Paul van den Hoven

The Narrator and the Interpreter in Visual and Verbal Argumentation

In this paper differences in the division of labor between the narrator and the interpreter in visual and verbal argumentation are explored. This is done by constructing pairs of dominantly verbal texts and dominantly pictorial texts that invite an interpreter to reconstruct a roughly similar argumentation. Comparing the role of abstract narrator in such ‘equivalent’ pairs reveals that in pictorial texts the narrator dominantly presents the signs in their iconic aspect (≈mimetic), while in verbal texts the narrator dominantly presents the signs in their indexical and symbolic aspect (≈diegetic). For argument theory this raises the problem of the accountability for diegetic elements in the argumentative reconstruction of dominantly pictorial texts because these elements are largely formulated by the interpreters. It raises the problem of the accountability for mimetic elements in dominantly verbal texts as these are largely formulated by the interpreter. Both problems may also affect the concept of propositionality that we often find to be an element in the definition of argumentation.

The Dilemma of Normativity: How to Interpret a Rational Reconstruction?

In modern argument theory argumentative practice is often analyzed and evaluated in terms of its correspondences with or deviations from a normative model. Such a methodology implies that there are three moments at which evaluations takes place which are not guided by the norms of the model itself because they imply an interpretation of the model by the analyst. This is demonstrated by an analogy with legal practice. this implies that an evaluation of an argumentative practice is not only relative to choice of the normative model as such, but also relative to the threefold interpretation of the model.In modern argument theory argumentative practice is often analyzed and evaluated in terms of its correspondences with or deviations from a normative model. Such a methodology implies that there are three moments at which evaluations takes place which are not guided by the norms of the model itself because they imply an interpretation of the model by the analyst. This is demonstrated by an analogy with legal practice. this implies that an evaluation of an argumentative practice is not only relative to choice of the normative model as such, but also relative to the threefold interpretation of the model.

Clear cases, do they exist?

ConclusionWhat I sought to demonstrate was that the relations between (a) how a case fits into the system, (b) what the main structure of the justification is, and (c) whether discretionary authority is used, are not as simple as suggested in the literature.What we saw is that if the justification for a decision in a particular case is a practical syllogism with an established legal rule as its major premiss, there are many possibilities: (a) the case did or did not raise a conflict for the judge between his intuitions about reasonableness and his interpretation of the legal system; (b) the case had or had not a clear solution in conformity with the legal system; (c) the case was or was not decided according to what the system seemed to prescribe.Therefore, the main structure of a justification cannot inform us about questions as: Did the case fit into the system? Is discretionary authority used? The opposition between hard cases and clear cases is much too complex to be of any use to clarify such issues.