Paul Needham

What is water

Putnam’s writings have established as philosophical orthodoxy the idea that substance kinds are identified by microscopic structure. The precise nature of the claim is difficult to pin down to a concise quotable formulation, however, and seems to rest on assumptions about how chemical kinds, typified by water, are understood by scientists and laymen which have not been clearly stated. Not only have the scientific details been severely rationed. Putnam is too quick on the dots in exemplifying the features forming his stereotypes, given the poor general characterisation offered of the layman’s conception. Any attempt to fill out the list soon runs into the problem of discerning how the line is supposedly drawn between ordinary and scientific descriptions. I suggest that microstructure does not play the leading role in individuating chemical kinds that recent discussions presuppose; rather, there is a complexity and variety at the microlevel which is unified only if seen in relation to single macroscopically distinguished kinds. Some aspects of the systematic role macroscopic features of matter play in determining chemical kinds, in particular thermodynamic criteria for sameness of kind, are outlined in section 1. Section 2 addresses the problem of providing a construal of ‘water is H2O’ and relating microto macrodescriptions.

The discovery that water is H2O

What are the criteria determining the individuation of chemical kinds? Recent philosophical discussion, which puts too much emphasis on microstructure, seems to presuppose a reductionist conception not motivated by the scientific facts. The present article traces the development of the traditional notion of a substance with the rise of modern chemistry from the end of the 18th century with a view to correcting this speculative distortion.

Duhem’s theory of mixture in the light of the Stoic challenge to the Aristotelian conception

Abstract The bulk of Duhem’s writing which bears on the understanding of mixtures suggests he adopted an Aristotelian position which he opposed only to the atomic view. A third view from antiquity—that of the Stoics—seems not to be taken into account. But his lines of thought are not always as explicit as could be wished. The Stoic view is considered here from a perspective which Duhem might well have adopted. This provides a background against which his somewhat unorthodox Aristotelianism might be understood.

Duhem's physicalism

Abstract Duhem is often described as an anti-realist or instrumentalist. A contrary view has recently been expressed by Martin (1991) ( Pierre Duhem: Philosophy and History in the Work of a Believing Physicist (La Salle, IL: Open Court)), who suggests that this interpretation makes it difficult to understand the vantage point from which Duhem argues in La science allemande (1915) that deduction, however impeccable, cannot establish truths unless it begins with truths. In the same spirit, the present paper seeks to establish that Duhem is at any rate not the kind of anti-realist he is often presented as being, and that his views are like those Quine sees fit to call realist. An interpretation of Duhems views on explanation and precision in science, and their bearing on the epistemological status of theory, is advanced which leads naturally into his critique of conventionalism. His attitude towards atomism, which should not be judged from a post-1925 perspective, is considered part of the unified view he strove after and appropriately called Duhems physicalism, standing in contrast to the kind of reductionist conception usually associated with atomism.

Has Daltonian atomism provided chemistry with any explanations

Philosophers frequently cite Dalton’s chemical atomism, and its nineteenth century developments, as a prime example of inference to the best explanation. This was a controversial issue in its time. But the critics are dismissed as positivist‐inspired antirealists with no interest in explanation. Is this a reasonable assessment?

Le Poidevin on the Reduction of Chemistry

In this article we critically evaluate Robin Le Poidevins recent attempt to set out an argument for the ontological reduction of chemistry independently of intertheoretic reduction. We argue, firstly, that the argument he envisages applies only to a small part of chemistry, and that there is no obvious way to extend it. We argue, secondly, that the argument cannot establish the reduction of chemistry, properly so called. 1. Introduction2. The scope of the reductionist claim3. The combinatorial argument4. The strength of the ‘reduction’5. Concluding remarks Introduction The scope of the reductionist claim The combinatorial argument The strength of the ‘reduction’ Concluding remarks

Mixtures and Modality

Some points are made aboutsubstance properties in their role ofintroducing mass terms. In particular, twoconditions of distributivity and cumulativityof mass predicates expressing these propertiesare not the independent pair they first appearto be. A classification of macroscopicsubstance concepts is developed. This needs tobe complemented in some way by the introductionof a modal qualification reminiscent ofAristotles distinction between actual andpotential presence of substances in a mixture. Consideration of the latter feature hasprompted Joe Earley to raise the question ofwhether there is any salt in the sea. I try toargue that there is.

Chemical Substances and Intensive Properties

Abstract: Despite the importance molecular structure has acquired in 20th century chemistry, more traditional macroscopic notions in terms of a continuous concept of matter continue to play a role in chemical theorizing. In the light of the extensive and determined criticism of reductionism in recent philosophy of chemistry, it is of interest to see macroscopic ontology treated autonomously. One aspect of this is developed here, namely, the concept of chemical substance. This is characterized by contrast with phases and solutions. The key conception is that of an intensive property, which is defined by appeal to the mereological structure of parts of the entities bearing substance properties.

Aristotelian chemistry: A prelude to duhemian metaphysics

Abstract In 1904 Joachim published an influential paper dealing with ‘Aristotles Conception of Chemical Combination’1 which has provided the basis of much more recent studies.2 About the same time, Duhem3 developed what he regarded as an essentially Aristotelian view of chemistry, based on his understanding of phenomenological thermodynamics. He does not present a detailed textual analysis, but rather emphasises certain general ideas. Joachims classic paper contains obscurities which I have been unable to fathom and theses which do not seem to be fully explained, or which at least seem difficult for the modern reader to understand. An attempt is made here to provide a systematic account of the Aristotelian theory of the generation of substances by the mixing of elements by reconsidering Joachims treatment in the light of the sort of points which most interested Duhem. The work described in this paper was undertaken with a view to providing a basis for presenting, evaluating and criticising Duhems understanding of what was for him modern (i.e. 19th-century) chemistry. This latter project will be taken up on another occasion. I hope the present paper will be of some value to a broader philosophical readership in so far as it provides a fairly clear conception of matter which might be called Aristotelian, even if it is not precisely Aristotles, and raises certain clear problems of interpretation. It may also be of interest to historians of chemistry in suggesting an analysis of the old chemical notion of a mixt independent of atomic theories.

Macroscopic Objects: An Exercise in Duhemian Ontology

Aristotelian ideas are presented in a favorable light in Duhems historical works surveying the history of the notion of chemical combination (1902) and the development of mechanics (1903). The importance Duhem was later to ascribe to Aristotelian ideas as reflected in the weight he attached to medieval science is well known. But the Aristotelian influence on his own mature philosophical perspective, and more particularly on his concern for logical coherence and the development of his ontological views, is not generally acknowledged. There are, however, clear pointers in this direction in these two earlier books on the history of science, which are unashamedly written in such a way as to project the authors own view of what is important in the relevant areas. Thermodynamics was the pinnacle of Duhemian science, and its interpretation requires the reinstatement, in Duhems view, of Aristotelian conceptions which have been unfashionable since the rise of certain ideas with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. The present paper is not primarily an exposition of these Aristotelian views of Duhems, but an attempt to pursue the interpretation of a macroscopic, thermodynamical perspective on chemical substances from an elementary viewpoint in the spirit of Duhem (1902), sometimes being more definite than Duhem seems to be, and occasionally taking issue with him on certain points. Some of his leading ideas will determine the general approach, but views and problems will also be taken from modern textbooks in an attempt to lay down the general lines along which an explicit ontology--in Quines sense--of macroscopic theory might be developed.