Paul Missios

Does size really matter? Landfill scale impacts on property values

The economic advantage of constructing and operating large-scale landfills over small-scale landfills has been used to justify regional landfills as a solution to the municipal waste disposal problem. In addition to the dampening effects on social efforts to divert waste away from landfills, higher external costs of larger landfills may in fact offset the private cost advantages. In this study, the negative effects of a landfill that are capitalized in property values of houses located in the proximity of two landfill sites of significantly different sizes in Toronto, Canada, are examined. The results suggest that larger landfills have greater adverse impacts on property values than smaller landfills, implying consumers perceive (and markets reflect) differences in external costs.

A Cross-Country Study of Household Waste Prevention and Recycling: Assessing the Effectiveness of Policy Instruments

With worldwide concern for how and where to dispose of household waste, policy makers are increasingly looking for tools to efficiently and effectively reduce the amount of waste households produce. Using a comprehensive household-level data set involving 10,251 respondents from a crosssection of 10 countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), we examine waste policy, recycling behavior, and waste prevention. Unlike previous work, we empirically make comparisons across countries, incorporate attitudinal characteristics and a wide range of policy instruments, and allow for interdependence of decisions about recycling different materials. (JEL H23, Q58)

The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis

This paper examines the conflict over catch quotas for turbot on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland between the European Union (EU) and Canada. Economic game theory is used to analyse Canadian policy, EU policy, and the ensuing resolution. Recommendations are provided for future agreements regarding the proper management of fish stocks to ensure the long-term viability of these resources.

Pricing of Drugs with Heterogeneous Health Insurance Coverage

In this paper, we examine the role of insurance coverage in explaining the generic competition paradox in a two-stage game involving a single producer of brand-name drugs and n quantity-competing producers of generic drugs. Independently of brand loyalty, which some studies rely upon to explain the paradox, we show that heterogeneity in insurance coverage may result in higher prices of brand-name drugs following generic entry. With market segmentation based on insurance coverage present in both the pre- and post-entry stages, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs are highly substitutable and the market is quite profitable but does not have to arise when the two types of drugs are highly differentiated. However, with market segmentation occurring only after generic entry, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs are weakly substitutable, provided, however, that the industry is not very profitable. In both cases, that is, when market segmentation is present in the pre-entry stage and when it is not, the paradox becomes more likely to arise as the market expands and/or insurance companies decrease deductibles applied on the purchase of generic drugs.

Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives

A simple, two-country theoretical model of transboundary fishing conflicts in which one country has a nonlucrative incentive to conserve the fish stock is presented to examine the effect of such a conservation motive on the steady state stock level and to analyze how this stock level is affected by the division of the harvest. It is demonstrated that a conservation motive for one or both countries serves to increase the stock level and that this level is dependent on the harvest share of the country with the motive. A brief application to the Canada-European Union turbot and Canada-United States salmon disputes suggests consistency between the principles of the model and reality.

Pollution havens, endogenous environmental policy, and foreign direct investment

In an increasingly integrated world economy, countries may have greater incentives to weaken environmental policy as disguised protection intended to give a competitive edge to local firms. This may generate pollution havens as firms relocate in response to different environmental policies. Foreign direct investment (FDI) weakens profit-shifting policy considerations while increasing environmental damages but, at the same time, may provide external benefits. We derive conditions under which the FDI-recipient country has an incentive to manipulate its environmental standard to prevent or attract FDI, potentially eliminating or creating pollution havens, in addition to examining the impact of FDI on the equilibrium state of the environment.