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Dive into the research topics where Peter A. Coles is active.

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Featured researches published by Peter A. Coles.


Games and Economic Behavior | 2014

Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets

Peter A. Coles; Ran I. Shorrer

Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented conditions under which truthful reporting by all agents is close to optimal (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011). Our results demonstrate that in large, uniform markets using the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, each womans best response to truthful behavior by all other agents is to truncate her list substantially. In fact, the optimal degree of truncation for such a woman goes to 100% of her list as the market size grows large. In general one-to-one markets we provide comparative statics for optimal truncation strategies: reduction in risk aversion and reduced correlation across preferences each lead agents to truncate more. So while several recent papers focused on the limits of strategic manipulation, our results serve as a reminder that without pre-conditions ensuring truthful reporting, there exists a potential for significant manipulation even in settings where agents have little information.


B E Journal of Theoretical Economics | 2012

Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game

Peter A. Coles; Ran I. Shorrer

In variants of the Electronic Mail Game (Rubinstein, 1989) where two or more players communicate via multiple channels, the multiple channels can facilitate collective action via redundancy, the sending of the same message along multiple paths or else repeatedly along the same path (Chwe, 1995 and De Jaegher, 2011). This paper offers another explanation for how multiple channels may permit collective action: parties may be able to coordinate their actions when messages’ arrivals at their destinations are sufficiently correlated events. Correlation serves to fill in information gaps that arise when players are uncertain of the source of message failure, effectively strengthening messages from one player. This asymmetry in message strength in turn permits cutoff equilibria, where players take action after receiving a minimum number of confirmations.


Journal of Economic Perspectives | 2010

The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective

Peter A. Coles; John Cawley; Phillip B. Levine; Muriel Niederle; Alvin E. Roth; John J. Siegfried


American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | 2013

Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Peter A. Coles; Alexey I. Kushnir; Muriel Niederle


Archive | 2014

Strategic Behavior in Unbalanced Matching Markets

Peter A. Coles; Yannai Gonczarowski; Ran I. Shorrer


Archive | 2011

Mobilizing Networked Businesses

Peter A. Coles; Benjamin Edelman


Archive | 2011

Attack of the Clones: Birchbox Defends Against Copycat Competitors

Peter A. Coles; Benjamin Edelman


Archive | 2009

Ocean Tomo: Building a Market for Intellectual Property

Andrei Hagiu; Peter A. Coles; Alison Berkley Wagonfeld


Archive | 2016

ENHANCED SUPPLY AND DEMAND TOOL

Wilson Pang; James Lane; Jaime Colmenares; Uwe F. Mayer; Gyanit Singh; Ravi Tiwari; Peter A. Coles; Dominic Coey


Archive | 2014

Market Design in Online Businesses (Abridged)

Peter A. Coles; Benjamin Edelman

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Alexey I. Kushnir

Carnegie Mellon University

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