Paul K. MacDonald

Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment

There is broad scholarly consensus that the relative power of the United States is declining and that this decline will have negative consequences for international politics. This pessimism is justified by the belief that great powers have few options to deal with acute relative decline. Retrenchment is seen as a hazardous policy that demoralizes allies and encourages external predation. Faced with shrinking means, great powers are thought to have few options to stave off decline short of preventive war. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, retrenchment is not a relatively rare and ineffective policy instrument. A comparison of eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 demonstrates that great powers frequently engage in retrenchment and that retrenchment is often effective. In addition, we find that prevailing explanations overstate the importance of democracies, bureaucracies, and interest groups in inhibiting retrenchment. In fact, the rate of decline can account for both the extent and form of retrenchment, even over short periods. These arguments have important implications for power transition theories and the rise of China.

Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment—Peril or Promise?

Paul MacDonald and Joseph Parent’s article “Graceful Decline?” offers a clear, parsimonious theory of great power retrenchment that helps all a massive gap in international relations scholarship.1 Through comparative case studies and “coarse grained” statistical analysis, MacDonald and Parent argue that the degree of a state’s decline often explains the form and extent of its retrenchment. They then show that retrenchment is a surprisingly common and effective response to relative decline. MacDonald and Parent correctly point out the myopia of the “pessimistic” structuralist dogma that simply dismisses retrenchment as an impractical and dangerous strategy that only accelerates decline by signaling weakness and creating additional vulnerability (pp. 13–18).2 Their spare neorealist model goes a long way toward repairing this deaciency. As a arst cut, it improves on the existing literature while facilitating progressive future research on the topic. Still, a number of theoretical and conceptual problems undermine their argument and compromise their results. Below I discuss three issues with MacDonald and Parent’s theory of retrenchment.

“Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion”: The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure

What can explain the decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars? Political scientists offer a variety of explanations for these trends. Some focus on the structure and doctrine of counterinsurgent forces, while others emphasize the lethality and motivation of insurgent adversaries. I challenge these explanations. Declines in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars are not driven by fundamental shifts in the character of these conflicts, but in the political context in which they take place. Nineteenth-century colonial incumbents enjoyed a variety of political advantages—including strong political will, a permissive international environment, access to local collaborators, and flexibility to pick their battles—which granted them the time and resources necessary to meet insurgent challenges. In contrast, twentieth-century colonial incumbents struggled in the face of apathetic publics, hostile superpowers, vanishing collaborators, and constrained options. The decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency warfare, therefore, stems not from problems in force structure or strategy, but in political shifts in the profitability and legitimacy of colonial forms of governance.

Is Imperial Rule Obsolete?: Assessing the Barriers to Overseas Adventurism

The idea that the United States is an empire or should adopt imperial strategies has been widely criticized. One of the most persuasive sets of arguments against imperial enthusiasts is that empire is an obsolete and outdated strategy. Both systemic- and domestic-level changes are said to prevent the United States from successfully implementing an imperial strategy. I maintain that the importance of these barriers—whether technological, economic, or ideational—are greatly overstated. In contrast, I point to a number of developments, such as the rise of nontraditional security threats, the revolution in military affairs, and changing norms of humanitarian intervention, that will encourage greater American overseas adventurism.

Rebalancing American foreign policy

ed foreign policy and national security challenges.1 Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global war on terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the increasing assertiveness of Russia, the growth of Chinese military power, global climate change, not to mention the spread of poverty, infectious diseases, and ethnic and religious strife around the world: the challenges aren’t limited; the resources to meet them are. The high operational tempo of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has stretched the military to the breaking point. The ongoing 1⁄2nancial crisis and economic recession will severely limit the ability of the federal government to sustain or increase expenditures for defense and foreign aid. The Obama administration has a unique opportunity to reorient American foreign policy and lay out a new national security strategy that more effectively strikes a balance between the ends we seek and the means we possess. Such a strategy would recognize that the United States faces considerable constraints in the realm of foreign policy. Some of these are selfinflicted: the war in Iraq, for example, proved to be a costly undertaking that has severely burdened the U.S. military. Other constraints stem from developments outside of Washington’s control. The rise of new regional powers and the erosion of the liberal consensus will increasingly limit the exercise of American power. Given these developments, Washington must not only scale back American ambitions, but also demonstrate prudence with the nation’s limited resources.