Per Sandin

Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle

This essay attempts to provide an analytical apparatus which may be used for finding an authoritative formulation1 of the Precautionary Principle. Several formulations of the Precautionary Principle are examined. Four dimensions of the principle are identified: (1) the threat dimension, (2) the uncertainty dimension, (3) the action dimension, and (4) the command dimension. It is argued that the Precautionary Principle can be recast into the following if-clause, containing these four dimensions: “If there is (1) a threat, which is (2) uncertain, then (3) some kind of action (4) is mandatory.” The phrases expressing these dimensions may vary in (a) precision and (b) strength. It is shown that it is the dimension containing the weakest phrase that determines the strength of the entire principle. It is suggested that the four-dimensional if-clause be used as an analytical apparatus in negotiations of the Precautionary Principle.

Five charges against the precautionary principle

We defend the precautionary principle against five common charges, namely that it is ill-defined, absolutist, and a value judgement, increases risk-taking, and marginalizes science. We argue, first, that the precautionary principle is, in principle, no more vague or ill-defined than other decision principles and like them it can be made precise through elaboration and practice. Second, the precautionary principle need not be absolutist in the way that has been claimed. A way to avoid this is through combining the precautionary principle with a specification of the degree of scientific evidence required to trigger precaution, and/or with some version of the de minimis rule. Third, the precautionary principle does not lead to increased risk-taking, unless the framing is too narrow, and then the same problem applies to other decision rules as well. Fourth, the precautionary principle is indeed value-based, but only to the same extent as other decision rules. Fifth and last, the precautionary principle is not unscientific other than in the weak sense of not being exclusively based on science. In that sense all decision rules are unscientific.

A paradox out of context: Harris and Holm on the precautionary principle.

The precautionary principle is frequently referred to in various momentous decisions affecting human health and the environment. It has been invoked in contexts as diverse as chemicals regulation, regulation of genetically modified organisms, and research into life-extending therapies. Precaution is not an unknown concept in medical contexts. One author even cites the Hippocratic Oath as a parallel to the precautionary principle. “Dissecting Bioethics,” edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Hayry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics. The section is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison peoples actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are therefore particularly appreciated. The themes covered in the section so far include dignity, naturalness, public interest, community, disability, autonomy, parity of reasoning, symbolic appeals, and toleration. All submitted papers are peer reviewed. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at tuija.takala@helsinki.fi.

Intensive forestry in Sweden: stakeholders' evaluation of benefits and risk

There is growing consensus about the need to develop sustainable use of forest resources, but no consensus about how to interpret and implement this goal. Political institutions, governmental agencies, forest companies, and environmental organizations have partly different views on what sustainable forestry means and what strategies to use to achieve it. Not least, the climate change issue has put higher and partly new demands on forests, both as providers of biomass and as carbon sinks, which may be in conflict with other services of the forests ecosystem. This paper analyses how different Swedish stakeholders evaluate the possibilities for intensive forestry, that is, to increase the production of woody biomass through increased use of fertilizers, improved genetic material, the introduction of exotic tree species, and the use of fast-growing deciduous tree species. The analysis shows that the pros and cons are evaluated differently, with some stakeholders assessing intensive forestry as a radical break from the current goal of sustainable forestry and others viewing it as according with it. It is concluded that this conflict should be understood as concerning not competing knowledge claims, but competing frames – schemes of interpretation through which the complexity of reality is reduced. This means that the solution is not to be found in improved knowledge but in increased awareness that the involved frames are the source of the conflict.

Precautionary Defaults—A New Strategy for Chemical Risk Management

ABSTRACT In order to give adequate support to risk managers, new risk assessment methods should be developed that are (1) scientifically sound, (2) simplified, and (3) suited for precautionary risk management. In this Perspective we propose that the notion of a precautionary default can be a useful tool in the development of such methods. A precautionary default is a cautious or pessimistic assumption that is used in the absence of adequate information and that should be replaced when such information is obtained. Furthermore, we point out some promising research areas for the development of such indicators, viz. connections between chemical characteristics such as persistence and effect parameters, monitoring of contaminants in polar regions, monitoring of contaminants in breast milk, application of results from (human) toxicology in ecotoxicology and vice versa, (eco)toxicological test systems that are sensitive to effects on reproduction, and the application of bioinformatic methods to complex data, both in genomic research and in ecotoxicology. We conclude that precautionary decision-making does not require less science, but to the contrary it requires more science and improved communication between scientists and risk managers.

Collective Military Virtues

Abstract In this article, it is argued that it is sometimes possible and reasonable to ascribe virtues to collectives. Doing so avoids at least one standard objection to virtue ethics (the situationist challenge). It is further argued that the military contains examples of groups to which collective virtue can be reasonably ascribed, and a sketch of justice as an example of such a virtue is given. At the end, some implications for military ethics are discussed.

The Precautionary Principle and Food Safety

Abstract.This review gives an overview of the arguments for and against the precautionary principle that have been advanced in the area of food safety. Extensive but not comprehensive coverage of relevant references is given. It begins with an introduction to the precautionary principle itself. After reviewing the arguments a rationale for the precautionary principle in the context of food safety is sketched.Zusammenfassung (Redaktion).Es werden die Argumente für bzw. gegen das Vorsorgeprinzip vorgestellt, das auf dem Gebiet der Lebensmittelsicherheit inzwischen an Bedeutung gewonnen hat. Dazu werden relevante Belegstellen ausführlich behandelt. Nach Sichtung der Argumente wird eine wissenschaftsbasierte Auslegung des Vorsorgeprinzips im Hinblick auf die Lebensmittelsicherheit skizziert.

Essentials of risk theory

Risk has become one of the main topics in fields as diverse as engineering, medicine and economics, and it is also studied by social scientists, psychologists and legal scholars. This Springer Essentials version offers an overview of the in-depth handbook and highlights some of the main points covered in the Handbook of Risk Theory. The topic of risk also leads to more fundamental questions such as: What is risk? What can decision theory contribute to the analysis of risk? What does the human perception of risk mean for society? How should we judge whether a risk is morally acceptable or not? Over the last couple of decades questions like these have attracted interest from philosophers and other scholars into risk theory. This brief offers the essentials of the handbook provides for an overview into key topics in a major new field of research and addresses a wide range of topics, ranging from decision theory, risk perception to ethics and social implications of risk. It aims to promote communication and information among all those who are interested in theoretical issues concerning risk and uncertainty. The Essentials of Risk Theory brings together internationally leading philosophers and scholars from other disciplines who work on risk theory. The contributions are accessibly written and highly relevant to issues that are studied by risk scholars. The Essentials of Risk Theory will be a helpful starting point for all risk scholars who are interested in broadening and deepening their current perspectives.

Virtual child pornography and utilitarianism

The most common argument against child pornography is that children are harmed in the process of producing it. This is the argument from abusive production. However, it does not apply to ‘virtual’ child pornography, i.e. child pornography produced using computer technology without involving real children. Autilitarian who wishes to condemn virtual child pornography cannot appeal to the argument from abusive production. I discuss three possible ways out of this: (1) abandoning the intuition that virtual child pornography is wrong, (2) abandoning utilitarianism, or (3)circumventing the problem. I propose a version of the third way out.

The Default Value Approach to the Precautionary Principle

In science, when information is lacking, the reasonable response is to suspend judgement. When incomplete scientific information is to be used for decision-making purposes, such as regulation, the option of suspending judgement is not available. In such situations the precautionary principle may be used. One of several problems with the precautionary principle is that it is poorly defined and difficult to operationalize. We propose a way of operationalizing the precautionary principle through assigning cautious default values to variables that are needed in the risk analysis but are nevertheless unknown. A formalized model is introduced, in which the precautionary principle is interpreted in terms of default values of chemicals regulation. Four different methods for choosing default values (positive list, negative list, statistical expectation, and precaution) are discussed.