Peter Chalk

Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements

Abstract : State support or sponsorship of an insurgency as an instrument of foreign policy was common during the Cold War. The United States, the Soviet Union, and a host of regional powers backed their favored proxies, often transforming local quarrels into international contests. The end of the Cold War did not end the use of insurgents, but the dimensions and nature of outside aid and the identity of the providers have changed significantly. Hundreds of millions of dollars no longer regularly flow from Washingtons and Moscows coffers. Leading state sponsors today such as Iran, Rwanda, Angola, and Pakistan, for example, devote far smaller amounts of money and resources to their proxies. Indeed, state support is no longer the only, or necessarily the most important, game in town. Diasporas have played a particularly important role in sustaining several strong insurgencies. More rarely, refugees, guerrilla groups, or other types of non-state supporters play a significant role in creating or sustaining an insurgency, offering fighters, training, or other important forms of support. This report analyzes these changes in the nature of outside support for insurgencies starting with the end of the Cold War. It describes the nature and motivations of state backers and examines the role of diasporas, refugees, and other non-state supporters of insurgencies. The report concludes by assessing which forms of outside support are most important and also offers implications for the analysis of insurgency today.

Trends in Terrorism, Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act

Abstract : The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was crafted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks after the insurance industry, stung by

The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s

32 billion in damage claims (by current estimates) and fearing another attack of equal magnitude, began to exclude terrorism coverage from policies. The legislation requires insurance companies to make terrorism insurance available to customers and, in return, provides federal reinsurance (a backstop) for losses from terrorist attacks. It is intended to give insurers time to assess their exposure to terrorism risk and to consider how to price and underwrite the risk. TRIA is set to expire at the end of December 2005. TRIA embodies federal policy that a private insurance market will provide the foundation of the financial recovery from future terrorist attacks. It also recognizes that since the risk is unfamiliar to the industry, federal government assistance should, at least in the short run, be made available to support this market. In this book, we examine whether this policy and, in particular, the architecture of TRIA provide robust protection against the threat of losses from future attacks. By robust, we ask specifically whether the structure of TRIA is in line with the fundamental qualities of the risk of terrorism and with likely evolving trends in this threat. The focus of the analysis is on developments that have relevance for terrorist attacks taking place within the borders of the continental United States and the extent to which they are addressed (or not) by the TRIA framework.

Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia

Far from being made redundant by the end of the Cold War, terrorism remains the favoured instrument of the extreme and politically disaffected. Indeed in many ways, the practice has become even more complex, multifaceted and lethal. It continues to affect many regions of the world, particularly in the third world, repeatedly demonstrating its ability to undermine the normal course of socio-political interaction. In chronically affected states such as Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Algeria it is, arguably, one of the most important contributing factors to the wholesale breakdown of effective societal functioning. The use of terrorism has also widened in the 1990s, devolving down to the level of the amateur and part-timer. As the 1995 Oklahoma bombing vividly demonstrated, this type of ad hoc terrorism can be just as effective and deadly as that carried out by more established, professional groups. Finally, as a mode of violence, terrorism has become progressively more violent and extreme, appearing, in certain instances, to be almost an end in itself (rather than a rational and limited means to an end). All of this suggests a disquieting trajectory for the future, not least in terms of the ultimate Armageddon scenario of a major act of mass destruction terrorism. It is certainly unfortunate that just as the international system is approaching the end of the millennium and all the apocalyptic connotations this implies, terrorism has come of age as a threat which, while somewhat vague about its long term aims, is utterly ruthless in its short term intentions (Hoffman 1998:204-5).

West European terrorism and counter-terrorism : the evolving dynamic

Building the capacity of Afghan special operations forces (SOF) is a key goal of the United States and its coalition partners. In February and March of 2013, RAND analysts conducted extensive battlefield circulations in Afghanistan and visited multiple training sites for Afghan SOF. The mentors at these sites hailed from a variety of International Security Assistance Force contributing nations, including the United States, Lithuania, Romania, Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom. This report summarizes key partnering practices across these international partners and presents findings from SOF partnership case studies in Iraq and Colombia. The goal is to identify best practices for SOF partnership that can benefit the development of the Afghan special operations capability. These best practices also have broader applicability for special operations partnerships beyond Afghanistan.