Peter G. Klein

Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and the Resource-Based View: Towards a New Synthesis

This paper maintains that the consistent application of subjectivism helps to reconcile contemporary entrepreneurship theory with strategic management research in general, and the resource-based view in particular. The paper synthesizes theoretical insights from Austrian economics and Penroses (1959) resources approach, arguing that entrepreneurship is inherently subjective and firm specific. This new synthesis describes how entrepreneurship is manifested in teams, and is driven by both heterogeneity of managerial mental models and shared team experiences.

Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of the Firm: Any Gains from Trade?

Although they have developed very much in isolation from each other, we argue the theory of entrepreneurship and the economic theory of the firm are closely related, and each has much to learn from the other. In particular, the notion of entrepreneurship as judgment associated with Frank Knight and some Austrian school economists aligns naturally with the theory of the firm. In this perspective, the entrepreneur needs a firm, that is, a set of alienable assets he controls, to carry out his function. We further show how this notion of judgment adds to the key themes in the modern theory of the firm (i.e., the existence, boundaries, and internal organization). In our approach, resource uses are not data, but are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods. The entrepreneur’s decision problem is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heterogeneous. Asset ownership facilitates experimenting entrepreneurship: Acquiring a bundle of property rights is a low cost means of carrying out commercial experimentation. In this approach, the existence of the firm may be understood in terms of limits to the market for judgment relating to novel uses of heterogeneous assets; and the boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of internal organization, may be understood as being responsive to entrepreneurial processes of experimentation.

The Entrepreneurial Organization of Heterogeneous Capital

Transaction cost, property rights, and resource-based approaches to the firm assume that assets, both tangible and intangible, are heterogeneous. Arranging these assets to minimize contractual hazards, to provide efficient investment incentives, or to exploit competitive advantage is conceived as the prime task of economic organization. None of these approaches, however, is based on a systematic theory of capital heterogeneity. In this paper we outline the approach to capital developed by the Austrian school of economics and show how Austrian capital theory provides a natural bridge between theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm. We refine Austrian capital theory by defining capital heterogeneity in terms of subjectively perceived attributes, the functions, characteristics, and uses of capital assets. Such attributes are not given, but have to be created or discovered by means of entrepreneurial action. Conceiving entrepreneurship as the organization of heterogeneous capital provides new insights into the emergence, boundaries, and internal organization of the firm, and suggests testable implications about how entrepreneurship is manifested.

The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A Stocktaking and Assessment

Ever since its emergence in the 1970s the modern economic or Coasian theory of the firm has been discussed and challenged by sociologists, heterodox economists, management scholars, and other critics. This chapter reviews and assesses these critiques, focusing on behavioral issues (bounded rationality and motivation), process (including path dependence and the selection argument), entrepreneurship, and the challenge from knowledge-based theories of the firm.

Original and Derived Judgment: An Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic Organization

Recent work links entrepreneurship to the economic theory of firm using the Knightian concept of entrepreneurship as judgment. When judgment is complementary to other assets, and these assets or their services are traded in well-functioning markets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to hire labor and own assets. The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his control. We extend this Knightian concept of the firm by developing a theory of delegation under Knightian uncertainty. What we call original judgment belongs exclusively to owners, but owners may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees “proxy-entrepreneurs,” and ask how the firm’s organizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating performance, and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy-entrepreneurship that increase firm value while discouraging actions that destroy value. Building on key ideas from the

Organizational Issues in the Agrifood Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach

This paper outlines a research program comparing the economic organization of agriculture in the United States and European Union. Both have highly developed agricultural sectors but their organizational arrangements vary widely. Comparative analysis not only provides a broad set of firms and industries to compare, but also highlights the interaction between the institutional environment and the arrangements established to govern agricultural transactions. We first assess the common trend toward consolidation and vertical integration, turning next to the economic organization of formal and informal networks. While history and path dependence explain some of the variety among U.S. and European practices, other local conditions are important as well. We conclude by assessing the policy implications of recent changes in economic organization.

Economic calculation and the limits of organization

ConclusionThe purpose of this paper has been to highlight some Austrian contributions to the theory of the firm and to suggest directions for future research along the same lines. In particular, Rothbards argument about the need for markets in intermediate goods, and how that places limits on the scale and scope of the organization, deserves further development. This may be a more fruitful exercise than some work in the alternative Austrian traditions.

Can Entrepreneurship Be Taught

Is entrepreneurship an innate ability or an acquired skill? Can entrepreneurship acumen be achieved and enhanced through education and training, or are certain people “born” to be entrepreneurs or to act entrepreneurially? Economists and management theorists give widely divergent answers to these questions. This paper reviews the major approaches to teaching entrepreneurship, primarily at the undergraduate level, and relates them to economic theories of entrepreneurship. Surprisingly, we find little connection between the leading approaches to entrepreneurship education and economists’ understanding of the entrepreneurial function. We assess likely explanations for the lack of contact between these two groups of scholars and suggest possible improvements.

Heterogeneous Resources and the Financial Crisis: Implications of Strategic Management Theory

Macroeconomic theory assumes that factors of production in the economy are homogeneous and fungible. As a result, it is poorly suited for analyzing and developing policy responses to the recent financial crisis. Theories of strategic management and organization, with their emphasis on heterogeneous resources and capabilities, are better positioned. We provide examples of how macroeconomic theory may lead policies astray, and how theories of strategic management provide insight into the nature and causes of the financial crisis and the appropriate policy response.

Politics and Productivity

We use a stochastic frontier approach to study the effects of political and regulatory institutions on aggregate productivity in 39 countries from 1975 to 1990. We show that technical efficiency is positively related to policies supporting laissez-faire and political structures that promote policy stability. Moreover, models of technical efficiency incorporating both measures perform better than models including only one or the other. This suggests that economic performance depends not only on current policies but also on the confidence of market participants and outside investors that these policies will remain in place. (JEL O40, O30, H10, N40, D23) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.