Paul Jouguet

Long Distance Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with a Gaussian Modulation

We designed high-efficiency error correcting codes allowing us to extract an errorless secret key in a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) protocol using a Gaussian modulation of coherent states and a homodyne detection. These codes are available for a wide range of signal-to-noise ratios on an additive white Gaussian noise channel with a binary modulation and can be combined with a multidimensional reconciliation method proven secure against arbitrary collective attacks. This improved reconciliation procedure considerably extends the secure range of a CVQKD with a Gaussian modulation, giving a secret key rate of about 10{sup -3} bit per pulse at a distance of 120 km for reasonable physical parameters.

Preventing Calibration Attacks on the Local Oscillator in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution

Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropriate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting the local oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical local oscillator pulses during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship. This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.

Field test of classical symmetric encryption with continuous variables quantum key distribution

We report on the design and performance of a point-to-point classical symmetric encryption link with fast key renewal provided by a Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) system. Our system was operational and able to encrypt point-to-point communications during more than six months, from the end of July 2010 until the beginning of February 2011. This field test was the first demonstration of the reliability of a CVQKD system over a long period of time in a server room environment. This strengthens the potential of CVQKD for information technology security infrastructure deployments.

Analysis of Imperfections in Practical Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution

As quantum key distribution becomes a mature technology, it appears clearly that some assumptions made in the security proofs cannot be justified in practical implementations. This might open the door to possible side-channel attacks. We examine several discrepancies between theoretical models and experimental setups in the case of continuous-variable quantum key distribution. We study in particular the impact of an imperfect modulation on the security of Gaussian protocols and show that approximating the theoretical Gaussian modulation with a discrete one is sufficient in practice. We also address the issue of properly calibrating the detection setup, and in particular the value of the shot noise. Finally, we consider the influence of phase noise in the preparation stage of the protocol and argue that taking this noise into account can improve the secret key rate because this source of noise is not controlled by the eavesdropper.

Quantum hacking on quantum key distribution using homodyne detection

Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing this loophole, the eavesdropper can vary the transmittances of the fiber beam splitter at the receivers side by inserting lights with wavelengths different from what is normally used. Here, we propose a wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system using homodyne detection. By inserting light pulses at different wavelengths, this attack allows the eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation even if it is done in real time. Based on experimental data, we discuss the feasibility of this attack and suggest a prevention scheme by improving the previously proposed countermeasures.

Robust shot-noise measurement for continuous-variable quantum key distribution

We study a practical method to measure the shot noise in real time in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) systems. The amount of secret key that can be extracted from the raw statistics depends strongly on this quantity since it affects in particular the computation of the excess noise (i.e. noise in excess of the shot noise) added by an eavesdropper on the quantum channel. Some powerful quantum hacking attacks relying on faking the estimated value of the shot noise to hide an intercept and resend strategy were proposed. Here, we provide experimental evidence that our method can defeat the saturation attack and the wavelength attack.

High Bit Rate Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution

Here, we demonstrate that a practical Continuous Variables Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) protocol relying on the Gaussian modulation of coherent states features secret key rates that cannot be achieved with standard qubit Discrete Variables (DV) QKD protocols. Notably, we report for the first time a practical postprocessing that allows to extract more than one bit of secret key per channel use.

Experimental plug and play quantum coin flipping

Performing complex cryptographic tasks will be an essential element in future quantum communication networks. These tasks are based on a handful of fundamental primitives, such as coin flipping, where two distrustful parties wish to agree on a randomly generated bit. Although it is known that quantum versions of these primitives can offer information-theoretic security advantages with respect to classical protocols, a demonstration of such an advantage in a practical communication scenario has remained elusive. Here we experimentally implement a quantum coin flipping protocol that performs strictly better than classically possible over a distance suitable for communication over metropolitan area optical networks. The implementation is based on a practical plug and play system, developed by significantly enhancing a commercial quantum key distribution device. Moreover, we provide combined quantum coin flipping protocols that are almost perfectly secure against bounded adversaries. Our results offer a useful toolbox for future secure quantum communications.

Experimental demonstration of continuous-variable quantum key distribution over 80 km of standard telecom fiber

Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) [1] is a promising alternative to commonly used discrete-variable QKD protocols, because this technology can be implemented with standard telecom components and recent results suggest that it will be compatible with standard wavelength division multiplexed telecommunication networks [2]. Security proofs against general eavesdropping attacks are available for CVQKD protocols using Gaussian modulation [3], and field implementations over deployed telecommunication networks have been demonstrated over the past few years [4].

Strenghtening classical symmetric encryption with continuous variable quantum key distribution

An improved security fast encryption prototype is implemented over field installed fibers. Continuous variable quantum key distribution produces 600 bit/sec secret keys allowing session keys renewal of classical symmetric algorithms each 10 seconds.