orthodox espoused Scotian freedom of indifference as an intrinsic feature of their anthropology. It is counter-argued that the sense given to ‘structural indifference’ is at odds with the Orthodox commitment to indifference in the divided sense. Further, recent commentators misunderstand the divided sense only as the Reformed Orthodox use it. Finally it is briefly argued that the Orthodox use of the contrast between being free and being constrained, and their criteria for moral accountability, are consistent with certain forms of compatibilism. So it is a reasonable presumption that as regards human freedom, the Orthodox favoured a version of compatibilism.

God, compatibilism, and the authorship of sin

Peter Byrne has presented arguments against the effectiveness of two ‘defensive strategies’ deployed in my books Eternal God and The Providence of God respectively. These strategies were originally presented to support the cogency of ‘theological compatibilism’ by arguing against the claims that it is inconsistent with human responsibility, and that it entails that God is the author of sin. In this present article the author offers a number of clarifications to his original thesis and argues that Byrnes arguments do not succeed in their aim of undermining the two strategies.

Reformed Thought on Freedom: Some Further Thoughts

Reformed Thought on Freedom introduces philosophical apparatus that was routinely employed by Reformed Orthodox theologians for discussing the metaphysics of human action. This article first offers critical reflection on the claims made for this apparatus as providing evidence for a commitment to the freedom of indifference. Then, taking the book’s treatment of Francis Turretin’s anthropology as an example, it is argued that the claim that his view of human freedom relies on the notion of synchronic contingency is not made out. There is a failure to distinguish between indifference as an intrinsic feature of the will, and the freedom of indifference.

The indispensability of belief to religion

The article examines a central methodological tenet of Grace Jantzens Becoming Divine . In this book she turns her back on what she calls Anglo-American philosophy of religion in favour of what she calls a continental approach. I argue that for her, belief is as indispensable in religion and in the philosophy of religion as it is for the Anglo-American philosophy of religion which she rejects. Further, the only argument that she offers for her position is a genetic argument for the origins of religious belief. Consistently with her position, she does not consider any empirical evidence relevant to this causal claim. However, the logic of such genetic claims is that for every empirically grounded genetic argument for A there is a corresponding genetic argument for not-A. So if such an argument invalidates A, it also invalidates not-A.

Necessity, Contingency and the Freedom of God

In this paper I attempt to argue that Antonie Vos’ claims respecting the relations between Calvin and Reformed Orthodoxy regarding the doctrine of God are exaggerated, with no convincing support. I argue, from the writings of Calvin, that he is not a necessitarian, but holds that God wills freely, choosing between alternatives in one eternal act. Furthermore, I have argued, on conceptual grounds, that in any case the doctrine of synchronic contingency applied to the life a timelessly eternal God does not deliver an intelligible account of divine freedom.

Speaking and revealing

I argue on three distinct grounds that the contrast between speaking and revealing is nothing like so sharp as Wolterstorff maintains in Divine Discourse . Speaking may be revealing: in speaking a person may reveal much about himself. Putative divine speaking can only be made intelligible given a background of what I refer to as INIS revelation, and in revealing, or more exactly, in having revealed, God may still speak.