Paul Hoffman

Direct Realism, Intentionality, and the Objective Being of Ideas

My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler’s account in Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. I argue contrary to Nadler that Descartes and Arnauld are representationalists, and I also argue that Aquinas is a representationalist.

Hume on the Distinction of Reason

This paper concerns Hume’s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume’s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume’s bold position and compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson).

Descartes's Watch Analogy

In earlier articles I have advocated a hylomorphic interpretation of Descartes’s account of the union of mind and body. Opponents of the hylomorphic interpretation have pointed to Descartes’s watch analogy in article 6 of The Passions of the Soul as providing decisive evidence on their behalf. In her book Descartes’s Dualism, Marleen Rozemond asserts that in that article Descartes ‘goes out of his way to deny that there is an important difference between a body united with the soul and one that is not’ and she concludes that the passage is ‘very un-Aristotelian’. In a recent article, Robert Pasnau has argued that the passage provides decisive evidence that Descartes did not put his claim that the mind or soul is the substantial form of the body to any serious philosophical use. Pasnau asserts that the passage seems impossible to reconcile with the view that Descartes takes seriously his remarks to Mesland that a human body remains numerically the same so long as it is joined to the same soul (AT IV 166; CSMK 242-3). However, if the identity of the human body does not depend on its being united to the mind, then that shows that Descartes does not take seriously his claim that the mind is a substantial form. Pasnau, like Rozemond, says that Descartes ‘is going out of his way’ to dismiss hylomorphism. Here is the watch analogy: