Peggy Li

Of substance: the nature of language effects on entity construal.

Shown an entity (e.g., a plastic whisk) labeled by a novel noun in neutral syntax, speakers of Japanese, a classifier language, are more likely to assume the noun refers to the substance (plastic) than are speakers of English, a count/mass language, who are instead more likely to assume it refers to the object kind [whisk; Imai, M., & Gentner, D. (1997). A cross-linguistic study of early word meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence. Cognition, 62, 169-200]. Five experiments replicated this language type effect on entity construal, extended it to quite different stimuli from those studied before, and extended it to a comparison between Mandarin speakers and English speakers. A sixth experiment, which did not involve interpreting the meaning of a noun or a pronoun that stands for a noun, failed to find any effect of language type on entity construal. Thus, the overall pattern of findings supports a non-Whorfian, language on language account, according to which sensitivity to lexical statistics in a count/mass language leads adults to assign a novel noun in neutral syntax the status of a count noun, influencing construal of ambiguous entities. The experiments also document and explore cross-linguistically universal factors that influence entity construal, and favor Prasadas [Prasada, S. (1999). Names for things and stuff: An Aristotelian perspective. In R. Jackendoff, P. Bloom, & K. Wynn (Eds.), Language, logic, and concepts (pp. 119-146). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] hypothesis that features indicating non-accidentalness of an entitys form lead participants to a construal of object kind rather than substance kind. Finally, the experiments document the age at which the language type effect emerges in lexical projection. The details of the developmental pattern are consistent with the lexical statistics hypothesis, along with a universal increase in sensitivity to material kind.

Words as Windows to Thought The Case of Object Representation

Languages differ in how they express thought, leading some researchers to conclude that speakers of different languages perceive objects differently. Others, in contrast, argue that words are windows to thought—reflecting its structure without modifying it. Here, we explore the case study of object representation. Studies indicate that Japanese, Chinese, and English speakers do not perceive objects differently, despite their languages’ grammatical differences. Syntax provides frames for words that can select among meanings without affecting underlying object perception.

Numerical morphology supports early number word learning: Evidence from a comparison of young Mandarin and English learners

Previous studies showed that children learning a language with an obligatory singular/plural distinction (Russian and English) learn the meaning of the number word for one earlier than children learning Japanese, a language without obligatory number morphology (Barner, Libenson, Cheung, & Takasaki, 2009; Sarnecka, Kamenskaya, Yamana, Ogura, & Yudovina, 2007). This can be explained by differences in number morphology, but it can also be explained by many other differences between the languages and the environments of the children who were compared. The present study tests the hypothesis that the morphological singular/plural distinction supports the early acquisition of the meaning of the number word for one by comparing young English learners to age and SES matched young Mandarin Chinese learners. Mandarin does not have obligatory number morphology but is more similar to English than Japanese in many crucial respects. Corpus analyses show that, compared to English learners, Mandarin learners hear number words more frequently, are more likely to hear number words followed by a noun, and are more likely to hear number words in contexts where they denote a cardinal value. Two tasks show that, despite these advantages, Mandarin learners learn the meaning of the number word for one three to six months later than do English learners. These results provide the strongest evidence to date that prior knowledge of the numerical meaning of the distinction between singular and plural supports the acquisition of the meaning of the number word for one.

Competing perspectives on frames of reference in language and thought

A study found that Dutch-speaking children who prefer an egocentric (left/right) reference frame when describing spatial relationships, and Hai||om-speaking children who use a geocentric (north/south) frame had difficulty recreating small-scale spatial arrays using their language-incongruent system (Haun, Rapold, Janzen, & Levinson, 2011). In five experiments, we reconciled these results with another study showing that English (egocentric) and Tseltal Mayan (geocentric) speakers can flexibly use both systems (Abarbanell, 2010; Li, Abarbanell, Gleitman, & Papafragou, 2011). In replicating and extending Haun et al. (Experiment 1), English- but not Tseltal-speaking children could use their language-incongruent system when the instructions used their non-preferred frame of reference. Perseveration due to task order may explain the discrepancies between present English- and previous Dutch-speaking children, while not understanding task instructions using left/right language may explain why present Tseltal- and previous Hai||om-speaking children had difficulty with their language-incongruent systems. In support, Tseltal-speaking children could use an egocentric system when the instructions were conveyed without left/right language (Experiments 2-4), and many did not know left/right language (Experiment 5). These findings help reconcile seemingly conflicting sets of results and suggest that task constraints, rather than language, determine which system is easier to use (Experiment 2 vs. 3).

Revisiting the plasticity of human spatial cognition

In a recent study by Haun et al. (2011), Dutch-speaking children who prefer an egocentric (left/right) reference frame when describing spatial relationships, and Haillom-speaking children who use a geocentric (north/south) frame were found to vary in their capacity to memorize small-scale arrays using their language-incongruent system. In two experiments, we reconcile these results with previous findings by Li et al. (2011) which showed that English (egocentric) and Tseltal Mayan (geocentric) speakers can flexibly use both systems. In Experiment 1, attempting to replicate Haun et al., we found that English- but not Tseltal-speaking children could use their language-incongruent system. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that Tseltal children can use an egocentric system when instructed nonverbally without left/right language. We argue that Haun et al.s results are due to the Haillom childrens lack of understanding of left/right instructions and that task constraints determine which system is easier to use.

“Two-Pound Cookies” or “Two Pounds of Cookies”: Children’s Appreciation of Quantity Expressions

ABSTRACT Inspired by Syrett (2013), three experiments explored children’s ability to distinguish attributives (e.g., “three-pound strawberries,” where MPs as adjectives signal reference to attributes) versus pseudopartitives (e.g., “three pounds of strawberries,” where MPs combine with of to signal part-whole relations). Given the systematic nature of the syntax-semantics mapping, we asked whether children are able to use syntax to interpret how entities are quantified. In Experiment 1, four- and five-year-olds were asked to choose between two characters for the one who was selling appropriate items matching an attributive or pseudopartitive expression. In Experiment 2, children of the same age heard items described with a phrase using either an attributive, a pseudopartitive, “each” (“each weighs three pounds”), or “all together” (“all together they weigh three pounds”). At test, with some items removed, children were asked whether the same phrase applied to the remaining items (e.g., “Does Dora still have three-pound strawberries?”). Children did not distinguish between attributives and pseudopartitives but did so for “each” and “all together.” Experiment 3 extends the age range with a third experimental design. Children heard “each” or “all together” descriptions (e.g., “each strawberry weighs three pounds”) and judged, at test, which of two characters “said it better” (i.e., “Mickey says ‘these are two pounds of strawberries,’ but Donald says ‘these are two-pound strawberries.’”). Children under 6 were at chance. Together, the three experiments suggest that despite its systematicity, children do not automatically appreciate the mapping between syntax and semantics.