Pedro Cantos

Productivity, efficiency and technical change in the European railways: A non-parametric approach

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the evolution of productivity in the European railways in the period 1970–95. We use a non-parametric approach that enables changes in productivity to be broken down into variations in efficiency and technical change. The results indicate that the productivity growth is concentrated in the last period (1985–95), when the majority of the companies undertook processes of reforms. This increase in productivity is mainly due to technical progress. We also analyse the determinants of efficiency and, unlike other papers, the technical change, finding that the greater the degree of autonomy and financial independence, the higher the efficiency levels and technical change.

Transport infrastructures, spillover effects and regional growth: evidence of the Spanish case

The impact of transport infrastructures on the economic growth of both regions and sectors, distinguishing among modes of transport, is analysed. An attempt is also made to capture the spillover effects associated with transport infrastructures. Two different methodologies are used: the first adopts an accounting approach based on a regression on indices of total factor productivity; the second uses econometric estimates of the production function. Very similar elasticities are obtained with both methodologies for the private sector of the economy, both for the aggregate capital stock of transport infrastructures and for the various types of infrastructure. However, the disaggregated results for sectors of production are not conclusive. The results confirm the existence of very substantial spillover effects associated with transport infrastructures.

COST AND REVENUE INEFFICIENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN RAILWAYS

This study analyses cost and revenue inefficiencies for a sample of European railway companies. On the basis of a DEA model we calculate cost and revenue inefficiencies, decomposing them into inefficiencies of a technical or allocative type. It is observed that inefficiencies in revenues are greater than those in costs, indicating that the study of inefficiencies in costs is only a partial analysis of the problem. Also, technical inefficiencies are greater than the allocative type. Finally, the most independent companies, with least external intervention in their decisions, are also the most efficient in both costs and revenue. Este trabajo analiza las ineficiencias en costes y en ingresos de una muestra decompanias ferroviarias europeas. Los indicadores de eficiencia en costes y en ingresosse calculan utilizando la tecnica DEA y se descomponen en sus en ineficiencias tecnicasy asignativas. Los resultados indican que las ineficiencias en ingresos son mayores quelas ineficiencias en costes, indicando que el estudio de las ineficiencias en costesconstituye un analisis parcial del problema. Asimismo, las ineficiencias tecnicas sonmayores que las de tipo asignativo. Finalmente, las companias mas independientes, conmenor intervencion externa en sus decisiones, son tambien las mas eficientes en costes yen ingresos.

EFFICIENCY MEASURES AND OUTPUT SPECIFICATION: THE CASE OF EUROPEAN RAILWAYS

This study analyzes the sensitivity of the efficiency indicators of a sample of European railway companies to different alternatives in output specification. The results vary according to the specification selected. Investigating the causes of these differences reveals that the efficiency indicators obtained with different specifications can be brought substantially closer, particularly when the efficiency indicators obtained by considering freight and passenger train kilometers as output variables are corrected to account for the impact of the load factor.

Regulating Privatized Rail Transport

Traditionally, transport regulation has been viewed as an exercise in second-best optimization, acknowledging the existence of huge information problems. Then the rail industry was deeply restructured worldwide to halt erosion of the sectors share of transportation markets. Restructuring took different forms in different countries, ranging from simple reorganization measures to extreme restructuring -with the private sector increasingly participating in the sector and with the provision of infrastructure separated from the provision of services. The authors argue that regulation of the rail industry cannot remain unaffected by these changes. New regulatory scenarios and issues have emerged. For example, contracts have to be defined for private participation and quality surveillance instruments must be defined. Traditional price controls have to be adapted to, and mechanisms designed to manage and plan infrastructure investments in, the new environment. Restructuring has brought new problems, too. Where licenses have been used, for example, several concessionaires have been unable to meet the objectives spelled out in the concession contract. Contracts should be flexible enough to take account of novel situations that may affect company performance. And yet, for the system to be credible, there cannot be systematic, unjustified deviations from the franchise objectives. Regulation of the sector should be simple and flexible, with license contracts designed to include the private sector and with industry organization adapted to local circumstances. Regulation should be governed by principles that foster competition and market mechanisms, wherever possible. At the same time, it should provide a stable legal and institutional framework for economic activity. Otherwise, regulators should refrain from intervening in the market-unless the goal of economic efficiency (subject to the socially demanded level of equity) is in jeopardy.