Penelope Rush

The metaphysics of logic

Introduction Penelope Rush Part I. The Main Positions: 1. Logical realism Penelope Rush 2. A defence of logical conventionalism Jody Azzouni 3. Pluralism, relativism, and objectivity Stewart Shapiro 4. Logic, mathematics and conceptual structuralism Solomon Feferman 5. A Second Philosophy of logic Penelope Maddy 6. Logical nihilism Curtis Franks 7. Wittgenstein and the covert Platonism of mathematical logic Mark Steiner Part II. History and Authors: 8. Logic and its objects: a medieval Aristotelian view Paul Thom 9. The problem of universals and the subject matter of logic Gyula Klima 10. Logics and worlds Ermanno Bencivenga 11. Bolzanos logical realism Sandra Lapointe Part III. Specific Issues: 12. Revising logic Graham Priest 13. Glutty theories and the logic of antinomies J. C. Beall, Michael Hughes and Ross Vandegrift 14. The metaphysical interpretation of logical truth Tuomas E. Tahko References Index.

Factivity, consistency and knowability

One diagnosis of Fitch’s paradox of knowability is that it hinges on the factivity of knowledge: that which is known is true. Yet the apparent role of factivity (in the paradox of knowability) and non-factive analogues in related paradoxes of justified belief can be shown to depend on familiar consistency and positive introspection principles. Rejecting arguments that the paradox hangs on an implausible consistency principle, this paper argues instead that the Fitch phenomenon is generated both in epistemic logic and logics of justification by the interaction of analogues of the knowability principle and positive introspection theses that are characteristic of, even if not entailed by, epistemic internalism.

Logic or Reason

This paper explores the question of what logic is not. It argues against the wide spread assumptions that logic is: a model of reason; a model of correct reason; the laws of thought, or indeed is related to reason at all such that the essential nature of the two are crucially or essentially coillustrative. I note that due to such assumptions, our current understanding of the nature of logic itself is thoroughly entangled with the nature of reason. I show that most arguments for the presence of any sort of essential relationship between logic and reason face intractable problems and demands, and fall well short of addressing them. These arguments include those for the notion that logic is normative for reason (or that logic and correct reason are in some way the same thing), that logic is some sort of description of correct reason and that logic is an abstracted or idealised version of correct reason. A strong version of logical realism is put forward as an alternative view, and is briefly explored.

Richard L. Epstein, “Critical Thinking”

Richard L. Epstein with Carolyn Kerbrger, Critical Thinking, 3rd Edition, Advanced Reasoning Forum, 2012, 464 pp., ISBN-10: 1938421000, ISBN-13: 978-1938421006. Richard L. Epstein, The Pocket Guide to Critical Thinking, 4th Edition, Advanced Reasoning Forum, 2011, 162 pp., paperback ISBN-13: 9780981550770, ISBN-10: 0981550770, ebook ISBN-13: 9780981550787.

The Applicability of Mathematics in Science: Indispensability and Ontology

This book is a collection of Sorin Bangu’s thoughts on the nature of mathematics and the relationship between mathematics, science, and the Quinean-inspired naturalism that Bangu advocates. The book is an inspiring and thought-provoking read, detailing carefully thought-out arguments, insightful explanations, and fascinating, in-depth examples of the role of mathematics in scientific discovery

Where Meaning is

Abstract In an attempt to find some new ways of tackling old problems about meaning, I explore some possible models in which meaning may be conceptually situated. I take a close look at a traditional realist conception of meaning and give some reasons as to why we may have more room to move within this than is immediately apparent. Alternative frameworks are explored along the way. The approach of thus situating meaning is an ontological one, but it is also an epistemological, as well as a hermeneutical one; in that the models put forward illuminate central issues and offer potential solutions to outstanding puzzles ranging across (at least) all of these broad realms of enquiry. Such solutions give a set of initial conceptualizations of the potential role meaning can play across broader frameworks of enquiry. As such they offer fresh inroads into otherwise deadlocked debates over the nature and place of meaning across philosophical enquiry in general.