Per A. Hallgren
Chalmers University of Technology
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Publication
Featured researches published by Per A. Hallgren.
conference on privacy security and trust | 2015
Per A. Hallgren; Martín Ochoa; Andrei Sabelfeld
Location Based Services (LBS) are becoming increasingly popular. Users enjoy a wide range of services from tracking a lost phone to querying for nearby restaurants or nearby tweets. However, many users are concerned about sharing their location. A major challenge is achieving the privacy of LBS without hampering the utility. This paper focuses on the problem of location proximity, where principals are willing to reveal whether they are within a certain distance from each other. Yet the principals are privacy-sensitive, not willing to reveal any further information about their locations, nor the distance. We propose InnerCircle, a novel secure multi-party computation protocol for location privacy, based on partially homomorphic encryption. The protocol achieves precise fully privacy-preserving location proximity without a trusted third party in a single round trip. We prove that the protocol is secure in the semi-honest adversary model of Secure Multi-party Computation, and thus guarantees the desired privacy properties. We present the results of practical experiments of three instances of the protocol using different encryption schemes. We show that, thanks to its parallelizability, the protocol scales well to practical applications.
acm workshop on programming languages and analysis for security | 2013
Per A. Hallgren; Daniel T. Mauritzson; Andrei Sabelfeld
The HTTP and HTTPS protocols are the corner stones of the modern web. From a security point of view, they offer an all-or- nothing choice to web applications: either no security guarantees with HTTP or both confidentiality and integrity with HTTPS. How- ever, in many scenarios confidentiality is not necessary and even undesired, while integrity is essential to prevent attackers from compromising the data stream. We propose GlassTube, a lightweight approach to web application integrity. GlassTube guarantees integrity at application level, without resorting to the heavyweight HTTPS protocol. GlassTube prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and provides a general method for integrity in web applications and smartphone apps. GlassTube is easily deployed in the form of a library on the server side, and offers flexible deployment options on the client side: from dynamic code distribution, which requires no modification of the browser, to browser plugin and smartphone app, which allow smooth key predistribution. The results of a case study with a web-based chat indicate a boost in the performance compared to HTTPS, achieved with no optimization efforts.
provable security | 2015
Per A. Hallgren; Martín Ochoa; Andrei Sabelfeld
We present a privacy-assured multiplication protocol using which an arbitrary arithmetic formula with inputs from two parties over a finite field F-p can be jointly computed on encrypted data using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Our protocol is secure against malicious adversaries. To motivate and illustrate applications of this technique, we demonstrate an attack on a class of known protocols showing how to compromise location privacy of honest users by manipulating messages in protocols with additively homomorphic encryption. We evaluate our approach using a prototypical implementation. The results show that the added overhead of our approach is small compared to insecure outsourced multiplication.
engineering secure software and systems | 2015
Martín Ochoa; Jorge Cuellar; Alexander Pretschner; Per A. Hallgren
Undesired flows of information between different sensitivity levels or domains can seriously compromise the security of a system. Moreover, even if specifications are secure, unwanted flows can still be present in implementations. In this paper we present a model-based technique to discover unwanted information flows in specifications and to test systems for unwanted flows. We base our approach on an unwinding relation for Extended Finite State Machines. We preliminary validate our approach by means of an implementation that allows us to benchmark the efficiency of our model-checking algorithm.
european symposium on research in computer security | 2018
Xueou Wang; Xiaolu Hou; Ruben Rios; Per A. Hallgren; Nils Ole Tippenhauer; Martín Ochoa
Location privacy has mostly focused on scenarios where users remain static. However, investigating scenarios where the victims present a particular mobility pattern is more realistic. In this paper, we consider abstract attacks on services that provide location information on other users in the proximity. In that setting, we quantify the required effort of the attacker to localize a particular mobile victim. We prove upper and lower bounds for the effort of an optimal attacker. We experimentally show that a Linear Jump Strategy (LJS) practically achieves the upper bounds for almost uniform initial distributions of victims. To improve performance for less uniform distributions known to the attacker, we propose a Greedy Updating Attack Strategy (GUAS). Finally, we derive a realistic mobility model from a real-world dataset and discuss the performance of our strategies in that setting.
parallel, distributed and network-based processing | 2017
Simonas Stirbys; Omar Abu Nabah; Per A. Hallgren; Andrei Sabelfeld
Location Based Services (LBS) have seen alarming privacy breaches in recent years. While there has been much recent progress by the research community on developing privacy-enhancing mechanisms for LBS, their evaluation has been often focused on the privacy guarantees, while the question of whether these mechanisms can be adopted by practical LBS applications has received limited attention. This paper studies the applicability of Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity (PPLP) protocols in the setting of mobile apps. We categorize popular location social apps and analyze the trade-offs of privacy and functionality with respect to PPLP enhancements. To investigate the practical performance trade-offs, we present an in-depth case study of an Android application that implements InnerCircle, a state-of-the-art protocol for privacy-preserving location proximity. This study indicates that the performance of the privacy-preserving application for coarse-grained precision is comparable to real applications with the same feature set.
ieee computer security foundations symposium | 2017
Per A. Hallgren; Claudio Orlandi; Andrei Sabelfeld
communications and networking symposium | 2016
Per A. Hallgren; Martín Ochoa; Andrei Sabelfeld
Archive | 2017
Per A. Hallgren
annual computer security applications conference | 2016
Ioannis Agadakos; Per A. Hallgren; Dimitrios Damopoulos; Andrei Sabelfeld; Georgios Portokalidis